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[T]he process of plea bargaining is not one which any student of the subject
regards as an ornament to our system of justice.
Justice William H. Rehnquist"
The present state of affairs was brought about by willingness to reduce
standards of justice to conform to the resources made available for its ad-
ministration. I suggest the time has come for the judiciary to start moving
in the other direction, and to insist on a return to first principles as quickly
as possible.
Justice Charles L. Levin2
Those who predict disaster for our criminal courts system if we cease plea
bargaining are really saying that the courts cannot provide a jury trial for
all those who have a right to trial. If this assessment were true, then the
courts should declare themselves bankrupt.... But I do not believe the
* The preparation of this article was supported by Grant No. 79-NI-AX-0101 of the
National Institute of Justice and by a Chicago Bar Foundation Fellowship at the Center for
Studies in Criminal Justice of the University of Chicago Law School. I am grateful to the
staff of the Institute and to Richard B. Collins, John H. Langbein, Mark Lowenstein, Norval
Morris, Robert F. Nagel, William T. Pizzi, Stephen J. Schulhofer, Welsh S. White, Stephen
F. Williams, and Franklin E. Zimring for their encouragement and valuable suggestions. Of
course, the opinions and conclusions expressed in this article are simply my own.
t Professor of Law, University of Colorado.
2 Peterson, A Bad Bargain, TRL, May-June 1973, at 16, 16.
2 People v. Byrd, 12 Mich. App. 186, 223, 162 N.W.2d 777, 797 (1968) (Levin, J.,
concurring).
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courts system will collapse under the weight of too many trials if we aban-
don plea bargaining.
Judge Arthur L. Alarcons
In a series of articles, I have suggested some of the defects of
plea bargaining.4 The task has been lengthy, for plea bargaining
has come to affect almost every aspect of our criminal justice sys-
tem from the legislative drafting of substantive offenses 5 through
the efforts of correctional officials to rehabilitate convicted
offenders.
Even a cursory listing of objections to this practice may con-
sume several paragraphs. Plea bargaining makes a substantial part
of an offender's sentence depend, not upon what he did or his per-
sonal characteristics, but upon a tactical decision irrelevant to any
proper objective of criminal proceedings.1 In contested cases, it
substitutes a regime of split-the-difference for a judicial determi-
nation of guilt or innocence and elevates a concept of partial guilt
above the requirement that criminal responsibility be established
beyond a reasonable doubt.8 This practice also deprecates the
value of human liberty and the purposes of the criminal sanction
by treating these things as commodities to be traded for economic
savings-savings that, when measured against common social ex-
penditures, usually seem minor2
3 Alarcon, Court Reform Would Solve the Problem, L.A. Times, Nov. 9, 1975, § 8, at 5,
coL 4.
4 Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CALIF. L. Rxv. 652 (1981) [here-
inafter cited as The Changing Debate]; Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79
COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as History]; Alsehuler, The Trial Judge's Role in
Plea Bargaining (pt. 1), 76 COLUM. L. Rpv. 1059 (1976) [hereinafter cited as The Trial
Judge's Role]; Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. Cm. L. Rev. 50
(1968) [hereinafter cited as The Prosecutor's Role]; Alschuler, The Supreme Court, the De-
fense Attorney, and the Guilty Plea, 47 U. COLO. L. REv. 1 (1975) [hereinafter cited as The
Supreme Court]; Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial Power: A Critique of Re-
cent Proposals for "Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 550 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Sentencing Reform]; Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea
Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179 (1975) [hereinafter cited as The Defense Attorney's Role];
Alschuler, Book Review, 12 CRIM. L. BULL. 629 (1976); Alschuler, Book Review, 66 LAw
LiBR. J. 122 (1973); Alschuler, Book Review, 46 U. CHI. L. RFv. 1007 (1979) (reviewing C.
SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1978)) [hereinafter cited as SILBERMAN
Book Review].
5 See The Trial Judge's Role, supra note 4, at 1145-46.
6 See J. BENNETT, OF PRISONS AND JUSTICE 124, 364-65 (1964); U.S. PRnsmzNr's
COMM'N ON CRIME IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, FINAL REPORT 253-54 (1966) (statement of
William E. Carr, Director, D.C. Dep't of Corrections); SILBERMAN Book Review, supra note
4, at 1041.
*See The Changing Debate, supra note 4, at 652-83.
* See id. at 703-07.
* See id. at 670-80.
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Plea bargaining leads lawyers to view themselves as judges and
administrators rather than as advocates; it subjects them to serious
financial and other temptations to disregard their clients' interests;
and it diminishes the confidence in attorney-client relationships
that can give dignity and purpose to the legal profession and that
is essential to the defendant's sense of fair treatment.10 In addi-
tion, this practice makes figureheads of court officials who typically
prepare elaborate presentence reports only after the effective de-
termination of sentence through prosecutorial negotiations.11 In-
deed, it tends to make figureheads of judges, whose power over the
administration of criminal justice has largely been transferred to
people of less experience, who commonly lack the information that
judges could secure, whose temperaments have been shaped by
their partisan duties, and who have not been charged by the elec-
torate with the important responsibilities that they have as-
sumed. 12 Moreover, plea bargaining perverts both the initial
prosecutorial formulation of criminal chargess and, as defendants
plead guilty to crimes less serious than those that they apparently
committed, the final judicial labeling of offenses.
The negotiation process encourages defendants to believe that
they have "'sold a commodity and that [they have], in a sense,
gotten away with something.' "11 It sometimes promotes percep-
tions of corruption. 16 It has led the Supreme Court to a hypocriti-
cal disregard of its usual standards of waiver in judging the most
pervasive waiver that our criminal justice system permits.17 The
practice of plea bargaining is inconsistent with the principle that a
10 See The Defense Attorney's Role, supra note 4, at 1180, 1241, 1307-13.
" See The Trial Judge's Role, supra note 4, at 1117. A probation officer in Alaska
described the frustration that she and her colleagues had experienced prior to the prohibi-
tion of plea bargaining by that state's Attorney General:
When we began to interview a defendant in order to prepare a presentence report, he
would tell us what sentence he was going to get. And the defendant was always right.
Even when we discovered significant new facts that the prosecutor and defense attor-
ney hadn't known about at the time they struck their bargain, the judge disregarded
them.
Interview with Karen Rogers, Probation-Parole Office of the Alaska Division of Corrections,
in Juneau (June 22, 1976).
" See The Trial Judge's Role, supra note 4, at 1063-67.
13 See The Prosecutor's Role, supra note 4, at 85-105.
" See The Trial Judge's Role, supra note 4, at 1141-42.
' SILBERMAN Book Review, supra note 4, at 1041 (quoting interview with J. Eugene
Pincham, Private Defense Attorney, in Chicago (Dec. 15, 1967)).
" See The Defense Attorney's Role, supra note 4, at 1197 n.55.
17 See The Supreme Court, supra note 4, at 68-69; Halberstam, Toward Neutral Prin-
ciples in the Administration of Criminal Justice: A Critique of Supreme Court Decisions
Sanctioning the Plea Bargaining Process, 73 J. CriM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1982).
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decent society should want to hear what an accused person might
say in his defense-and with constitutional guarantees that em-
body this principle and other professed ideals for the resolution of
criminal disputes.18 Moreover, plea bargaining has undercut the
goals of legal doctrines as diverse as the fourth amendment exclu-
sionary rule,1 the insanity defense, 20 the right of confrontation,21
the defendant's right to attend criminal proceedings, 22 and the re-
cently announced right of the press and the public to observe the
administration of criminal justice.28 This easy instrument of ac-
commodation has frustrated both attempts at sentencing reform24
and some of the most important objectives of the due process
revolution.25
Plea bargaining provides extraordinary opportunities for lazy
lawyers whose primary goal is to cut corners and to get on to the
next case;26 it increases the likelihood of favoritism and personal
influence;27 it conceals other abuses;2 it maximizes the dangers of
representation by inexperienced attorneys who are not fully versed
in an essentially secret system of justice;29 it promotes inequali-
ties; 0 it sometimes results in unwarranted leniency;31 it merges the
tasks of adjudication, sentencing, and administration into a single
amorphous judgment to the detriment of all three;32 it treats al-
most every legal right as a bargaining chip to be traded for a dis-
count in sentence; 3 and it almost certainly increases the number
of innocent defendants who are convicted." In short, an effort to
describe comprehensively the evils that plea bargaining has
wrought requires an extensive tour of the criminal justice system.
IS See The Changing Debate, supra note 4, at 677; The Supreme Court, supra note 4,
at 63-65.
" See The Changing Debate, supra note 4, at 711-13; The Prosecutor's Role, supra
note 4, at 82-83.
10 See The Prosecutor's Role, supra note 4, at 72-75.
2' See The Trial Judge's Role, supra note 4, at 1127 n.226.
" See id. at 1134-36.
23 See The Changing Debate, supra note 4, at 719-20.
, See Sentencing Reform, supra note 4, at 563-77.
" See History, supra note 4, at 37-40.
2 See The Changing Debate, supra note 4, at 690-92.
17 See The Prosecutor's Role, supra note 4, at 71, 79-80, 94, 106; The Defense Attor-
ney's Role, supra note 4, at 1219-24, 1237-40.
18 See The Prosecutor's Role, supra note 4, at 66-68.
29 See The Defense Attorney's Role, supra note 4, at 1268-70.
3' See, e.g., The Changing Debate, supra note 4, at 653, 657-58.
31 See SILBERMAN Book Review, supra note 4, at 1022-23.
32 See The Prosecutor's Role, supra note 4, at 52-53.
3 See The Changing Debate, supra note 4, at 657.
" See id. at 713-16.
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This is an article about exorcism. However unjust plea bar-
gaining may seem, it has become fashionable to contend that the
process is inevitable. Indeed, scholars and practitioners proclaim
that "to speak of a plea bargaining-free criminal justice system is
to operate in a land of fantasy. 3 5 They advance two arguments in
support of this contention. First, they emphasize the extent of the
demon's possession. In view of the overwhelming number of cases
that currently are resolved by guilty pleas,38 they maintain that
providing the economic resources necessary to implement the right
to trial would be impracticable; their view apparently is that our
nation cannot afford to give its criminal defendants their day in
court.87 Second, they suggest that in view of the mutuality of ad-
vantage that prosecutors and defense attorneys are likely to per-
ceive in the settlement of criminal cases, any attempt to prohibit
this process would be countered by widespread subterfuge. In prac-
tice, they argue, the only choice is between a system of negotiated
case resolution that is open, honest, and subject to effective regula-
tion and one that has been driven underground."'
This article responds to these contentions and explores a
range of reforms that might be implemented within the American
33 M. HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING 162 (1978).
36 It is commonly estimated that 90% of all criminal convictions in the United States
are by pleas of guilty. Cramer, Rossman & McDonald, The Judicial Role in Plea-Bargain-
ing, in PLEA BARGAINING 139, 139 (W. McDonald & J. Cramer eds. 1980).
'7 See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971) (plea bargaining is an
"essential component of the administration of justice .... If every charge were subjected
to a full-scale trial, the states and federal government would need to multiply by many
times the number of judges and court facilities."); People v. Griffith, 43 A.D.2d 20, 22, 349
N.Y.S.2d 94, 97 (1973) (elimination of plea bargaining would result in "total breakdown" of
the courts' operations); M. MAYER, THE LAwYERs 159 (1967) ("If even one percent of [the
defendants arraigned in Manhattan] were actually to proceed to full-fledged trial, the sys-
tem would break down instantly."); Arenella, Reforming the Federal Grand Jury and the
State Preliminary Hearing to Prevent Conviction Without Adjudication, 78 MICH. L. REv.
463, 524 (1980) ("the criminal justice system would collapse"); Welch, Settling Criminal
Cases, LGATION, Winter 1980, at 32, 32 ("our court system would be crushed by the
caseload"); White, A Proposal for Reform of the Plea Bargaining Process, 119 U. PA. L.
REv. 439, 440 (1971) ("Removal of the incentive to plead guilty would place an intolerable
strain on the system."); George, Book Review, 65 MICH. L. Rv. 815, 817 (1967) ("It is futile
to talk of abolishing [plea bargaining and judicial acquittals] unless we prefer the alterna-
tive of complete breakdown of the system.").
3 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIm. P. 11(e)(6) advisory committee note; Gifford, Meaningful
Reform of Plea Bargaining: The Control of Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983 U. ILL. L. REv.
37, 74 n.10, 96; Rosett, The Negotiated Guilty Plea, 374 ANNALS 70, 74 (1967); The Su-
preme Court, 1978 Term, 93 HARv. L. REv. 60, 81 (1979); Simon, Judge Explains Why He
Backs Open Plea Bargaining System, Chicago Sun-Times, Jan. 15, 1975, at 8, col. 1 (state-
ment of Judge Richard J. Fitzgerald: "[B]y necessity plea bargaining will always be with us.
... If they passed a law saying you can't have it, you'd still have it secretly because it
simply exists.").
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criminal justice system to end an unjust practice. Part I examines
one obvious solution to today's excessive dependency on the guilty
plea-spending the money necessary to implement our constitu-
tional ideals without shortcuts. Focusing first on felony prosecu-
tions, it argues that the United States could provide three-day jury
trials to all felony defendants who reach the trial stage by adding
no more than an estimated $850 million to annual criminal justice
expenditures. Moreover, it contends that the actual cost of imple-
menting a plea bargaining prohibition would be less than this
amount, in part because most cases now resolved through plea bar-
gaining could be tried in less than three days and, even more im-
portantly, because many defendants would plead guilty without
bargaining. The article then turns to misdemeanor prosecutions
and proposes a short-form nontrial procedure modeled after the
West German penal order. It argues that this procedure could per-
mit the prohibition both of explicit plea bargaining and of implicit
sentencing concessions for pleas of guilty without any significant
increase in the amount that Americans now spend on misdemeanor
justice. Part I ends by discussing the enforcement of a plea bar-
gaining prohibition, contending that although evasions of this pro-
hibition might not be suppressed altogether, they could be kept
within tolerable limits.
Part II takes a different approach. It examines the relation-
ship between the complexity of our trial procedures and our plea
bargaining practices, and it describes some reforms that might per-
mit the termination of plea bargaining even in felony cases without
an increase in resources. This part notes initially both that the An-
glo-American legal system afforded defendants an unfettered right
to trial during most of its history and that most legal systems of
the world apparently survive without plea bargaining today. Nev-
ertheless, every legal system that has managed without plea bar-
gaining has employed a much more expeditious trial procedure
than ours. After a brief review of our own history and a more ex-
tensive description of current practices in other nations, the article
considers how American trial procedures might be simplified in the
interest of making trials more available to defendants who want
them. The article argues that, contrary to common understanding,
the federal Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court
would not preclude the substitution of mixed tribunals of profes-
sional and lay judges for criminal juries in state court proceedings.
It discusses additional innovations that might accompany this re-
form, some of them controversial and perhaps even startling, but
worthy of serious consideration even apart from their facilitation
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of a plea bargaining prohibition.
Recognizing that reconsideration of the right to jury trial and
of other central facets of American trial procedure is unlikely in
the foreseeable future, the article also discusses a number of less
sweeping proposals that already have some currency in the Ameri-
can legal system. It notes that each of these reforms could conserve
substantial resources that might be used to implement the right to
trial.
Finally, the article suggests that a less restrictive form of bar-
gaining could be substituted for plea bargaining-bargaining for
waiver of the right to jury trial but not for waiver of the right to
trial before a court. Analysis of this alternative begins with a
description of practices in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, where to a
large extent this substitution has occurred. A concluding section
suggests that this "jury waiver bargaining" could be coupled with
sentencing guidelines in an effort to treat together two issues that
merit unified treatment, sentencing reform and plea negotiation.39
I. MATCHING THE REALITY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE TO
CONSTITUTIONAL IDEALS
A. Toward Full Implementation of the Right to Jury Trial in Fel-
ony Cases
The frequent claim that our nation cannot afford to provide
jury trials to all defendants who want them and are entitled to
them is unattractive. Chief Justice Burger wrote in 1971, "An afflu-
ent society ought not be miserly in support of justice, for economy
is not an objective of the system."' 0 The Chief Justice earlier had
said, "No one should challenge any expense to afford a defendant
full due process and his full measure of days in court."41 Moreover,
the Supreme Court has said that "the Constitution recognizes
higher values than speed and efficiency,' 42 that to "'secure greater
speed, economy, and convenience in the administration of the law
at the price of fundamental principles"' is to pay too high a
' Among the sources relied upon in this article are interviews with prosecutors, defense
attorneys, trial judges, academics, and other observers of the criminal justice system. State-
ments that appear in quotation marks are not always exact quotations. I have attempted to
recreate in a concise, readable, and accurate way what the persons I interviewed told me.
My paraphrasing has rarely been extensive, and I hope and believe that it has retained both
the substance and the style of the men and women with whom I talked.
" Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 201 (1971) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
4' Burger, "No Man Is an Island," 56 A.B.A. J. 325, 325 (1970).
4' Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972) (footnote omitted).
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price,43 that "[c]ongestion in the courts cannot justify a legal rule
that produces unjust results,"" and that "administrative conven-
ience alone is insufficient to make valid what otherwise is a viola-
tion of due process of law."'45
Those who assert this idealistic and undoubtedly excessive po-
sition seem to tremble, however, when they confront some per-
ceived realities of the plea bargaining process. Chief Justice Bur-
ger, for example, said of America's lopsided dependency on the
guilty plea:
The consequence of what might seem on its face a small per-
centage change in the rate of guilty pleas can be tremendous.
A reduction from 90 per cent to 80 per cent in guilty pleas
requires the assignment of twice the judicial manpower and
facilities-judges, court reporters, bailiffs, clerks, jurors and
courtrooms. A reduction to 70 per cent trebles this demand.46
Although the Chief Justice's analysis has been often re-
peated,41 in some respects it is fallacious. It is commonly estimated
that 90% of all criminal convictions in America are by guilty
plea,48 but guilty pleas do not occur in anything close to 90% of all
criminal prosecutions. One federally sponsored study of thirteen
state court jurisdictions reported, for example, that guilty pleas ac-
counted for 85% of the convictions in cases commenced by felony
arrests but for only 53% of the dispositions of filed cases. 49 Some-
what surprisingly, cases that end in dismissal appear to be more
costly to the criminal justice system than cases that end either in
guilty pleas or in nonjury trials.50 The Chief Justice's projection of
43 Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968) (quoting People v. Fisher, 249 N.Y.
419, 432, 164 N.E. 336, 341 (1928) (Lehman, J., dissenting)).
44 United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 408 (1975).
4 Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Lafleur, 414 U.S. 632, 647 (1974) (footnote omitted).
46 Burger, The State of the Judiciary-1970, 56 A.B.A. J. 929, 931 (1970).
47 See, e.g., Arenella, supra note'37, at 524; Parnas & Atkins, Abolishing Plea Bargain-
ing: A Proposal, 14 CRIM. L. BuLL. 101, 117 (1978).
48 See supra note 36.
49 K. BROSI, A CROss-CmTy COMPARISON OF FELONY CASE PROCESSING 35 (1979) (percent-
ages derived from aggregate of the individual jurisdictions shown).
a o A dismissal commonly occurs after a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence or
after some other judicial proceeding. A study based on California data found that the cost to
the Superior Court of a case dismissed before trial or transferred to another jurisdiction was
$1444. Although lower than the cost of a case that ended in a jury trial ($1772), this cost was
greater than the cost of a case resolved by a nonjury trial ($844) or by a plea of guilty
($250). D. Weller & M. Block, Estimating the Cost of Judicial Services 6, 8 (May 1979)
(unpublished technical report CERDCR-1-79 of the Center for Econometric Studies of the
Justice System of the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, on file with The University
of Chicago Law Review). See also Castillo, New York Courts Found to Lag in Focusing on
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what increases in criminal justice expenditures would be necessary
if plea bargaining were reduced neglected the very significant re-
sources consumed by the many cases that do not end in
conviction."1
Moreover, even when one focuses only on those cases that end
in conviction, the Chief Justice's assertion that a reduction in the
rate of guilty pleas from ninety to eighty percent would require a
doubling of manpower and facilities apparently rested on the as-
sumption that the plea bargaining system consumes only negligible
resources. In reality, the bargaining process leads to substantial ex-
penditures of resources, many of which seem difficult to justify in a
supposedly overburdened system.
The bargaining process has increasingly been surrounded by
time-consuming courtroom rituals whose function seems more the
appeasement of troubled consciences than any genuine safeguard-
ing of the quality of guilty plea justice.52 Moreover, plea bargaining
has led defense attorneys to file absurd pretrial motions simply be-
cause "it takes time to refute even a bad contention" and "every
motion added to the pile helps secure a better plea."' s It has led
prosecutors to inflate and multiply criminal charges so that, when
defendants refuse to yield, trials are lengthy and complex." This
Dangerous Crime, N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1980, § 1, at 1, col. 1 to 28, col. 2 ("The city's
criminal justice system spends more-$945--in processing an arrest that results in a dismis-
sal, than in processing an arrest resulting in imprisonment... The cost of the latter, on the
average, is $877.").
"l These cases include not only prosecutions that are dismissed before trial, see supra
note 50, but also cases of acquittal at trial that obviously consume substantial resources.
52 1 have observed half-hour and 45-minute guilty plea proceedings in which defendants
have been instructed about some aspects of criminal procedure that I do not discuss in a full
semester course on that subject. The defendants have been advised of their right to chal-
lenge the jurisdiction of the court, of their right to challenge jurors for cause, of their right
to peremptory challenges, of the fact that juries must be unanimous to convict, of the fact
that juries must be unanimous to acquit, and so on (and on). The defendants have been
asked to affirm after each advisement that they understand it. It generally is regarded as
coercive for a trial judge to tell a guilty plea defendant the thing that he most wants to
know-the sentence that will follow his plea. See The Trial Judge's Role, supra note 4, at
1087-91, 1103-08. Nevertheless, judges routinely tell guilty plea defendants many things that
they do not want to know at all.
Professor Stephen J. Schulhofer has estimated on the basis of Philadelphia data that
the entry and acceptance of a guilty plea consumes about 55 minutes of courtroom time
(with both waiting time and processing time included); this figure excludes the courtroom
time devoted to preliminary hearings, hearings on motions, and delayed sentencing proceed-
ings in guilty plea cases. S. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable? 55-60 (April 14, 1983)
(unpublished manuscript on file with The University of Chicago Law Review; forthcoming
in 97 HARv. L. lav. - (Mar. 1984)).
83 The Prosecutor's Role, supra note 4, at 56.
"Id. at 104.
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process often has led to vacant courtrooms as defendants, for both
strategic and psychological reasons, have delayed their acceptance
of prosecutorial offers until shortly before their cases were sched-
uled to be tried. It has led, in addition, to frequent court recesses
for the purpose of facilitating negotiations. Finally, plea negotia-
tions themselves may be prolonged, may be characterized by ban-
ter and psychological ploys, and may consume substantial
resources.
55
With all of its rituals and delays, the bargaining process is no
masterpiece of efficiency. A recent study of the effects of Alaska's
plea bargaining prohibition reported a thirty-seven percent in-
crease in the number of trials and, at the same time, a substantial
decrease in the time between the filing of felony charges and their
final disposition." Although in Anchorage this change might have
been attributable in part to personnel changes and to a new calen-
daring system, similar phenomena were observed in Fairbanks and
Juneau. The study concluded that this reduced delay in the dispo-
sition of cases might be explained primarily by a reduction in the
dilatory tactics that plea bargaining had encouraged.5 7
In seeking the resources needed to implement the right to jury
trial, one might begin with the substantial resources now devoted
to plea bargaining gamesmanship. Still, even if Chief Justice Bur-
ger's estimates are discounted substantially, the high rate of guilty
pleas in America may make the prospect of affording jury trials to
all defendants who want them seem almost unthinkable.5 8
This prospect becomes less unthinkable, however, when one
recognizes how limited the current resources are. In my home juris-
diction, Boulder County, Colorado, with a population of 190,000, a
single judge conducts all trials, hearings on motions, and guilty
plea proceedings in felony cases.59 In nearby Denver, with a popu-
65 The Trial Judge's Role, supra note 4, at 1132 n.237.
so M. RuniNsmN, S. CLARKE & T. WHIrE, AL~sKA BANs PLEA BARGAINING 151, 274 (Ta-
ble 11-2) (1980).
• Id. at 105-06.
Nevertheless, Professor Stephen J. Schulhofer has argued that if nonjury trials were
afforded to defendants who now plead guilty, a reduction of the guilty plea rate from 90 to
80% would not require anything close to a doubling of current resources. Instead, this ap-
parently dramatic change might require less than a 2.8% increase in judicial capacity. S.
Schulhofer, supra note 52, at 157-159B.
so BuREAu OF THE CENsus, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERcE, STATE AND METROPOLITAN AREA
DATA BOOK 1982, at 68 (1982) (189,625 people). The statistics given in this paragraph for the
number of judges serving these various areas were obtained through telephone calls to court
personnel in 1981.
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lation of approximately one-half million, 0 five judges are responsi-
ble for the conduct of felony proceedings. The city of San Fran-
cisco, California, has just over two-thirds of a million people,"1 but
four judges in San Francisco hear felony cases on a full-time basis
while two others hear felony cases part-time. In 1981, Indianapolis,
Indiana, with almost three-quarters of a million people,62 had only
two judges hearing felony cases.
A doubling, a tripling, or even a quadrupling of the resources
now devoted to felony prosecutions therefore might require one,
two, or three additional judges in counties like Boulder; two, four,
or six additional judges in a city like Indianapolis; and five, ten, or
fifteen additional judges in cities like Denver and San Francisco.
Even when the necessary additions in physical plant, support per-
sonnel, jurors, prosecutors, and defense attorneys are considered,
this sort of investment need not inspire panic.63 Indeed, in almost
every American jurisdiction, a multiplication several times over of
the resources devoted to the resolution of felony cases apparently
would require no more than the building and staffing of one new
courthouse. This task might be about as burdensome as the build-
ing and staffing of a new high school; it would be less burdensome
than providing a new hospital. If the need were in medicine or edu-
cation, however, responsible citizens would at least talk about
meeting it. They would not insist that "practical necessity" re-
quired bargaining with patients to waive their operations or with
students to waive their classes.
Although the current era is marked by taxpayer rebellion and
a retrenchment in government services, Americans are seriously
concerned about crime." They are so concerned that an over-
40 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 21 (Table 24) (102d ed. 1981) (491,000 people).
*' Id. (679,000 people).
42 Id.
63 Whether sufficient legal manpower is available to implement a plea bargaining prohi-
bition is obviously a different question from whether sufficient funds are available. Never-
theless, at a time when law school enrollments have grown more substantially than the de-
mand for legal services, so that many qualified law school graduates are unable to secure
employment as lawyers, any manpower concerns that a plea bargaining prohibition might
raise seem surmountable. Moreover, a nation that uses lawyers in welfare termination hear-
ings and many other nontraditional settings, see, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270-
71 (1970), should be able to find enough lawyers to perform the more basic legal functions of
prosecuting and defending criminal cases.
" See, e.g., BUREAU OF JusTIcE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT OF JusTIcE, SoURCFBOOK OF
CamimAL JUSTICE STATIsTIcs-1980, at 178 (Table 2.14) (1981) (92% of the respondents to a
Harris survey taken in 1978 regarded controlling crime as "very important in making the
quality of life better in this country"--a greater proportion than regarded "achieving quali-
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whelming majority of the respondents in one Gallup poll reported
that they would support increased expenditures to deal with this
problem. 5 Nevertheless, Americans now spend approximately $13
billion each year for police protection, more than four times as
much as they spend for judicial services in both civil and criminal
cases.e6 A relatively slight reallocation of today's crime-fighting
dollars or a slight overall increase in the total crime-fighting
budget probably would be sufficient to implement the right to jury
trial in felony cases. Indeed, the necessary expenditure might
prove cost effective even if judged solely in economic terms. One
econometrician has estimated that each additional dollar expended
on the criminal courts would reduce the current costs of crime by
somewhere between five and eleven dollars.6 7 He has suggested
that an optimal American criminal court system, judged only in
terms of its crime reduction efficiency, would be triple its current
size."8 One need not have great faith in this analysis to recognize at
least the possibility that greater expenditures on the criminal
courts could be offset to some extent by resulting gains in crime
control.69
It might be instructive to estimate roughly the costs of abol-
ishing plea negotiation in felony cases throughout America. One
significant difficulty in calculating this estimate, however, is that
the effect of a plea bargaining prohibition on guilty plea rates is
ty education for children," "conserving energy," or any of the other items included in the
survey with the same level of concern).
65 See Justice on Trial-A Special Report, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 8, 1971, at 16, 43 (Gallup
poll "found fully 83% of Americans reconciled to the notion of putting more money into the
[crime] problem").
66 BUREAU OF JUSTCE STATISTICS, supra note 64, at 4, (Table 1.3) (in 1979, federal,
state, and local governments spent $13.1 billion on police protection and $3.1 billion for
judicial services in civil and criminal cases).
67 E. Noam, A Cost-Benefit Model of Criminal Courts 11 (Rev. ed. July 1980) (unpub-
lished manuscript on file with The University of Chicago Law Review) [hereipafter cited as
Cost-Benefit Model]. See also E. Noam, The Criminal Justice System: An Economic Analy-
sis of Benefits and Interrelationships (1975) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis in the Department of
Economics, Harvard University) [hereinafter cited as Economic Analysis].
" Economic Analysis, supra note 67, at 7. The same scholar has estimated that every
additional dollar expended on the police would reduce the costs of crime by only about 33t.
Id. at 69.
65 Although I have written that "a substantial influx of resources" might lead to more
severe sentences, The Changing Debate, supra note 4, at 725, I doubt that either the impre-
cise relationship between expenditure levels and sentence severity or the equally imprecise
relationship between sentence severity and crime control can be approximated even re-
motely by an econometric formula. At the same time, a plea bargaining prohibition ulti-
mately might enhance the effectiveness of the criminal sanction quite apart from any effect
that this prohibition might have on sentencing. See id. at 706-07.
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almost entirely a matter of conjecture. In some jurisdictions where
plea bargaining has been prohibited, guilty pleas still account for a
high percentage of felony convictions. One federal district judge
who does not permit plea agreements in his court has reported that
he cannot discern any notable disparity in guilty plea rates be-
tween his court and others.70 In Alaska, where guilty pleas ac-
counted for ninety-one percent of all felony convictions in the year
before a plea bargaining prohibition, the rate declined to eighty-
four percent in the year after."1 Of course, when a reasonably high
guilty plea rate of this sort persists despite an announced prohibi-
tion of plea bargaining, one may suspect that some form of explicit
or implicit bargaining, or at least a general perception on the part
of defendants and their attorneys that judges may reward guilty
pleas in the sentencing process, continues to exert an influence. 2
If today's plea bargaining process is not a sham, an effective
plea bargaining prohibition certainly ought to lead to more trials.
At the same time, however, the claim that almost every defendant
would insist on a trial in the absence of plea negotiation is unwar-
ranted. Because juries are unpredictable and prosecutors may
make errors, it sometimes is suggested that any defendant ought to
seek a trial unless he receives some concession for foregoing it."3
Nevertheless, the chance that all state witnesses will suffer heart
attacks on their way to the courthouse is not, in practice, a suffi-
cient reason for most defendants and defense attorneys to insist on
trial; and in many cases, the possibility of multiple heart attacks is
apparently the best hope that defendants may have. 4
Following a judicially initiated prohibition of plea negotiation
in El Paso, Texas, I interviewed a number of prosecutors, defense
attorneys, probation officers, and trial judges in that city. At the
70 United States v. Griffin, 462 F. Supp. 928, 932 (E.D. Ark. 1978) (Eisele, C.J.).
7' M. RUBINSTEIN, S. CLARKE & T. WHITE, supra note 56, at 118 (percentages derived
from figure 2).
'2 Alaska's plea bargaining prohibition, which was instituted by the state's Attorney
General, obviously did not restrict the ability of trial judges to sentence defendants who
were convicted at trial more severely than comparable defendants who had pleaded guilty.
An evaluation of the Alaska reform found evidence of this implicit bargaining in some crime
categories but not in others. Id. at 88.
73 See, e.g., id. at 80.
7' As Professor Malvina Halberstam has observed, "While it is true that a defendant
would have little to lose by going to trial, the typical criminal defendant would also have
little to gain." Halberstam, supra note 17, at 36 (footnotes omitted); see M. HEUMANN,
supra note 35, at 60 (experienced defense attorneys agree that most cases are "devoid of any
legally disputable issue" and that they are "born dead"). But see S. Schulhofer, supra note
52, at 148-50 (only 39 to 52% of the cases in a Philadelphia sample could be regarded as
"dead bang" cases").
1983]
The University of Chicago Law Review
conclusion of these interviews, I was persuaded that prosecutorial
bargaining had been effectively abolished; not one of my sources
hinted that there was a back door to the district attorney's office or
a system of winks and nods that might achieve the effects of bar-
gaining. More importantly, even though I was not convinced that
implicit judicial bargaining had been eliminated, most defense at-
torneys were convinced; they insisted that El Paso's judges would
not sentence defendants more severely after convictions at trial
than they would following pleas of guilty."5 I therefore asked these
attorneys why they advised some clients to plead guilty, sometimes
suggesting to them that it might be a denial of effective represen-
tation not to take whatever chance of acquittal a trial might offer.
A common response was that in many cases the evidence is so
overwhelming that it is simply hopeless to take the case to trial.76
Apart from the fact that defendants and their attorneys have
little reason to seek trials that offer no realistic hope of acquittal,7 7
trial would not become an entirely cost-free alternative for defen-
dants even in the absence of plea bargaining. Nonindigent defen-
dants would continue to pay attorneys' fees and other costs, and
even indigent defendants would invest the time and energy and
suffer the delay, the uncertainty, and the psychological anguish
that trials inherently require. The "process costs" of trial might
lead to significant numbers of guilty pleas. 8
Although some defendants would plead guilty without the in-
75 The judges themselves were unwilling to adopt this position without significant qual-
ifications. One judge, for example, said that a defendant who insisted on trial when he had
no plausible defense ought to receive a more severe sentence than if he had pleaded guilty.
Interview with Judge Sam W. Callan, in El Paso (June 8, 1976).
76 One lawyer seemed to capture the pervasive common sense of most others when he
said, "I had a client last week who was charged with escape, and he was still in the hand-
cuffs when they arrested him two hours later. If I had known how to try that case, I guess I
might have given it a shot."
El Paso's plea bargaining prohibition led within a few years to an increase in the back-
log of criminal cases. The increased backlog, in turn, led El Paso's judges to replace their
initial plan for eliminating plea bargaining with a strange regime of bargaining by probation
officers. See Callan, An Experience in Justice Without Plea Negotiation, 13 LAW & Soc'y
REv. 327, 346 app. (1979). Nevertheless, Judge Callan, the principal architect of both El
Paso's plea bargaining prohibition and its replacement, maintained that the addition of a
single judge to the El Paso bench would have made modification of the initial plan unneces-
sary. Interview with Judge Sam W. Callan, in French Lick, Indiana (June 14, 1978).
7 Lawyers and judges in Alaska emphasized this circumstance in explaining the persis-
tence of a seemingly high rate of guilty pleas after the state's prohibition of plea bargaining.
As one judge expressed it, "Human nature doesn't want to engage in a fruitless act." M.
RUBINSTEIN, S. CLARKE & T. WHITE, supra note 56, at 81.
"8 For further discussion of the significance of "process costs" in inducing pleas of
guilty, see infra notes 105-27 and accompanying text.
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ducements that today's plea bargaining process provides, one can
only guess how many. The best way to approach the task of esti-
mating the maximum possible cost of a plea bargaining prohibition
therefore may be to assess the cost of providing jury trials to all
felony defendants. Even this task is not easy. For one thing, de-
spite recent federal efforts to develop criminal justice statistics and
to study the operation of the criminal justice system,79 no one has
a very good idea how many defendants are charged with felonies
each year in state and federal courts. In 1967, the President's Com-
mission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice esti-
mated this number at 338,000.0 If this figure had since increased
at the same rate as the United States population, it would now be
376,000.81 If it had increased at the same rate as arrests reported to
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, however, it would be much
larger, 591,900.82 Although it may seem doubtful that the capacity
of the courts has increased as rapidly as the number of arrests, this
larger figure can serve as a ballpark estimate.83
79 See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 64, passim.
so TASK FORCE ON THE ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 55 (1967) ("According to the only
available estimate, there are approximately 314,000 felony defendants formally charged by
the filing of an indictment or information each year in State courts, and about 24,000 felony
defendants are prosecuted in Federal courts.").
81 The population of the United States was estimated at 197,864,000 in 1967 and at
223,239,000 in 1980. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 60, at 21 (Table 24).
82 In 1967, 5,422,526 arrests were reported to the F.B.I.; in 1979 there were 9,488,212.
See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 1967 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 116-17 (Table 23)
(1968); FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 1979 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 188-89 (Table 25)
(1980).
83 In 1980, when California had more than 10% of the entire United States population,
43,609 defendants were charged with felonies in that state's superior courts. CAL. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, CRIME AND DmINQUENCY IN CALIFORNIA 1980, at 45 (Table 6) (1980). Projecting the
filing rates of this most populous state to the rest of the nation might be likely to yield an
overestimate rather than an underestimate of the number of felony prosecutions in trial
courts of general jurisdiction, but even this projection would yield a substantially smaller
number of felony cases than the figure suggested here.
Statewide felony filings for 32 jurisdictions are reported in BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATIS-
TICS, supra note 64, at 408 (Table 5.14). The total for all of these jurisdictions was 580,857
in 1977. Nevertheless, some of these jurisdictions treated each criminal charge as a separate
"filing." For example, if an accused armed robber had been charged with robbery, assault,
larceny, and the unlawful possession of a firearm following a single holdup, four felony
filings would have been recorded. Moreover, if the defendant had been accused of accosting
and robbing a half-dozen victims, the number of filings might have grown to twenty-four.
Even the jurisdictions that seemed to count defendants rather than charges reported
the "unit of count" as "the number of defendants on the information, indictment, or com-
plaint." Id. Apparently, if separate indictments or informations had been filed for robbing
each of six victims in a single transaction, six filings would have been recorded.
So long as all of the charges against a defendant could be resolved at a single trial, these
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One multiple-city study estimates that approximately one-
third of the annual felony filings are dismissed prior to trial. 8
There is no reason to suppose that this figure would be reduced if
plea bargaining were prohibited. To the contrary, to the extent
that a plea bargaining prohibition strained available resources,
prosecutors probably would be even more selective both in the
cases that they filed and in the cases that they pressed to comple-
tion. The number of filings therefore might decline and the num-
ber of dismissals increase. If, however, only one-third of the hy-
pothesized 591,500 felony filings each year were dismissed, the
remaining 394,333 cases would represent the approximate number
of cases in which jury trials might be required. Moreover, in some-
thing like 47,320 of these cases, jury trials are afforded already.8 5
The number of additional jury trials that a plea bargaining prohi-
bition might require in felony cases would be about 347,013.
One study of felony prosecutions in thirteen diverse state
court jurisdictions compared the costs of guilty plea cases with
those of jury trials. It reported that the entry of a guilty plea re-
sulted on the average in "court savings per case" of $1528 and in
"prosecutor savings per case" of $450.8 Although the total savings
reported per case ($1978) did not include any reduction in the cost
of defense services, the "defense savings" effected by a guilty plea
certainly do not exceed the "prosecutor savings. '87 If the "defense
savings" per case are also assumed to be $450, the total savings per
charges should be regarded as a single unit for the purpose of estimating the maximum
number of trials that a plea bargaining prohibition might require. Accordingly, the aggre-
gate data presented in the Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics seem even less helpful
than the outdated estimate of the number of defendants charged with felonies offered by
the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice in 1967.
84 K. BROSI, supra note 49, at 15.
85 This figure represents eight percent of the initial felony filings. See Y. KAMISAR, W.
LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 23 (5th ed. 1980) (10 to 15% of felony
cases filed are ultimately tried and 60 to 65% of these trials are jury trials; accordingly,
between 6.0 and 9.8% of the felony cases filed are resolved by jury trial).
" See K. BRoSI, supra note 49, at 47 (Table 7) (figures in text derived from average of
figures for individual jurisdictions shown).
87 One reason is that public defenders commonly are paid less than prosecutors. See
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, THE OTHER FACE OF JUSTICE 67 (1973) (86% of de-
fender offices reported that the chief public defender is paid less than his counterpart in the
local prosecutor's office; 63% reported that staff attorney salaries are lower than in the pros-
ecutor's office). Of course, because nonindigent defendants are expected to hire their own
attorneys, not all of the increased costs of defense services caused by a plea bargaining
prohibition would be borne by the public. In addition, in view of the current fee-setting
practices of private defense attorneys, it is doubtful that an increase in the time devoted to
trials would lead to a proportional increase in legal fees. See The Defense Attorney's Role,
supra note 4, at 1199-1200.
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case becomes $2428.
This $2428 figure is probably an overestimate of the total ad-
ditional cost that might be incurred by affording a jury trial to a
typical felony defendant who now pleads guilty.88 It is based on the
assumption that this defendant's trial would consume 24.2 hours of
court processing time, a figure derived from a 1974 study of jury
trials in California. 9 California seems atypical, however; other, na-
tionally based studies have concluded that jury trials are usually
completed, not in more than three days, but in less than two.90
Moreover, even this smaller figure probably is not an appropriate
guide, for any estimate based on the current costs of jury trials
overlooks the fact that jury trials occur most frequently in time
consuming cases involving serious charges rather than in more rou-
tine prosecutions.9 1 Most of the cases now resolved through plea
bargaining probably would require fewer resources to try than
most of the cases tried today.2
Of course some of the 347,013 cases in which jury trials might
be required are currently resolved at nonjury trials. In these cases,
the incremental expenditure necessary to afford jury trials would
be less than the additional cost of affording jury trials in cases now
resolved by guilty plea.9" If, however, one disregards this additional
" At the same time, this figure may not include all the costs that a plea bargaining
prohibition would impose. Most notably, an increase in the frequency of trials probably
would lead to an increase in the frequency of appeals. The estimate does not consider the
financial impact of a plea bargaining prohibition upon appellate courts or upon the appel-
late work of prosecutor and defender offices, nor does it include any figure for an expansion
of correctional facilities. I have argued elsewhere that a prohibition of plea bargaining could
not be expected, in itself, to lead to any increase in sentence severity. The Changing Debate,
supra note 4, at 724-30.
89 See K. BRosI, supra note 49, at 47.
80 See Y. KAi sAR, W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 85, at 13 (4th ed. 1974); BIRm
ENGINEERING-RESEARCH Assoc., INC., CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SERVICE, JURY SYSTEM
OPERATION FINAL REPORT 14-17 app. D (1974).
' See, e.g., H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 20 (Table 2) (1966).
, Indeed, if the trial of a routine burglary or simple street crime truly would require
more than three days and cost approximately $2500, that circumstance would illustrate the
need for a radical simplification of the American trial process. A reduction in the cost of
trials would make a prohibition of plea bargaining substantially less burdensome. See infra
Parts HI-B, III-C.
Although $2428 is an estimate of the cost savings effected by a guilty plea rather than
an estimate of the total cost of a jury trial, the estimate was based on the assumption that a
guilty plea proceeding requires only 1/97th of the resources required for a jury trial. See K.
BROSI, supra note 49, at 47 (15 minutes of court time for guilty plea as compared to 1452
minutes for jury trial). The total cost figure for a jury trial is therefore only slightly higher
than the "cost savings" figure.
"3 There are probably about 39,100 nonjury trials in felony cases each year in the
United States. See supra note 85 (4.6% of the 591,500 felony cases initially filed; 4.6%
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cost reducing factor and simply multiplies the $2428 "guilty plea
savings" by 347,013, it becomes apparent that the annual cost of
providing three-day jury trials to every felony defendant who
reaches the trial stage probably would not exceed $843 million.
The cost of providing two-day trials would be about $559 million.
The cost of providing one-day trials (which ought to be adequate
to permit careful development of the factual circumstances sur-
rounding most crimes and which would facilitate and encourage
much more attention than most felony prosecutions currently re-
ceive) would be about $275 million.94
Even the $843 million figure represents only a little more than
one-third of Lockheed's $2 billion cost overrun on the C-5A air-
craft;9 5 it is less than the cost of a single Aegis cruiser;" and it is
also less than the amount that the now-disbanded Law Enforce-
ment Assistance Administration once spent annually on improving
state criminal justice.9 7 Overall, an additional $843 million per year
would represent a 3.2% increase in civil and criminal justice ex-
penditures in the United States over the level in 1979.98 As a pres-
tigious national study group concluded ten years ago, "[T]he basic
problem is not financial; the cost of a model system of criminal
justice is easily within the means of the American people." 9 When
one glances behind the plea of poverty that advocates of plea bar-
gaining have used to justify this practice, one sees mostly the de-
sire of the legal profession to rationalize the way things are.
B. Toward an Unencumbered Right to Trial in Misdemeanor
Prosecutions
Although the abolition of plea bargaining certainly would not
represents the approximate difference between the percentage of felony cases tried and the
percentage tried to a jury). For one estimate of the differing costs of jury trials, nonjury
trials, and guilty plea proceedings, see supra note 50. Of course the incremental cost of
providing jury trials in cases now resolved at nonjury trials would not be a cost of prohibit-
ing plea bargaining.
"' These estimates are based on the assumption that a guilty plea proceeding consumes
only 15 minutes of court processing time (1/97th of the time required for a three-day jury
trial).
See B. RICE, THE C-5A SCANDAL, at xii & passim (1971).
"Is America Strong Enough?, NEwSWEEK, Oct. 27, 1980, at 48, 55.
The 1975 budget of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration was
$887,171,000. U.S. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR 1977, at 253 (1977).
9S See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 64, at 6 (Table 1.4) (1982).
"RESEARCH & POLICY COMM., COMM. FOR ECONOMIC DEV., REDUCING CRIME AND ASSUR-
ING JUSTICE 16 (1972).
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require so radical a change, even the prospect of affording jury tri-
als to all felony defendants in America ought not cause one to
blanch. Felony prosecutions comprise only about ten percent of all
criminal cases, however, 100 and the prospect of affording jury trials
to all misdemeanor defendants might well inspire fiscal terror. Of
course, as a first step toward reform (or perhaps even as a final
step), a legislature might prohibit plea bargaining only in felony
cases. This ten percent solution would be a major reform, and pru-
dence might suggest that its consequences should be evaluated
before going further. Moreover, even as a final accommodation,
this solution would accord with the generally accepted notion that
less careful and less safeguarded procedures are appropriate when
lesser sanctions are at issue. 10 1
Nevertheless, the elimination of plea bargaining in misde-
meanor cases probably would be easier and less costly than its
elimination in felony cases. It might require no influx of resources
whatever. Indeed, a reformed misdemeanor system in which full
trials were afforded to all defendants who wanted them conceiva-
bly might cost less to administer than the current misdemeanor
system. As a prelude to the development of these positions, it will
be useful to examine some of the basic motivations that prompt
criminal defendants to plead guilty. The general discussion that
follows will set the stage for an argument that unobjectionable pro-
cedures could yield as large a number of guilty pleas in misde-
meanor courts as plea bargaining yields in those courts today.
1. Reasons for Pleading Guilty: A Three-Part Typology.
Criminal defendants may decline to contest the charges against
them although they do not expect their guilty pleas to lead to more
lenient sentences. This section argues that there are normative and
doctrinal distinctions among three types of guilty pleas: "no dis-
pute" guilty pleas, "process cost" guilty pleas, and "bargained"
guilty pleas.
Some observers, however, apparently do not see much differ-
ence between plea negotiation and other governmental practices
that can lead to pleas of guilty. In Brady v. United States, " the
Supreme Court considered whether the threat of execution, seem-
100 See M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT, at xv, 5 (1979); TASK FORCE ON
THE ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, supra note 80, at 29.
1I See, e.g., Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979) (constitutional right to counsel
inapplicable when defendants not threatened with imprisonment); Baldwin v. New York,
399 U.S. 66, 73 (1970) (constitutional right to jury trial inapplicable to offenses punishable
by six months' imprisonment or less).
102 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
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ingly one of the most coercive threats in the government's arsenal,
had rendered a guilty plea involuntary. Although the Court as-
sumed for purposes of decision that the threat of a death sentence
had prompted the defendant "to plead guilty and thus limit the
penalty to life imprisonment," it said that this assumption merely
identified the threat of capital punishment "as a 'but for' cause of
his plea." 103 This circumstance did "not necessarily prove that the
plea was coerced. ' 10 4 The Court explained:
The State to some degree encourages pleas of guilty at
every important step in the criminal process. For some people,
their breach of a State's law is alone sufficient reason for sur-
rendering themselves and accepting punishment. For others,
apprehension and charge, both threatening acts by the Gov-
ernment, jar them into admitting their guilt. In still other
cases, the post-indictment accumulation of evidence may con-
vince the defendant and his counsel that a trial is not worth
the agony and expense to the defendant and his family. All
these pleas of guilty are valid in spite of the State's responsi-
bility for some of the factors motivating the pleas ....
Nevertheless, there are differences in kind as well as in degree
among the circumstances that the Court described.
At one extreme, a defendant may plead guilty because he is
remorseful or, even if not remorseful, because he recognizes that he
has no possible defense to the government's charge. A guilty plea
in this situation does not reflect the consensual resolution of a
criminal dispute, for there is no dispute between the defendant
and the state concerning the defendant's guilt. Of course one might
favor trial even in this situation on paternalistic grounds (the de-
fendant might be mistaken) or on the ground that trials serve im-
portant symbolic functions; 0 6 indeed, with a seeming abundance of
caution, most European nations require the trial of serious charges
even when defendants admit their guilt and do not desire trials.10 7
Nevertheless, most Americans probably would consider a require-
ment of trial in no-dispute situations artificial. They would insist
203 Id. at 749-50.
104 Id. at 750.
105 Id.
10" See Arnold, The Criminal Trial as a Symbol of Public Morality, in Y. KAMISAR, F.
INBAU & T. ARNOLD, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TnME 137, 143-44 (1965); Gifford, supra note
38, at 70-71; Kipnis, Plea Bargaining: A Critic's Rejoinder, 13 LAw & Soc'y REv. 555, 556-
57 (1979).
1o See H. SILVING, ESSAYS ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 250, 255 (1964).
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that disputes should not be manufactured when they do not exist
in fact and that defendants should not be forced to use adjudica-
tive procedures when the defendants themselves see no reason for
doing so.
Even when a defendant considers himself innocent and recog-
nizes the existence of disputable issues, he may yield to conviction
because trial would be bothersome or expensive. A familiar exam-
ple is the case of a driver who fails to contest a traffic ticket be-
cause a court appearance would be more burdensome to him than
the payment of a fine. Guilty pleas induced by the "process costs"
that defendants would incur by contesting the charges against
them sometimes may be as troublesome as guilty pleas induced by
plea bargaining. One can imagine, for example, an extraordinarily
elaborate procedure for the resolution of minor traffic disputes
that would require every traffic defendant who sought a trial to
spend the better part of a week in a courtroom. In practice, despite
its formal safeguards, this procedure would not afford traffic defen-
dants greater protection than they currently receive. Instead, it'
probably would prove as effective as any but the most virulent plea
bargaining practices in inducing pleas of guilty. Procedural safe-
guards plainly have backfired when those whom they were in-
tended to benefit find the procedures too burdensome to use. 108
At the same time, significant process costs are inherent in any
form of adjudication. When shaping our courtroom procedures,
lawmakers ought to be aware of these costs and of the burdens
that they are likely to impose, not only on the taxpayers who
finance them, but on defendants as well. Still, after these burdens
have been considered, certain procedures will of course be consid-
ered essential to fair adjudication." 9 Although the costs imposed
by these procedures inevitably will lead some defendants to decline
to contest the charges against them, this result should not cause
notable concern. So long as the adjudicative balance is fair and the
procedures seem worthwhile, their chilling effect will be incidental.
The purpose of these procedures will be the promotion of fair and
108 In recent years, commentators have begun to devote some attention to the effects of
process costs in inducing pleas of guilty. For example, one commentator has noted that
defendants may plead guilty partly because trials would require them to pay substantial
legal fees, and has proposed that acquitted defendants be reimbursed to a certain level for
their legal expenses in order to minimize this "process cost" inducement to sacrifice the
right to trial. Note, Costs and the Plea Bargaining Process: Reducing the Price of Justice to
the Nonindigent Defendant, 89 YAL L.J. 333 (1979).
100 These procedures are likely to vary with both the complexity of the issues presented
and the severity of the sanctions threatened.
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accurate verdicts, not discouragement of the exercise of the right
to trial. Any waiver of legal rights that these procedures induce
will be an inevitable by-product of an appropriate adjudicative
process, and a defendant who cares too little about his case to fight
conviction through appropriate procedures probably should not be
forced to do so. Like guilty pleas in no-dispute situations, guilty
pleas induced by appropriate process costs seem unobjectionable.
Finally, a defendant may plead guilty, not because contesting
the charges against him would be too much trouble, but because a
judge or prosecutor has threatened to "up the ante" or to impose a
more severe penalty if he exercises the right to trial. The threat of
differential punishment, whether phrased in terms of rewarding a
plea of guilty or of penalizing the exercise of the right to trial, is
the essence of the plea bargaining process."' This threat is not
merely an incident of a procedure designed to promote fair and
accurate verdicts; instead its very purpose is to discourage the ex-
ercise of a constitutional right."" It is this gratuitous threat that
opponents of plea bargaining find offensive and that an effective
plea bargaining prohibition should eliminate.
Even if one assumes that the consensual resolution of most
misdemeanor prosecutions is a practical necessity, one should not
confound this apparent necessity with a need for plea bargaining.
For it is primarily the process costs of misdemeanor justice that
currently cause all but a small minority of defendants to yield to
conviction; these process costs are, in practice, more influential
than plea bargaining. Before proposing a simplified nontrial proce-
dure for misdemeanor cases-one that would make plea bargaining
in these cases even less necessary than it is today-this article will
explore the impact of current process costs on the decisions of mis-
demeanor defendants to plead guilty.
2. The Process Costs of Misdemeanor Justice. The most in-
sightful recent study of an American misdemeanor court is a book
by Professor Malcolm Feeley, The Process Is the Punishment.11 2
This work, whose thesis is stated succinctly in its title, describes
the functioning of the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven,
Connecticut, a court with jurisdiction over misdemeanors and
lesser felonies. In this reasonably typical lower court, although
every defendant had a right to trial by jury, not a single defendant
110 See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
" See The Supreme Court, supra note 4, at 64-65.
12 M. FEELEY, supra note 100.
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in a sample of 1640 cases invoked that right.11 The principal rea-
son for the stunning lack of jury trials was not the practice of plea
negotiation. Instead, according to Feeley's description, the routine
workings of American misdemeanor justice yielded a troublesome
conclusion-a conclusion expressed here in less cautious terms
than Feeley himself expressed it. A misdemeanor defendant, even
if innocent, usually is well advised to waive every available proce-
dural protection (including the right to counsel) and to plead
guilty at the earliest possible opportunity." 4 This strategy is likely
to minimize the painful consequences of criminal proceedings for
the defendant even when he almost certainly would be acquitted at
trial and even when he receives no sentencing concession in return
for his plea.
In the Court of Common Pleas, an immediate guilty plea is
typically followed by a suspended sentence or a small fine (usually
of less than thirty dollars).1 5 Although the defendant incurs the
disabilities of a misdemeanor conviction, for a variety of reasons a
person who appears as a misdemeanor defendant is unlikely to re-
gard these disabilities as a serious burden. 6 The limited formal
sanctions that follow a plea of guilty pale in practice when com-
pared to the informal and largely unintended sanctions that flow
routinely from an invocation of procedural protections.
When a misdemeanor defendant pleads not guilty, he may be
unable to secure his pretrial release. A commonly noted irony of
American misdemeanor justice is that, despite the widespread im-
plementation of bail reform during the past two decades, many
more defendants are imprisoned before trial than are imprisoned
after conviction (four times as many in Feeley's sample,"' al-
though the Connecticut bail reform statute has been widely re-
garded as a model).118 Moreover, when a defendant does not incur
this most dramatic of the process costs that insistence on the right
to trial may exact, a court may require him to post bond. To ob-
Id. at 9.
114 Cf. id. at 199-201.
115 Id. at 155.
"' For one thing, many defendants already have misdemeanor records. For another, a
minor criminal record is not likely to limit the employment opportunities of day laborers or
to cause the discharge of many people who already have jobs. Finally, Feeley observed that
as a group misdemeanor defendants tend to be "present-oriented" and to discount the re-
mote possible consequences of conviction. Even when they probably should take the collat-
eral consequences of misdemeanor convictions seriously, they usually do not. See id. at 201.'
117 Id. at 236.
"I See, e.g., O'Rourke & Carter, Comment: The Connecticut Bail Commission, 79 YALE
L.J. 513, 514-15, 520, 526 (1970).
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tain his bond, the defendant ordinarily must locate a bondsman
and pay a fee of $70 or $100, an amount greatly in excess of the
fine that normally would follow conviction.119
Similarly, when a nonindigent defendant seeks the services of
counsel, he is likely to pay a legal fee of about $350, an amount
more than ten times larger than the average fine.120 Even an indi-
gent defendant entitled to free legal services may find the process
of representation burdensome. Initially, the appointment of coun-
sel may subject this defendant to minor indignities; an apparently
irritated judge may ask, for example, why the defendant has not
sold his car to hire a private attorney. 1 Then the defendant's at-
torney insists on an interview at the public defender office. The
appointment usually is scheduled at a time when an employed de-
fendant otherwise would be at work; it may well be canceled and
rescheduled; and when the time for the defendant's appointment
does arrive, he is likely to be kept waiting.1 22 Finally, for several
reasons (including the scheduling conflicts of attorneys), represen-
tation by counsel may increase significantly the number of court
appearances that a defendant is required to make. Apart from its
more obvious burdens, each appearance may lead to a loss of wages
and may risk the defendant's dismissal from his employment.2
When a prosecutor in the Court of Common Pleas asks a defen-
dant, "Do you want to get your own attorney, apply for a public
defender, or get your case over with today?,' 24 he accurately de-
scribes the defendant's dilemma. Half of the defendants in Feeley's
sample did forgo the services of counsel. 25
Feeley reported that when a court appearance is scheduled,
every defendant is required to appear at 10:00 A.M., an hour early
enough that it usually will have been impractical for the defendant
to report to work but late enough that he already will have missed
119 M. FEELEY, supra note 100, at 238.
120 Id.
21 Id. at 220-21.
122 See id. at 32.
123 See id.
124 Id. at 220.
125 Id. at 9. A defendant eligible for a pretrial diversion program may be able to avoid
conviction by participating in regularly scheduled meetings for a three-month period. If he
declines to participate, however, his case is likely to be dismissed anyway. Moreover, if the
defendant is convicted, he runs virtually no risk of incarceration and ordinarily pays only a
$10 or $20 fine. It is not surprising that only 2.3% of the eligible defendants chose to par-
ticipate in the court's diversion program. Id. at 233. Indeed, Feeley noted that, from a de-
fendant's perspective, even a decision to engage in protracted plea negotiation is likely to
increase the practical burdens of the criminal process. Id. at 30.
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a significant part of the working day. And when the court con-
venes, the defendant usually waits. Many cases are not called until
after the court's noon recess, and after the defendant has waited,
he may be informed that his case will be continued and heard an-
other day. If one assumes, based on Feeley's findings, that a court
appearance typically requires four hours of a defendant's time and
that the average number of appearances per defendant is 3.3, a de-
fendant who is paid only the minimum wage is likely to lose more
in wages by virtue of his appearances than he ordinarily would
have been required to pay in fines had he pleaded guilty at the
earliest opportunity.126 Finally, when a case does go to trial, the
defendant must incur the additional burden of locating witnesses
and arranging their appearance and must suffer the anxiety and
frequent humiliation that trial is likely to involve.
When misdemeanor defendants confront process costs that
significantly exceed the sanctions at issue, plea negotiation plainly
is unnecessary to induce the overwhelming majority to yield to
conviction. Far from qualifying as a practical necessity, this prac-
tice becomes gratuitous overkill. As Feeley summarized his find-
ings, "In essence, the process itself is the punishment. The time,
effort, money, and opportunities lost as a direct result of being
caught up in the system can quickly come to outweigh the penalty
that issues from adjudication and sentence. '127
Many of the process costs that Feeley described could be elim-
inated. Certainly a defendant should not be required to post a
$1000 bond in a case in which the sanction realistically at issue is a
fine of $30. It seems almost equally nonsensical to require all de-
fendants to appear in court at the same early hour when most of
their cases will not be called until substantially later. The schedul-
ing of court proceedings on Saturday or in the evening might help
minimize the burdens of criminal justice not only for defendants
but for victims and witnesses as well. Nevertheless, even after a
conscientious effort to minimize process costs, the problem would
remain. When a defendant recognizes that the evidence against
him is strong (and frequently even when it is not), very little pro-
cess can overbalance the nonincarcerative sanctions at issue in
most misdemeanor prosecutions. Even when the adjudicative pro-
cess is expeditious, rational, self-interested defendants usually will
"pay the man the thirty dollars and go home." With plea bargain-
ing or without it, misdemeanor courts are unlikely to become the
I16 Id. at 239-40.
127 Id. at 30-31.
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scene of frequent adversary battle.
3. A Simplified Nontrial Procedure for Misdemeanor Cases.
Once this central reality of misdemeanor justice is recognized and
its implications faced, the direction of reform seems plain. A sim-
ple, straightforward nontrial procedure should be made available
to misdemeanor defendants who do not wish to contest the charges
against them. This procedure would (1) eliminate some costs cur-
rently and unnecessarily imposed even on defendants who decline
contest with the state, thereby making contest less likely; (2) re-
veal to defendants the limited sanctions realistically at issue in
most misdemeanor prosecutions, thereby promoting intelligent de-
cisions concerning the wisdom of incurring the costs of trial; (3) at
the same time assure defendants that their sentences will be unaf-
fected by the exercise of legal rights so that the burdens incurred
by insisting on trials will be only those inherent in the adjudicative
process itself; (4) bring substantially greater order and dignity to
misdemeanor proceedings; and (5) conserve prosecutorial and judi-
cial resources, which might be used to afford trials to defendants
who want them. The penal order procedure of West Germany pro-
vides a useful model for this reform.128
Under this West German procedure (comparable to the non-
trial procedures employed by most other European nations in mi-
nor cases), 12 a prosecutor may propose a specific penal sanction
128 The reluctance of some American observers to draw lessons from comparative study
is so strong that one may hesitate to mention that a proposed reform has been implemented
elsewhere. Even when one suggests that the proposal might be evaluated on its own terms
without reference to an apparently successful foreign experience, a skeptic may dismiss it
with observations about differing crime rates, legal traditions, cultures, and the like. For
example, Professor Lloyd L. Weinreb prefaced his proposals for substantial revision of the
American criminal justice system by saying, "'Continental' criminal procedure provided a
direction for my thinking.. . . The reason for adopting a model like the one I have outlined,
however, is not that something similar has worked acceptably elsewhere, but that that is
where our own principles and experience lead." L. WEINREB, DENIAL OF JUSTICE at x (1977).
Nevertheless, Weinreb's critics generally failed to evaluate his proposals in the way that he
suggested. Instead, they asserted a lack of empirical proof that Continental procedures truly
work better than ours. See, e.g., Johnson, Book Review, 87 YALE L.J. 406, 410 (1977). It is
conceivable that Weinreb's proposals would have had a more favorable reception if he had
managed to keep secret their Continental origins, so that observations about the distinctive
nature of our problems could not have been substituted so readily for an evaluation of the
proposals' merits.
129 See, e.g., H. SILVING, supra note 107, at 255 (Spain); Felstiner & Drew, European
Alternatives to Criminal Trials: What We Can Learn, JUDGES' J., Summer 1978, at 18, 21-
22 (Sweden, Denmark, and Belgium); Myhre, Conviction Without Trial in the United
States and Norway: A Comparison, 5 Hous. L. REv. 647, 649-51 (1968) (Norway); Pugh,
Ruminations Re Reform of American Criminal Justice (Especially Our Guilty Plea Sys-
tem): Reflections Derived From a Study of the French System, 36 LA. L. REv. 947, 969
(1976) (France); Stepan, Possible Lessons From Continental Criminal Procedure, in Tim
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not involving imprisonment in a draft judicial order that courts
routinely approve. 130 The draft order informs the defendant that if
he files an objection within a specified period of time, the order
will be set aside and he will be entitled to a full criminal trial. If,
however, he fails to object, the order will become final.
When a defendant accepts a proposed penal order, a parallel
to the American guilty plea is of course obvious, and some similar-
ity to plea bargaining is evident as well. Nevertheless, as Professor
John H. Langbein has observed,
Two major aspects of penal order procedure distinguish it
from American plea bargaining: the limitation to nonim-
prisonable misdemeanors and the absence of a sentencing dif-
ferential. The former is explicit in the statute, and we need
hardly belabor the contrast with American practice, where
plea bargaining is routine for felonies and serious
misdemeanors. 31
As Langbein noted, a West German court is not precluded
from imposing a more severe sentence after trial than the prosecu-
tor had proposed before trial in a rejected penal order; the court,
however, is inhibited from doing so by a requirement that any in-
crease in a defendant's sentence beyond that proposed in a penal
order be accompanied by a statement of reasons for this in-
crease-reasons that apparently must be based on evidence that
was unavailable when the penal order was proposed.3 2 A recent
study by William L.F. Felstiner concluded on the basis of inter-
views with West German judges, prosecutors, and academics that
"German defendants who do not accept a penal order. . . are not
treated more harshly than those who do."133 Felstiner reported
that prosecutors were strongly committed to the view that it would
be unjust to penalize a defendant for rejecting a penal order (or,
for that matter, for any other tactical mistake). This attitude was
so pervasive that one prosecutor with eight years' experience told
Felstiner incorrectly that a trial court simply lacked the authority
to impose a more severe sentence than had been proposed in a re-
ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 181, 198 (S. Rottenberg ed. 1973) (Austria).
130 See Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining: How the Germans Do It, 78 MICH. L.
REv. 204, 213 (1979). For evidence that the judicial review of proposed penal orders is not
always perfunctory, however, see Felstiner & Drew, supra note 129, at 23.
1s Langbein, supra note 130, at 214.
132 Id.
23 Felstiner, Plea Contracts in West Germany, 13 LAW & Soc'y REv. 309, 315 (1979).
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jected penal order.'
An American penal order procedure might be similar to West
Germany's, but it should offer clearer assurances against an in-
crease in sentence when a defendant exercises his right to trial. As
in West Germany, a prosecutor who does not seek a defendant's
incarceration 3 5 should be able, if he chooses, to prepare a written
proposal specifying whatever lesser sanction he considers appropri-
ate. Before delivering this proposal to the defendant by registered
mail, the prosecutor probably should be required to secure ap-
proval of its terms by a court."'3 Of course the form of the proposal
should emphasize its tentative character,1 3 7 yet it also should em-
phasize that if the defendant fails to object within a specified pe-
riod of time, the proposed sanction will be imposed without further
proceedings. If local law or practice extends the right to counsel to
cases in which a defendant does not risk imprisonment, the propo-
sal should advise the defendant of this right and of the procedure
by which an indigent defendant may consult a public defender
before accepting or rejecting the proposal. It also should contain a
suitable admonition of the collateral consequences of a misde-
meanor conviction.13 8 Upon objection by the defendant, he should
134 Id.
"' Even a defendant who risks incarceration may find it in his interest not to incur the
process costs of trial when he recognizes that his chances of acquittal are small. A pretrial
procedure that enabled this defendant to know the sanction at issue and to weigh this sanc-
tion against the burdens of trial would therefore have some virtue. Although extension of
the penal order procedure to situations in which the state sought a defendant's imprison-
ment might not be seriously objectionable in any case and might in some cases be useful,
any use of an essentially administrative procedure to deprive a person of his liberty remains
somewhat troublesome. On balance, the focus of proceedings that may lead to incarceration
probably should remain the courtroom, and judges should take a more active part in these
proceedings than they are likely to take in the formulation of penal orders.
138 In West Germany, judges have tended to approve proposed penal orders without
close scrutiny, see supra note 130 and accompanying text, and one suspects that judicial
approval could become something of a rubber-stamp process in the United States as well.
Nevertheless, when a defendant accepts a proposed penal order, the order determines his
sentence. This article will suggest in addition, see infra note 139 and accompanying text,
that the sanction proposed in a penal order should limit the sentence that a judge may
impose following a trial. It therefore seems appropriate to give a court the opportunity to
veto inappropriate proposals even if judges are unlikely to exercise this power very often.
'37 For example, use of the word "order" probably should be avoided unless it is accom-
panied by a word like "tentative." The format of the West German penal order is probably
too authoritative to serve as a close model for written prosecutorial proposals here. See 8 K.
MARQUART, HANDBUCH DER RECHTSPRAXIS 113-14 (3d ed. 1977).
138 Whether obtained through a penal order procedure, through current plea negotia-
tion practices, or even through adjudication, misdemeanor convictions are unlikely to reflect
the careful deliberation that should accompany the imposition of lifetime disabilities. For
this reason as well as others, it probably would be desirable to provide for the automatic
expungement of misdemeanor convictions after a specified period of time.
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obtain a trial whose guilt-determination phase will be unaffected in
any way by his rejection of the prosecutor's proposal.
If the defendant is convicted at trial, however, the proposal
drafted by the prosecutor and approved by the court should as,
sume significance at sentencing. This proposal should advise the
defendant that his insistence on trial cannot lead to a more severe
sentence than the sanction that the prosecutor has proposed. In
West Germany, defendants may be aware without this express as-
surance that courts virtually never "up the ante" when a defendant
rejects a proposed penal order and insists upon trial, but in light of
the pervasiveness of plea bargaining in the United States, the mat-
ter should not be left to implication here."3 9
Assurance that the post-trial sentence will not exceed the sen-
tence proposed would free defendants of the gratuitous leverage of
current plea bargaining practices. At the same time, specification
of the sanction actually at issue would permit each defendant to
choose between acquiescence and contest on a knowledgeable ba-
sis. With the stakes made clear, many defendants, especially those
with little chance of acquittal, undoubtedly would forgo the bur-
dens of trial. The procedure would in some ways be similar to plea
bargaining, for prosecutors would continue to make sentence pro-
posals on more or less the same basis that they do today.'40 Never-
theless, each defendant's choice would be made on a more appro-
priate basis than that provided by today's bargaining
practices-practices that usually leave the trial stakes unknown
apart from the fact that they probably will include a tariff for the
invocation of procedural protections. The factors influencing a de-
fendant's choice would change significantly, but there is little rea-
2S" Limitation of the post-trial sentence to the punishment specified in a pretrial propo-
sal might seem incongruous in an unusual case in which the prosecutor had not investigated
the circumstances adequately and in which evidence presented at trial showed the proposal
to be too lenient. Nevertheless, the same sort of incongruity can arise when new evidence
emerges after a plea bargain or a trial, and of course the overly lenient sentence would have
gone undetected had the defendant simply accepted the prosecutor's proposal. In view of
the offers that prosecutors commonly make in plea bargaining on the basis of incomplete
information and their great effect on sentencing, a defender of plea negotiation probably
should not insist too vigorously that sentencing always should be based on the fullest possi-
ble information. In any event, the incongruity of an occasionally inappropriate sentence
would seem a small price to pay in order to assure defendants that their invocation of proce-
dural safeguards will not be punished.
140 In most cases, prosecutors probably would base their proposed penal orders on a
review of police offense reports and the defendants' prior records, the same sources that
they currently consult in formulating plea bargaining offers. See, e.g., M. HEuMANN, supra
note 35, at 103. As in plea bargaining, however, prosecutors also would be free to interview
witnesses or to consult other sources of information about their cases.
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son to expect the reform to increase significantly the number of
trials.
Indeed, one important virtue of the proposed procedure is its
efficiency. Despite the praise that today's plea bargaining process
has received from champions of economy in government, this pro-
cess is not efficient at all. Like misdemeanor trial procedures, plea
negotiation procedures in misdemeanor cases impose substantial
process costs-costs that to a considerable extent are unnecessary.
Today's misdemeanor defendants commonly must take time
from work to assemble in crowded courtrooms. There they and
their counsel wait for rushed huddles with a prosecutor or, fre-
quently, with a prosecutor and a judge in chambers. The prosecu-
tor or judge almost invariably offers some concession for a plea of
guilty. When a defendant persists in seeking a trial, the prosecutor
or judge may offer a greater concession. Then, when the bargaining
is concluded, the judge ascends the bench, delivers some formal
admonitions, and accepts pleas of guilty from almost all of the de-
fendants in his court.
Certainly the admonitions that surround the acceptance of
pleas of guilty would mean more if they were presented to each
defendant in writing and if he could consider them at leisure
before deciding whether to accept a prosecutor's proposal. Simi-
larly, a penal order procedure would save both defendants and
prosecutors the need to make and evaluate proposals under the
pressures of a "hurry-up" conference. The crowds, the waiting
time, the absences from work, the cajolery, the general bustle; and
the play of personalities would all be eliminated. The misdemeanor
process would become far more dignified and deliberative. More-
over, although the detailed cost accounting necessary to document
this proposition seems nearly impossible, a penal order procedure
almost certainly would cost American taxpayers less than today's
daily enactment of scenes from Kafka. The resulting savings could
be used to provide trials in misdemeanor cases in which defen-
dants did risk imprisonment and sensed a significant chance of ac-
quittal and in other atypical cases in which defendants found the
inherent costs of trial worth bearing. Conceivably, some savings
might even be left ever and used to finance trials in felony courts
where, from the defendant's perspective, process costs usually do
not loom so large. In any event, it would seem desirable to intro-
duce to the criminal justice system a remarkable technological in-
novation, the post office. With the adoption of a nontrial procedure
for misdemeanor cases vastly more orderly than today's lower
court plea bargaining, the elimination of plea bargaining in misde-
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meanor courts probably would impose little or no additional bur-
den on American taxpayers.
C. The Problem of Enforcement
Although some plea bargaining proponents contend that an at-
tempt to prohibit this practice would "drive [it] ... back into the
shadows from which it has so recently emerged, 141 others appar-
ently maintain only that complex, far-reaching mechanisms for en-
forcing the prohibition would be necessary.142 For example, when
the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of plea bargaining
in Brady v. United States,1 " it wrote:
A contrary holding would require the States and Federal Gov-
ernment to forbid guilty pleas altogether, to provide a single
invariable penalty for each crime defined by the statutes, or to
place the sentencing function in a separate authority having
no knowledge of the manner in which the conviction in each
case was obtained. In any event, it would be necessary to for-
bid prosecutors and judges to accept guilty pleas to selected
counts, to lesser included offenses, or to reduced charges. 14
Anyone who seeks a plan for abolishing plea bargaining that
would preclude all revision of criminal charges, forbid all guilty
pleas, or seek in other ways to foreclose every conceivable route of
evasion will not find it in this article. Indeed, plea bargaining prob-
ably cannot be abolished. Neither can murder, armed robbery, ra-
cial discrimination, police brutality, cruelty to animals, littering, or
(probably) any other activity known to humankind. So far as I am
aware, there is no perfect enforcement mechanism for any legal
obligation.
Of course, the violation of a law can become so widespread
that the law itself seems futile. Federal liquor prohibition offers
the classic illustration. Nevertheless, some evasion is routinely tol-
erated-substantial evasion on occasion. For example, our legal re-
strictions on the sale of cigarettes to minors have not made it im-
possible for minors to obtain cigarettes. To a considerable extent,
141 The language is from Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978). See also
supra note 38 and accompanying text.
142 Indeed, some opponents of plea bargaining apparently share the same view. For ex-
ample, Parnas and Atkins have proposed an early "charge-setting hearing" at which a mag-
istrate or judge would approve a charge that a prosecutor could not alter without presenting
"significant new information" to the court. Parnas & Atkins, supra note 47, at 119-21.
143 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
144 Id. at 753.
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these restrictions have invited subterfuge and have driven cigarette
smoking by minors underground. Nevertheless, without these re-
strictions the number of minors who smoke probably would in-
crease.14 5 Despite disturbing evasions, legal prohibitions that
merely reduce the incidence of prohibited behavior can be worth-
while. It is a matter of costs and benefits and a matter of degree. It
therefore is not enough for social scientists to proclaim that the
opponents of plea bargaining are bound to fail if they wish to cre-
ate a bargain-free world. 146 That criticism implicitly applies to one
law a standard that no law can meet. Similarly, an empirical find-
ing that some plea bargaining persists in a jurisdiction that has
purported to ban it is worth little more as a guide to policy than a
finding that some burglary persists in a jurisdiction that has at-
tempted to end that activity.
Of course prosecutors and defense attorneys sense personal
advantages in plea bargaining. There are natural temptations to
engage in most of the activities that the law prohibits. Moreover,
plea bargaining commonly occurs in private where no victim, mem-
ber of the public, or other watchdog is likely to see it and howl.
Undeniably, the impediments to enforcement of a plea bargaining
prohibition are substantial. Again, however, plea negotiation is not
unique. Without suggesting that bribery is analogous to plea bar-
gaining in more important ways, one can note a minor parallel. It
is always in the interest of a person who offers a bribe to secure
favorable governmental action, and it is always in the interest of
an official who accepts a bribe to become rich. Bribery, too, is a
transaction between willing adults in private. We have not con-
cluded that the only realistic choice is to legalize bribery or else to
drive it underground.14 7
In a few respects the enforcement of a plea bargaining prohibi-
tion might be easier than the enforcement of our laws against brib-
ery, the sale of cigarettes to minors, and other forbidden consen-
sual behavior. For one thing, the final product of successful plea
bargaining-a plea of guilty-must surface in an inauspicious place
for. illegal behavior, a courtroom. This circumstance at least can
trigger an inquiry. For another, this official inquiry can be directed
to prosecutors and defense attorneys, people who have special obli-
gations to the law.
14 For a penetrating analysis of the problem of teenage smoking, see F. ZIMRING, THE
CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE 136-54 (1982).
146 See, e.g., M. HEUMANN, supra note 35, at 162.
147 See H. PACKER, THE Lnsrrs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 267 (1968).
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A simple and straightforward plan for prohibiting plea bar-
gaining might rely in part on these circumstances; it might consist
of only a little more than what Anglo-American courts did long ago
before they became so plea hungry. When a defendant submits a
plea of guilty, the trial judge should question him, his lawyer, and
the prosecutor individually, asking each whether any reward, favor,
concession, or benefit of any description (express or implied) has
been offered or is anticipated in response to the plea.14 Before ac-
cepting a guilty plea, a court should be required to find, as of old,
that it is not motivated by hope of reward or by fear of official
retaliation for exercising the right to trial. Moreover, although
some observers have argued that implicit judicial bargaining (the
practice of sentencing defendants who plead guilty less severely
than those convicted at trial) would lead to the speedy downfall of
any attempted plea bargaining prohibition,149 they have failed to
consider the most apparent response to this evasion-the prohibi-
tion of implicit bargaining along with its more explicit counter-
parts. As was apparently the practice in England in the nineteenth
century,1 50 a trial judge might inform a defendant who submits a
plea of guilty that his plea will make no difference in the sentence
that he will receive.151
48 This formulation or something close to it might be appropriate for prosecutors and
defense attorneys, but simpler language might be more suitable for interrogating defen-
dants: Has anyone made a deal with you concerning your guilty plea? So far as you know,
has anyone made any deal with your attorney? Has anyone told you that you are likely to
receive a lighter sentence because you are pleading guilty? Have you been told that you are
likely to receive some other break? Although no one may have told you to expect a break, do
you in fact expect to obtain a lighter sentence or some other break because you are pleading
guilty? In your own words, why have you decided to plead guilty?
149 E.g., M. HEUMANN, supra note 35, at 158.
150 See 1 J. ARCHBOLD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, PLEADING AND EVIDENCE 334 (8th ed.
1877):
[A]s defendants often imagine that, by pleading guilty, they are likely to receive some
favor from the court in the sentence ... the judge very frequently undeceives them in
that respect, and apprizes them that their pleading guilty will make no alteration what-
soever in their punishment. If, however, they still persist in their plea of guilty, it is
then recorded by the clerk ....
151 This proposal raises the question whether a defendant's plea of guilty might be rele-
vant to the sentence that he should receive on some occasions. The issue is discussed in The
Changing Debate, supra note 4, at 661-69, and I repeat here only a small part of that
discussion:
One can imagine, if one likes, that a defendant once pleaded guilty out of remorse and
therefore received a relatively lenient sentence. A second defendant, however, after
noting the sentence that the first defendant received, may have pleaded guilty, not
because he was remorseful, but because he hoped to obtain the same favorable treat-
ment. From the day of this first strategic guilty plea until the present, no one has been
able to tell simply by examining a defendant's plea whether or not he was remorseful.
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Of course we have experienced empty guilty plea ceremonies
before, and this proposal might appear to invoke only the failed
historic safeguards that have let us slide to where we are. Before
endorsing this objection, however, one should consider what it says
about members of the legal profession. For the proposal is not to
turn back the clock. It is not to ask form questions of a defendant
who has been persuaded that the court's acceptance of a guilty
plea will save him from the harsh sentence likely after a trial. It is
to ask-as part of a seriously intended plea bargaining prohibi-
tion-questions of two lawyers.
The theory that plea bargaining is inevitable because prosecu-
tors and defense attorneys would find ways to bargain even if bar-
gaining were illegal is unattractive-as unattractive as the theory
that plea bargaining is ineradicable because our nation cannot af-
ford to implement the right to trial promised by the Constitution.
This theory offers a dark view of the legal profession. It sees
America's men and women of the law as lawless, and it proclaims
without evidence, without hesitation, and even without blushing
that large numbers of these people not only would break the law to
achieve their goals, but also that they would lie about this
violation.152
In many ways, to be sure, lawyers and judges could be ex-
pected to resist a plea bargaining prohibition. Many would con-
strue ambiguities, expand exceptions, seek loopholes, and bend im-
precise language in order to continue their established ways.
Indeed, a defense attorney who believed a plea agreement to be in
a client's interest ought to consider it his ethical duty to stretch a
plea bargaining prohibition to its limit. Once the scope of the pro-
hibition were made clear, however, his ethical obligation would be
to comply. Our law imposes a great many limits on what lawyers
may do to advance their clients' interests, and most lawyers seem
to respect these limits (especially when the restrictions are reason-
ably clear, as in the commands not to bribe judges and not to sub-
orn perjury). The key to an effective plea bargaining prohibition
Id. at 662.
Of course there may be guilty-plea cases in which remorse is evidenced by circum-
stances other than the defendant's plea of guilty, and in some of these cases, a failure
to plead guilty might have called into question the inference of remorse that otherwise
would have seemed warranted. One would not hesitate to grant the defenders of plea
bargaining this inch were it not for the strong likelihood that they would take a mile.
Id. at 662 n.29.
151 Although my writings have not expressed a terribly exalted opinion of lawyers and
judges, I do not share this dismal vision of our profession.
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probably lies less in proliferating intricate enforcement mecha-
nisms than in clarifying the scope of the substantive prohibition.
As I have argued elsewhere at greater length,"' it is not always
easier to regulate a practice than to forbid it; that modern truism
simply is not true. The effective implementation of an unambigu-
ous plea bargaining prohibition probably would prove less difficult
than the enforcement of elaborate regulatory schemes. 154 The
Panel on Sentencing Research of the National Academy of Sci-
ences reviewed the available literature on the implementation of
plea bargaining prohibitions and declared, "Prosecutors have re-
frained from proscribed forms of bargaining."' 55
Some advocates of plea bargaining apparently take a different
and somewhat schizophrenic view. While confidently asserting that
a prohibition of plea bargaining would be unenforceable, they dis-
regard problems of enforcement in advancing their own proposals
for reform. 158 For example, the Advisory Committee on the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure declared in 1974, "We have previ-
ously recognized plea bargaining as an ineradicable fact. Failure to
recognize it tends not to destroy it but to drive it underground."' 5 7
At the same time, the Committee added to the federal rules a pro-
vision that trial judges "shall not participate in [plea] discus-
sions."1 58 The Committee offered neither a procedure for enforcing
this prohibition nor any discussion of the likelihood of evasion;
presumably the Committee regarded it as unthinkable that judges
would not comply. One is left to infer that prohibiting judicial plea
bargaining tends not to drive it underground but only to destroy
it. 15 Other defenders of plea bargaining have offered such reform
proposals as, "Similarly situated defendants should be afforded
"' SBERMAN Book Review, supra note 4, at 1036-38.
I" See id.
"' 1 RESEARCH ON SENTENCING 28 (A. Blumstein, J. Cohen, S. Martin & M. Tonry eds.
1983). The panel sometimes described this general compliance with plea bargaining prohibi-
tions as "formal." It noted, for example, that in a county in which only charge bargaining by
prosecutors was proscribed, sentence bargaining by trial judges took its place at least in
part. Id. at 187. Of course lawyers and judges have not hesitated to exploit the loopholes
that the prosecutors who have authored most current plea bargaining prohibitions have left
by accident or design. Nevertheless, recent experience apparently offers no support for the
view that lawyers would violate plea bargaining prohibitions once some obvious loopholes
were closed and the scope of the lawyers' obligations made clear.
154 SiLBERmN Book Review, supra note 4, at 1036-38 (discussing Silberman's proposals
for improving the plea bargaining process).
15 FED. R. CRM. P. 11 advisory committee note.
1 FED. R. Cam. P. 11(e)(1).
15 But see The Trial Judge's Role, supra note 4, at 1151-52.
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equal plea agreement opportunities."16 0 These observers may be-
lieve that the general high-mindedness of prosecutors will be
enough to effectuate reforms that they desire but that no enforce-
ment machinery can implement reforms that they oppose.
Of course some lawyers and judges might disobey a plea bar-
gaining prohibition. For example, after telling a defendant that his
choice of plea would not affect his sentence, a trial judge might
disregard this pledge and, through actions that spoke louder than
his words, demonstrate the foolishness of the defendant's exercise
of the right to trial. To a considerable extent, the plea acceptance
procedures proposed in this article wager the right to trial on the
proposition that most trial judges have not attained the high level
of malevolence that this turnabout would require."' Nevertheless,
some check on the possibility that the proposed procedures would
become hypocritical rituals in the hands of dishonest lawyers and
judges might be warranted.
This check could be provided by permitting postconviction
proceedings in which allegations of noncompliance with a plea bar-
gaining prohibition could be heard and adjudicated. When a defen-
dant who has pleaded guilty demonstrates by a preponderance of
the evidence that his plea was the product either of a sub rosa
promise or of a pattern of implicit bargaining, his conviction
should be set aside. Similarly, when a defendant convicted at trial
shows by a preponderance of the evidence that he was sentenced
more severely as the result of exercising his right to trial, he should
be entitled to reformation of his sentence."'2
160 3 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 14-3.1(c) (2d ed. 1980); OR. REV. STAT. §
135.405(4) (1977).
261 Of course, without any deliberate turnabout, a trial judge might inadvertently im-
pose upon a defendant convicted at trial a more severe sentence than the judge would have
imposed following a plea of guilty. Nonetheless, I believe that a judge would have done
enough when he had done the best that he could. A sentence differential so small that the
judge himself could not perceive it would be unlikely to discourage exercise of the right to
trial.
Even if the sentence differential were eliminated, defense attorneys might "con" their
clients by advising them that guilty pleas probably would be rewarded. A defendant might
become skeptical of his attorney's description of a judge's sentencing practices, however,
when the judge himself assured the defendant in court that his practices were different.
Moreover, an attorney who offered this advice would be ethically obliged to reveal its nature
when asked in court whether he anticipated that the defendant's guilty plea would be re-
warded. An attorney who regularly advised his clients in one way and answered the court's
inquiries in another could not be confident that his misconduct would escape detection.
162 As federal and state rules have required ever-more-elaborate courtroom guilty plea
colloquies, the Supreme Court has expressed the hope that sufficiently intricate plea-accept-
ance procedures can foreclose all avenues of postconviction relief. See, e.g., McCarthy v.
United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969); Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 (1977). The Court
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A few other embellishments of a plea bargaining prohibition
merit consideration. It would be inappropriate to forbid a prosecu-
tor from reducing a charge that he had filed if new evidence made
the initial charge appear unjustified, and it also might seem inap-
propriate to forbid charge reduction when further reflection con-
vinced the prosecutor that his initial charge was inequitable. More-
over, it might seem undesirable to prohibit a defense attorney from
urging the prosecutor to reconsider his charge. Of course a charge-
revision process, especially one that included discussions between
prosecutors and defense attorneys, could lead to implicit under-
standings, implicit misunderstandings, and expectations of reci-
procity. To clarify the situation, it might be desirable to require a
prosecutor to file with any downward revision of a charge an ex-
press assurance that no expectation of reciprocity existed and that
the defendant might still stand trial on the revised charge. It also
might be desirable to provide that no guilty plea to the reduced
apparently believes that guilty pleas can be packaged carefully enough that the prospect of
post-conviction proceedings will disappear. This hope is misconceived. An attachment to
finality in guilty plea cases is likely to prevent even moderate reform of the plea bargaining
process.
Although this article has expressed considerable optimism about revised courtroom pro-
cedures that would include the interrogation of prosecutors and defense attorneys, the par-
ties to an improper bargain have an undeniable interest in concealing it. The proposed plea-
acceptance procedures might inhibit illicit bargaining by lawyers but would be unlikely to
reveal whatever bargaining occurred despite the ban. Moreover, today's courtroom proce-
dures-procedures that seek answers only from defendants-are far less likely to succeed.
If the villain of a melodrama were to place a gun at the hero's head and require him to
sign, first, a deed conveying his farm and, second, a paper declaring that there was no gun at
his head, the second paper would be worth no more than the first. Moreover, the second
paper would not gain value with the addition of more elaborate clauses and more emphatic
denials. Similarly, a defendant's affirmation of the voluntariness of his guilty plea at the
time that he enters it adds almost nothing to the plea itself. This in-court affirmation is
merely another piece of paper, and making the defendant's affirmation more detailed and
elaborate cannot cure its inherent defects.
Plainly coercive threats are unlikely to be revealed so long as the consequence of re-
vealing them will be the rejection of a guilty plea-and the consequence of rejecting the
guilty plea, execution of the threats. A full presentation of coercive circumstances can be
expected only after those circumstances have abated, and any effort to force "final" adjudi-
cation of the voluntariness of a defendant's guilty plea at the moment it escapes his lips is
fundamentally misguided.
Plea agreements can be placed on the record, but perhaps only to the extent that courts
decline to review very seriously the terms of these agreements. Once some sorts of plea
agreements were denied judicial approval, a court could not be certain that agreements of
this sort would be revealed. Of course this circumstance does not argue against recording
plea agreements. The principal function served by recording them, however, is not to facili-
tate judicial review of the fairness of their terms. It is to prevent misunderstandings and
contrived claims concerning the contents of these agreements, the same function served by
statutory requirements that especially important private contracts be memorialized in writ-
ing. See, e.g., U.C.C § 2-201 (1978).
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charge could be entered for a period of perhaps thirty days so that
a sub rosa understanding could not be implemented immedi-
ately.1, 3 The incentives for entering an under-the-table plea agree-
ment plainly would be reduced if one party ran a substantial risk
that the other would fail to carry out this unverifiable bargain.
I repeat that none of the safeguards proposed here would be
foolproof and that some evasion undoubtedly would occur," 4 but
whatever the level of subterfuge and evasion at the outset, it prob-
ably would diminish with time. Law typically works less through
specific enforcement mechanisms than through its gradual influ-
ence upon attitudes. Fifty years ago, for example, police use of the
third degree to secure confessions was apparently a widespread ac-
tivity.165 We have not, in the interim, devised an effective means of
policing what occurs in the backroom of a stationhouse. Neverthe-
less, the third degree does not seem to be nearly as significant a
problem today."'8 Even if determined prosecutors and defense at-
torneys were to devise an elaborate system to evade new legal re-
strictions on plea bargaining, the next generation of prosecutors
and defense attorneys might have a different attitude.
I have argued elsewhere that critics of the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule "have followed too closely Justice Holmes' advice
to view the law from the perspective of a 'bad man' who wishes
only to evade it.11 67 From a "bad cop" perspective, it is easy to
ridicule the supposed deterrent effect of the fourth amendment ex-
clusionary rule." 8 This perspective, however, has led critics of the
rule to overlook what is probably one of the law's success stories.
Police behavior has changed for the better in the generation since
Mapp v. Ohio,"9 and it has improved dramatically in the two gen-
163 Use of this waiting period was suggested by Professors John C. Coffee Jr. and
Michael Tonry.
16 Without attempting to treat this regrettable circumstance as a virtue, one can note
that at least it would reduce the strain on existing resources that a plea bargaining prohibi-
tion might produce. One cannot logically contend both that a plea bargaining prohibition
would be a dead letter and that it would swamp the courts. If the behavior of prosecutors,
defense attorneys, and trial judges would not change overnight, the morning would not see a
sudden devouring of the courts by the caseload monster.
165 See NAT'L COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS
IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 153 (1931).
166 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445-49 (1966).
167 The Changing Debate, supra note 4, at 713.
See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 415 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (the hope that the exclusionary rule would
"give meaning and teeth to the constitutional guarantees" was "hardly more than a wistful
dream").
169 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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erations since the Wickersham Commission reported on the third
degree17 and the Supreme Court began excluding coerced confes-
sions from evidence in state criminal proceedings. 71 The causes of
these changes obviously are complex, but the law probably has had
an influence. The principal reason has not been that lawless and
dishonest officers have greatly feared the discovery of their abuses
and the courtroom exclusion of coerced confessions or illegally
seized evidence. Rather it has been that essentially law-abiding of-
ficers have accepted (although slowly and reluctantly on some oc-
casions) the guidance that the law has provided. People who confi-
dently assert that a prohibition of plea bargaining would only drive
it underground have fallen into the Holmesian trap and have been
thinking about law enforcement in the wrong way. The "bad man
of the law" does deserve careful attention, but the good person of
the law merits notice as well.
II. ALTERNATIVE SHORTCUTS
This article has suggested that full implementation of the
right to jury trial would be costly only in felony cases and that,
even in felony cases, the cost would be far from exorbitant. Never-
theless, however bearable this cost might seem, Americans might
prove unwilling to pay it.172 Even this refusal to afford criminal
defendants the kind of trial promised by the Constitution would
not require the continuation of plea bargaining. In providing elabo-
rate trials to a minority of defendants while pressing all others to
abandon their right to trial, our nation allocates its existing re-
sources about as sensibly as a nation that attempted to solve its
transportation problem by giving Cadillacs to ten percent of the
population while requiring everyone else to travel by foot. The cen-
tral argument of this part of the article is that less would be more.
The article develops this theme partly by exploring the exper-
iences of other times and places. Much of today's talk about eco-
nomic necessity, immutable principles of organizational interac-
tion, and the inevitability of plea bargaining seems strained when
one glances beyond the boundaries of our own criminal justice sys-
tem. Most of the world actually lives in what the proponents of
plea bargaining tend to regard as fantasy land.17 3 Moreover, the
170 See NAT'L COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, supra note 165.
171 See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
172 The available evidence suggests that Americans are not in fact so miserly. See supra
note 65 and accompanying text.
17, See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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Anglo-American legal system itself survived without plea bargain-
ing throughout most of its history.1 74 Indeed, two American juris-
dictions, Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, have avoided the over-
whelming dependency on plea bargaining that characterizes most
American cities by implementing systems of expedited nonjury tri-
als. 175 History, comparative legal study, and contemporary Ameri-
can experience thus support a thesis that I have advanced before
and that this part of the article will develop more fully: "[T]he
more formal and elaborate the trial process, the more likely it is
that this process will be subverted through pressures for self-in-
crimination. The simpler and more straightforward the trial pro-
cess, the more likely it is that the process will be used. 17 6
Apart from offering empirical material in support of this the-
sis, part II will consider a number of ways in which our trial proce-
dures might be simplified. The key to eliminating America's wide-
spread subversion of the right to trial may lie in making trial a
more workable, more affordable procedure.
A. Other Times, Other Places
1. Some Lessons of History. In 1979, I published a history of
the guilty plea in Anglo-American law,17 and for present purposes,
only a brief recapitulation of some of my conclusions seems neces-
sary. For many centuries, Anglo-American courts did not en-
courage guilty pleas but actively discouraged them. s78 Guilty pleas
apparently accounted for a small minority of criminal convictions
during the Middle Ages, 79 the Renaissance,'"s the American colo-
nial period, 8 l and even the first part of the nineteenth century. 8
As recently as the early twentieth century, moreover, our criminal
justice system was not as dependent on the guilty plea as it has
now become. For example, in 1908 and for several years thereafter,
only about fifty percent of all convictions in the federal courts were
obtained by guilty plea rather than trial.83 Moreover, when plea
174 See infra notes 177-96 and accompanying text.
178 See infra notes 412-501 and accompanying text.
76 History, supra note 4, at 42.
177 History, supra note 4.
178 Id. at 7-12.
17 Id. at 7 & n.31.
1 0 Id. at 7, 17 & n.98.
181 Id. at 8-9, 17-18.
182 Id. at 8-10.
183 Id. at 27 (citing ALI, A STUDY OF THE BusINEss OF TH FEDERAL COURTS (pt. 1) 58
(1934)).
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bargaining first emerged in the period following the American Civil
War, appellate courts emphatically condemned it, and they articu-
lated some principles that had seemed implicit in earlier practices
on both sides of the Atlantic: "No sort of pressure can be permit-
ted to bring the party to forego any right or advantage however
slight. The law will not suffer the least weight to be put in the
scale against him."18" "[L]itigation is . . . the safest test of jus-
tice. '185 "The law. . . does not encourage confessions of guilt, ei-
ther in or out of court.' 86 "All courts should so administer the law
.. . as to secure a hearing upon the merits if possible."'187
In the golden age of trials that Anglo-American legal systems
now have abandoned, the trials themselves were not gilt-edged. 188
When defendants offered to plead guilty, judges strongly urged
them to reconsider,' 9 but this practice developed at a time when
the trial process was neither notably burdensome nor particularly
protective of defendants' rights.9 0 Professor Langbein has re-
ported that an English jury could resolve between twelve and
twenty cases during a single day in the 1730's.' 91 At this time
neither party was usually represented by counsel; there was ordi-
narily no voir dire of prospective jurors; a single jury might hear
several cases before retiring; the accused participated actively and
informally in the trial process; and the law of evidence was almost
entirely undeveloped. 92 Moreover, Professor Lawrence M. Fried-
man has reported that one American felony court could conduct a
half dozen jury trials in a single day as recently as the 1890's.9 3
The speed and informality that characterized the trials of past
centuries undoubtedly harbored potential for abuse, but the Amer-
ican jury trial now has become so complex that our society usually
refuses to provide it. Reluctant to reconsider our expensive trial
procedures, we press most defendants to forgo even the more expe-
O'Hara v. People, 41 Mich. 623, 624, 3 N.W. 161, 162 (1879).
Wright v. Rindskopf, 43 Wis. 344, 357 (1877).
lee Griffin v. State, 12 Ga. App. 615, 622, 77 S.E. 1080, 1084 (1913).
187 Deloach v. State, 77 Miss. 691, 692, 27 So. 618, 618 (1900).
I" History, supra note 4, at 40-41.
Is* Id. at 7-9.
190 Id. at 40-41.
" Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. Cm. L. REv. 263, 277
(1978).
192 Id. passim; see also Baker, Criminal Courts and Procedure at Common Law, in
CRIME IN ENGLAND 1550-1800, at 15, 32-45 (J. Cockburn ed. 1977); Langbein, Shaping the
Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial: A View from the Ryder Sources, 50 U. Cm. L. Rav. 1
(1983).
193 Friedman, Plea Bargaining in Historical Perspective, 13 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 247, 257
n.16 (1979).
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ditious form of trial that defendants once were freely afforded as a
matter of right."'
As Professor Langbein has demonstrated,195 this paradox of
our criminal justice system has a parallel in history. On the Euro-
pean continent during the late Middle Ages and the Renaissance, a
formalistic, rule-bound trial process designed to protect defendants
had proven unworkable in practice. Rather than revise their un-
realistically high standards of proof, officials adopted expedient
shortcuts to induce defendants to incriminate themselves. These
shortcuts included a judicially sanctioned system of torture sur-
rounded by supposed safeguards that were similar to those that
surround the plea bargaining process today.198 Both Continental
and Anglo-American history support the view that pressures for
self-incrimination increase as trial procedures grow complex.
2. A Rapid International Tour. In 1961 in Rogers v. Rich-
mond, 97 the Supreme Court declared, "[O]urs is an accusatorial
and not an inquisitorial system-a system in which the State must
establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured and
may not by coercion prove its charge against an accused out of his
own mouth."198 In this statement, the Court revealed some narrow-
ness of vision. Professor Lloyd L. Weinreb has noted that "no
country relies so much as we on the defendant's formal acknowl-
edgement of his guilt."' 19 Plea bargaining is not only a relatively
recent phenomenon; it is also a distinctive feature of Anglo-Ameri-
can legal systems. Still, as Professor Rudolph B. Schlesinger has
observed with a touch of provocative exaggeration, "[W]hen it
comes to problems of criminal procedure, [American lawyers] are
possessed by. a feeling of superiority that seems to grow in direct
proportion to the ever-increasing weight of the accumulating evi-
dence demonstrating the total failure of our system of criminal
justice. '20 0
That the extent of a jurisdiction's reliance on plea bargaining
is likely to turn largely on the complexity of its trial procedures is
illustrated, not only by America's unhappy experience and the less
distressing experience of nations that have managed to avoid plea
14 See History, supra note 4, at 41.
l" Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHli. L. REv. 3 (1978).
19 See id. at 14-19.
1 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
"~ Id. at 541.
1 L. WEINRm, supra note 128, at 148.
200 Schlesinger, Comparative Criminal Procedure: A Plea for Utilizing Foreign Experi-
ence, 26 BuFFALo L. RBv. 361, 363 (1977).
[50:931
Alternatives to Plea Bargaining
bargaining, but also by the experience of some "intermediate" ju-
risdictions. Most notably, England's trial procedures have been
used more frequently than our more elaborate alternatives but less
frequently than the simpler procedures of nations that do not en-
gage in plea bargaining.0 1 Moreover, the practices of other nations
of the British Commonwealth and of countries like Israel that have
derived their legal systems partly from English or American insti-
tutions seem to fit the same "in-between" pattern.20 2
The frequent denial that plea bargaining occurs in England0 s
is apparently based largely on semantics;2 04 there is ample evidence
that what Americans would call plea bargaining does occur, not
only in England,20 5 but also to some degree in several of these
other nations.2 0 6 Nevertheless, these nations do not seem as depen-
dent on plea bargaining as we are. 07 The nation whose practice
101 See infra note 211 and accompanying text.
1 See infra notes 203-16 and accompanying text.
20 E.g., ABA House of Delegates Approves Fair Trial-Free Press Guidelines, 19 CrIM.
L. REP. (BNA) 2437, 2440 (Aug. 25, 1976) (statement of Richard DuCann, Queen's Counsel).
10 For example, one prosecuting counsel in England told an interviewer, "There is a
difference between plea-bargaining and accepting on behalf of the prosecution a plea to one
of the counts, perhaps one of the lesser ones, in an indictment." Seifman, Plea-Bargaining
in England, in PLEA BARGAINING 179, 188 (W. McDonald & J. Cramer eds. 1980).
20 See J. BALDWIN & M. McCoNVILLE, NEGOTIATED JusTcE passim (1977); Baldwin &
McConville, Plea Bargaining and Plea Negotiation in England, 13 LAw & Soc'Y Rav. 287
(1979); Heberling, Conviction Without Trial, 2 ANGLO-AM. L. Rav. 428 (1973); Seifman,
supra note 204; Thomas, An Exploration of Plea Bargaining, 1969 CriM. L. Rv. 69; cf.
Davis, Sentences for Sale: A New Look at Plea Bargaining in England and America (pts. 1
& 2), 1971 CraM. L. Rav. 150, 218 (England and America have "very different plea bargain-
ing practices"); Purves, That Plea-Bargaining Business: Some Conclusions from Research,
1971 CraM. L. REv. 470 (concluding that plea bargaining in England "differs significantly
[from that in America] at all levels").
26 See, e.g., B. GRoSMAN, THE PROsEcuToR 29-44 (1969) (Canada); Cousineau & Ver-
dun-Jones, Evaluating Research into Plea Bargaining in Canada and the United States:
Pitfalls Facing the Policy Makers, 21 CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY 293 (1979); Parker, Cop-
ping a Plea, 20 CHITTY's L.J. 310 (1972) (Canada); Ratushny, Plea-Bargaining and The
Public, 20 CHrrry's L.J. 238 (1972) (Canada); Verdun-Jones & Cousineau, Cleansing the
Augean Stables: A Critical Analysis of Recent Trends in the Plea Bargaining Debate in
Canada, 17 OSGOODa HALL L.J. 227 (1979); Westling, Plea-Bargaining: A Forecast for the
Future, 7 SYDNEY L. Rxv. 424 (1976) (Australia); Interview with David Libai, former Israeli
prosecutor and defense attorney, in Chicago (Oct. 11, 1967) (Israel); Letter from Robert D.
Seifman, University of Melbourne (June 24, 1980) (Australia). For an indication that plea
bargaining, if it occurs, lacks any official approval in New Zealand, see The King v. Walsh,
1948 N.Z.L.R. 937 (S.C.) (guilty plea set aside because Detective Sergeant might have in-
duced defendant to plead guilty).
207 For example, a former Los Angeles prosecutor who had become a Senior Lecturer in
Law at the University of Sydney began a discussion of plea bargaining in Australia by say-
ing, "There can be little doubt that some plea bargaining exists in Australian courts. It may
not be very widespread, it may be done in subtle and unannounced ways, and it may lack
official sanction, but it does exist in some degree." Westling, supra note 206, at 424.
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comes closest to that of the United States is probably Canada,
where "of the cases adjudicated approximately 70 per cent are dis-
posed of by guilty pleas and approximately 30 per cent . ..by
trial."20 8 Empirical studies of Canadian practices have concluded
that the entry of a guilty plea has only a minor or imperceptible
effect on a defendant's sentence-considerably less effect than this
tactical decision usually has in the United States.209 Moreover, al-
though plea bargaining may be reasonably widespread in Canada,
most Canadian authorities seem far from reconciled to it. As two
Canadian scholars have observed,
Evidently the plea agreement has now been enshrined as a
cornerstone of the federal criminal justice system within the
United States. In Canada, the main drift in policy making has
been in exactly the opposite direction. Canadian courts are
beginning to express strong disapproval of plea bargaining
while the Law Reform Commissions both of Canada and On-
tario have strongly advocated rigorous suppression of the
practice.21 0
In England, approximately forty percent of the defendants
Although he knew of no official statistics, a former Israeli prosecutor and defense attor-
ney expressed his confidence that guilty plea rates in Israel were substantially lower than
those in the United States. He described plea bargaining in Israel as "neither very wide-
spread nor very unusual." Noting the absence of jury trials, he observed,
There is no feeling that the great mass of defendants must be induced to plead guilty.
Two or three ordinary trials, involving neither terribly simple nor terribly complex
cases, can usually be conducted in a single morning. It is a rare case that cannot be
proven with two or three witnesses, and prosecutors know that they may very well
spend more time bargaining a case than they would spend at trial. Accordingly they do
not regard plea bargaining as a great administrative boon.
Interview with David Libai, supra note 206.
208 Ferguson, The Role of the Judge in Plea Bargaining, 15 CRIM. L.Q. 26, 30 (1972).
The statistics Ferguson cites are apparently derived from studies of Magistrates' Courts,
and some studies of Magistrates' Courts have suggested lower guilty plea rates. See Verdun-
Jones & Cousineau, supra note 206, at 250-51 (43.5% guilty plea rate in a sample of 1655
cases from the Magistrates' Courts of Toronto during 1970 and 1971). Guilty plea rates in
the county courts and the Supreme Court are apparently lower than those in the Magis-
trates' Court. See CANADIAN COMM'N ON CORRECTIONS, TowARD UNITY 134 (1969) (law en-
forcement officers believe 40-50% of all convictions result from guilty pleas). For a review of
several studies of guilty plea rates in Canada, see Verdun-Jones & Cousineau, supra note
206, at 250-51.
109 Compare M. FRIEDLAND, DETENTION BEFORE TRIAL 121 n.12 (1965) (no great varia-
tions between the sentences imposed after guilty and not guilty pleas) and J. HOGARTH,
SENECING AS A HUMAN PROcEss 345-49 (1971) (no statistical correlation between plea and
length of sentence imposed in Canadian Magistrates' Courts) with The Changing Debate,
supra note 4, at 652-56 (empirical evidence indicates major effect of plea on sentence in the
United States).
210 Cousineau & Verdun-Jones, supra note 206, at 294 and sources cited therein.
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charged in Crown Courts have received jury trials in recent
years.21' Moreover, the plea bargaining that occurs seems relatively
genteel by American standards. Until 1970, counsel for the defen-
dant sometimes could obtain an advance indication from the trial
judge of the sentence that his client was likely to receive on a plea
of guilty,2 12 but a judicial decision of that year apparently put an
end to the practice.213 Counsel for the crown is never permitted to
make sentence recommendations,214 and bargaining focuses exclu-
sively on possible reductions in the charge. Moreover, the Court of
Criminal Appeal has ruled that it is improper to reduce a charge
"where nothing appears on the depositions which can be said to
reduce the crime from the more serious offense" and that trial
judges should refuse to permit charge reductions unless this stan-
dard is satisfied. 5 One commentator, a barrister familiar with
both English and American practice, has maintained that conces-
sions to defendants who plead guilty are far less routine in Eng-
land, that judicial review of prosecutorial decisions is far more vig-
orous, and that American prosecutors "have assumed unto
themselves certain discretions which in England are still carefully
guarded by the judges." '
"' Wilson, Crime and Punishment in England, PuB. INTEREST, Spring 1976, at 3, 18.
See also Baldwin & McConville, supra note 205, at 287 n.1 (suggesting a somewhat lower
figure for 1976); Heberling, supra note 205, at 428 n.1 (54% of Crown Court convictions are
by guilty plea). Guilty plea rates in the Magistrates' Courts seem considerably higher than
those in the Crown Courts, however, id.; Baldwin & McConville, supra note 205, at 287 n.1,
and the rate of guilty pleas in England apparently has increased in recent decades. During
the 1940's, it was asserted that less than half of those indicted in England pleaded guilty. L.
ORPIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 297 n.122 (1947). To establish the
legal context of these statistics, it should be noted that all trials in the Crown Courts are
jury trials and all trials in the Magistrates' Courts are nonjury trials.
211 See, e.g., Stockdale, The Problem of Wounding With Intent, 1958 CraM. L. REv.
675, 677.
213 Regina v. Turner, [1970] 2 Q.B. 321 (Crim. App.). This case held only that a judge
could not indicate a probable sentence unless he also declared that this sentence would be
unaffected by whether the defendant pleaded guilty or was convicted at trial. Nevertheless,
the court's ruling led to a situation in which trial judges apparently never give advance
indications of the sentences that they intend to impose. Interview with Ivan Lawrence,
Member of Parliament and London barrister whose practice consists largely of defending
criminal cases, in London (Sept. 1, 1980). At the same time, it is widely believed that En-
glish judges sentence defendants who plead guilty less severely than comparable defendants
convicted at trial. One London solicitor maintained that a one-third discount is the approxi-
mate going rate. Interview with James Morton, in Boulder, Colorado (Apr. 6, 1983).
214 Interview with David S. Gandy, Chief Prosecuting Solicitor of the County of Greater
Manchester, in Washington, D.C. (June 4, 1976); see Baldwin & McConville, supra note 205,
at 289 (a specific sentence recommendation by a prosecutor would be unethical).
"' Rex v. Soanes, 32 Crim. App. 136, 136-37 (C.A. 1948).
" Davis, supra note 205, at 156; see also 1970 CRiM. L. REv. 601 (prosecutor's decision
to proceed on reduced charges not binding on court).
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Although English trial and pretrial procedures are substan-
tially more burdensome than those of many nations that sense no
need to engage in plea bargaining, these procedures are also less
elaborate than our own. The grand jury in England has been dis-
carded, and nonunanimous jury verdicts are permitted. 1 As is the
case almost everywhere except in the United States, the products
of unlawful searches and seizures are admitted into evidence in
most cases.2 18 Although the law provides for the peremptory chal-
lenge of prospective jurors, this prerogative is rarely exercised, and
a jury is usually empaneled in minutes.2 19 Of course English proce-
dure recognizes a privilege against self-incrimination, but it also
operates to encourage defendants to testify by forbidding impeach-
ment on the basis of prior convictions in most situations and by
permitting juries to draw adverse inferences from silence.220 These
rules promote use of the evidence of defendants them-
selves-evidence that, as Professor Langbein has observed, is "al-
most always the most efficient testimonial resource. '221 In addi-
tion, "lawyers almost never object to a question, . . . the hearsay
rule has been abolished,. . . [and] leading questions are permitted
on direct as well as cross-examination. 2 22 The intermediate com-
plexity of English trial procedure may explain both why plea bar-
gaining has become part of the English criminal justice system and
why it has not become as important a part of that system as it is of
ours.
The criminal procedures of continental Europe have provided
the principal model for most of the rest of the world, and although
217 Edwards, English Criminal Procedure and the Scales of Justice, in THE ECONOMICS
OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 129, at 203, 216-17; see also Kaufman, Criminal
Procedure in England and the United States: Comparisons in Initiating Prosecutions, 49
FORDHA L. Rnv. 26, 27 (1980) (elimination of grand jury).
218 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 463 U.S. 388,
415 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Jeffrey v. Black, [1978] 1 Q.B. 490 (Q.B. Div'l Ct.);
Williams, The Exclusionary Rule Under Foreign Law-England, 52 J. CRiM. L. CRIMINOL-
OGY & POLICE Sc. 272 (1961).
219 See Zeisel & Diamond, The Effect of Peremptory Challenges on Jury and Verdict:
An Experiment in a Federal District Court, 30 STANi . L. REV. 491, 498-99 (1978); see also
Stafford, Trial by Jury-the English Way, 66 A.B.A. J. 330, 332 (1980).
220 See Schlesinger, supra note 200, at 378-79. An English judge may not invite a jury
to infer that a defendant is guilty because he has remained silent, but a judge may invite a
jury to give less weight to an account that a defendant has given for the first time at trial
and to give special weight to prosecution evidence that the defendant has failed to answer.
See Greenawalt, Perspectives on the Right to Silence, in CRIME, CRIMINOLOGY AND PUBLIC
POLICY 235, 240, 243-44 (R. Hood ed. 1974).
221 Langbein, supra note 130, at 208.
22 Stafford, supra note 219, at 330.
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some Americans maintain that there are near equivalents of the
negotiated plea in European practice,22 3 these Continental proce-
dures also provide the principal illustration of the ability of ad-
vanced legal systems to avoid reliance on plea bargaining. 24 The
experience of the Scandinavian nations may be especially instruc-
tive, for in some ways the procedures of these nations differ from
those on the rest of the Continent and are parallel to our own.
Although writings in English about Scandinavian criminal proce-
dure are unfortunately scanty, 25 an article by Jonas A. Myhre, a
Norwegian attorney, has provided a thoughtful description of the
workings of criminal justice in that country.226 In most of continen-
tal Europe, even the institution of the guilty plea is unknown ex-
cept in minor cases2 27 so that essentially the same trial procedures
are employed when a defendant confesses as when he does not.
Norway, however, does permit the consensual resolution of serious
criminal charges.
For all offenses except those punishable by more than ten
years' imprisonment, the Norwegian code of criminal procedure
provides that a defendant may make "an unreserved confession" in
open court. If the accuracy of this confession is "corroborated by
other existing evidence," the code provides that "the case may,
upon the consent of the accused, at once be adjudicated and tried
without a formal charge and without lay judges being sum-
moned. ' 228 The resulting "trial" is probably somewhat more elabo-
rate than the courtroom procedures that precede the acceptance of
guilty pleas in the United States, but not greatly S0.229 Moreover,
23 See, e.g., Goldstein & Marcus, The Myth of Judicial Supervision in Three "Inquisi-
torial" Systems: France, Italy, and Germany, 87 YALE L.J. 240 (1977).
224 See, e.g., Damaska, The Realilty of Prosecutorial Discretion: Comments on a Ger-
man Manuscript, 29 Am. J. CoMP. L. 119, 130 (1980); Schlesinger, supra note 200, at 382;
Weigend, Continental Cures for American Ailments: European Criminal Procedure as a
Model for Law Reform, 2 CRIME & JUST. 381, 386 (1980); K6tz, Book Review, 48 U. CHI. L.
REv. 478, 481 (1981).
228 See K. HAUKAAS, NORWEGIAN LEGAL PUBLICATIONS IN ENGLISH, FRENCH AND GERMAN
46-47 (1967). A useful description of Swedish criminal procedure is H. BECKER & E. HJEL-
LEMO, JUSTICE IN MODERN SWEDEN (1976), which indicates the existence of a guilty plea
procedure but offers no hint of plea bargaining. Id. at 87.
"' Myhre, supra note 129.
22 See H. SILVING, supra note 107, at 250, 255.
218 Myhre, supra note 129, at 649-50.
" See id. at 650, 653. In Japan, too, a procedure between a guilty plea and a full trial
has been established--"a mode of summary trial which may be had when the accused, at the
beginning of trial, has made a statement that he is guilty of the facts charged." Dando,
Japanese Criminal Procedure Reform, in ESSAYS IN CRIMINAL SCIENCE 447, 458 (G. Mueller
ed. 1961). Nevertheless, one source insisted that there is no bargaining for guilty pleas or for
judicial confessions in Japan. Interview with Chisugi Mukai, Tokyo trial judge, in Boulder,
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Norwegian prosecutors are not restricted by a rule of compulsory
prosecution like the rules applicable in West Germany and Italy;
they may properly decline to prosecute even when the evidence in-
dicates a defendant's guilt.230
Norway also goes farther than most other European nations in
promoting public participation in the administration of justice. Al-
though this nation, like many others, employs mixed tribunals of
professional and lay judges in less serious criminal cases, it retains
ten-person criminal juries for the most serious cases. 21 In addition,
trial procedures are accusatorial in character, and the state bears
the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt." 2 Finally, Norway, like most other European nations, has
experienced a rapid expansion of criminal caseloads in recent
years.2 33
Despite the existence of broad prosecutorial discretion, a con-
fession procedure very much like the guilty plea, a jury system for
serious cases, and other conditions that are thought to make plea
bargaining inevitable in the United States, Myhre reported that
the Norwegian prosecutor "is not allowed to bargain with the de-
fendant in order to secure a conviction," that "he is liable to crimi-
nal prosecution if he does so," that "[b]argains are almost nonexis-
tent," and that "the system functions very well without them."2'
Of course, when prosecutors do not bargain, judges may re-
ward the entry of guilty pleas by sentencing defendants who plead
guilty less severely than those who are convicted at trial.3 5 This
"implicit" judicial bargaining can prove as intimidating as the
more "explicit" kind,36 and a system that merely substituted one
Colorado (Oct. 4, 1978).
20 Myhre, supra note 129, at 658-60.
232 Interview with Johannes Andenaes, Professor of Law and Director of the Institute of
Criminology and Criminal Law at the University of Oslo, Norway, in Chicago (Mar. 14,
1968). The criminal jury also has been retained in Denmark and in some of the Swiss can-
tons. H. KALVEN & H. ZEiSEL, supra note 91, at 14 n.3.
232 Myhre, supra note 129, at 647.
233 Id. at 661.
34 Id. at 658. One rarely used Norwegian procedure, however, the patale unnlatelse,
can be viewed as a form of plea bargaining. It is an official judgment of guilt rendered, not
by a court, but by a prosecutor. It cannot be accompanied by any fine or imprisonment
whatever. Although the issuance of a patale unnlatelse does not seem to be the product of
back-and-forth negotiations, it must be accepted by the accused, and the accused does risk a
more severe sanction if he rejects it and insists upon standing trial before a court. See Fel-
stiner & Drew, supra note 129, at 21.
235 See Church, Plea Bargains, Concessions, and the Courts: Analysis of a Quasi-Ex-
periment, 10 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 377, 384-88 (1976).
Is' See The Trial Judge's Role, supra note 4, at 1076-87.
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form of bargaining for another might not seem a promising model
for reform. Myhre, however, addressed this possibility:
The punishment [of the defendant who confesses] will,
neither as a matter of law, nor of practice, be more lenient
than in judgments entered after a trial. The only concession
thus given the accused is a procedural one, being saved the
inconvenience and publicity of an ordinary trial. In spite of
this, there are a great number of accused persons who prefer
the summary adjudication, a fact which may sound rather in-
credible to those familiar with the system in the United
States. "
The ability of European legal systems to function effectively
without plea bargaining seems to be disputed only in the United
States, and the controversy focuses almost exclusively on the possi-
bility of implicit bargains. European law forbids the exchange of
prosecutorial or other official concessions for confessions, and de-
spite the claim that those who find merit in the European systems
may have compared the "law on the books" in Continental nations
237 Myhre, supra note 129, at 650. Nevertheless, of the Continental lawyers and schol-
ars with whom I have discussed the issue, the only one to concede the existence of a func-
tional equivalent of plea bargaining in his nation spoke of a Scandinavian country. Professor
Jdrn Vestergaard of the Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology of the University of
Copenhagen, Denmark, noted that 64% of the defendants in cases filed by public prosecu-
tors in Denmark in 1977 pleaded guilty, and he suggested that some form of implicit bar-
gaining probably lay behind this figure. Although Professor Vestergaard doubted that lay
judges have harsher attitudes toward sentencing than do professional judges, he observed
that some professional judges and lawyers probably believe that lay judges are more severe.
In Denmark, as in Norway, a defendant's confession usually leads to sentencing by a profes-
sional judge rather than by a mixed tribunal, and defendants with little chance of success at
trial may confess partly because they prefer this alternative. Professor Vestergaard con-
ceded that this speculation was based neither on experience, nor on observation of the crim-
inal courts, nor on conversations with practitioners; he merely had drawn an inference from
what he regarded as a high rate of confessions-a rate that does seem higher than that of
most other Continental jurisdictions. Interview with Professor Vestergaard, Institute of
Criminal Law and Criminology of the Univ. of Copenhagen, Denmark, in Boulder, Colorado
(Aug. 25, 1980).
Professor Johannes Andenaes of Norway was confident that in his country, too, a ma-
jority of defendants do not contest their guilt, but he rejected the suggestion that any sort of
implicit bargaining might account for their confessions. It would be "impossible," Andenaes
said, for a judge to declare that he viewed a defendant's failure to confess as an appropriate
sentencing consideration, and a judge also would be unlikely to regard a defendant's confes-
sion as evidence of remorse except in the most unusual circumstances. Cf. infra note 267
and accompanying text. According to Andenaes, Norwegian defendants feel no pressure to
confess; the only benefits that a defendant may gain from confession are a simplified trial
procedure and an escape from some publicity. Interview with Johannes Andenaes, supra
note 231.
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with the "law in action" here,2 38 European prosecutors, judges, and
defense attorneys insist with a uniformity rarely encountered in
field research that this legal requirement is observed and that talk
of trading a defendant's confession for some benefit that a prosecu-
tor or trial judge might provide simply does not occur.239
The legal constraints under which many European prosecutors
operate. tend to add credibility to these assertions about
prosecutorial practice. In West Germany, for example, a rule of
compulsory prosecution applicable to serious offenses requires the
prosecution of "all prosecutable offenses, to the extent that there is
a sufficient factual basis. '240 Violation of this rule can lead to citi-
zen complaints and administrative and judicial remedies; in a mer-
itocratic corps of career prosecutors in which even unsuccessful
complaints may hinder career advancement, the incentives for
obeying the rule are apparently powerful.2 4' Moreover, if a prose-
cutor were to defy the rule by charging a less serious offense than
that which the evidence would support, his concession might prove
ineffective; a West German court is not bound by a prosecutor's
formulation of the charge and, after giving the defendant appropri-
ate notice and an opportunity to be heard, may convict of any of-
fense that the evidence establishes.4 2 Although West German
prosecutors invariably make sentence recommendations, these rec-
ommendations are followed far less often than are prosecutorial
sentence recommendations in the United States. 243 In legal systems
like West Germany's, in which the guilty plea as such does not
238 See, e.g., Goldstein & Marcus, supra note 223, at 245; Johnson, supra note 128, at
410.
230 See, e.g., Goldstein & Marcus, supra note 223, at 269-70; Langbein, supra note 130,
at 212.
240 Langbein, supra note 130, at 210. For discussion of the rule of compulsory prosecu-
tion, see generally Herrmann, The Rule of Compulsory Prosecution and the Scope of
Prosecutorial Discretion in Germany, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 468 (1974); Langbein, Controlling
Prosecutorial Discretion in Germany, 41 U. Cm. L. REv. 439 (1974).
242 See Langbein, supra note 130, at 211.
242 See J. LANGBEIN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PRocEDuR: GERMANY 66 (1977); Weigend,
supra note 224, at 402-03. Of course, in an effort to prevent the exercise of this judicial
power, a West German prosecutor might attempt to keep incriminating evidence from the
court, but this stratagem would also be difficult to effect. The court has the prosecutor's
dossier before it and conducts most of the courtroom examination of witnesses. See J.
LANGBEIN, supra, at 62, 74-75. Any facts that the prosecutor wished to suppress might very
well be revealed.
242 Compare Casper & Zeisel, Lay Judges in the German Criminal Courts, 1 J. LEGAL
STUD. 135, 167 n.31 (1972) (prosecutors' sentence recommendations adopted in 29% of the
cases in a West German sample) with Johnson, Sentencing in the Criminal District Courts,
9 Hous. L. REv. 944, 971 (1972) (prosecutors' sentence recommendations adopted in 98% of
the guilty plea cases in one Texas county).
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exist in serious cases, in which trials are so uncomplicated that
there is little administrative reason to avoid them, and in which
legal ideology strongly opposes any form of bargaining for confes-
sions, even the most skeptical observers seem to agree that explicit
plea bargaining is unknown.2 4
As Professor Langbein has contended, however, Americans
"feel a deep need for reassurance that what they are doing is not so
bad as it looks. . . .As a corollary to the proposition that plea
bargaining is not really so bad, the claim is advanced that every-
body else does it too. ' 4 5 Professor William M. Landes once wrote:
Although American and Continental procedures for dis-
posing of criminal cases appear to be different ... one can
argue that in actuality they are nearly equivalent .... There
does not have to be an explicit bargain between the prosecu-
tor and the defendant. It is sufficient that the courts operate
in a manner to reward defendants who have confessed with
lighter sentences, and that this fact be known to defendants.
We would predict that European trials in which a confession
has been made .. .would be similar to the formal proceed-
ings before a judge in the United States for defendants who
plead guilty. If my hypothesis is correct, then confessions in
European criminal procedure serve the same purpose as guilty
pleas in American procedure .... This is not surprising since
the forces I cited as producing guilty pleas. . . would operate
on the Continent to produce confessions. 46
Professor Landes, conceding a lack of empirical support for his hy-
pothesis, recognized that it ought to be tested.4 7 Two American
legal scholars, however, Abraham S. Goldstein and Martin Marcus,
have reported on the basis of interviews in West Germany, Italy,
and France that covert European practices may provide "func-
tional analogues of the guilty plea and 'plea bargaining.' ,248
Goldstein and Marcus suggested that uncontested trials in Eu-
24 See Goldstein & Marcus, Comment on Continental Criminal Procedure, 87 YALE
L.J. 1570, 1571 (1978); Goldstein & Marcus, supra note 223, at 269; see also McDonald,
From Plea Negotiation to Coercive Justice: Notes on the Respecification of a Concept, 13
LAw & Soc'y REv. 385 (1979).
' Langbein, supra note 130, at 204.
24 Landes, Comments on the Papers in the Seminar, in THE EcONOMICS OF CRIME AND
PuNIsHMENr, supra note 129, at 225, 228. Accord McDonald, supra note 244, at 386.
247 Landes, supra note 246, at 229.
2 8 Goldstein & Marcus, supra note 223, at 264. For a forceful response to this article,
see Langbein & Weinreb, Continental Criminal Procedure: "Myth" and Reality, 87 YALE
L.J. 1549, 1569 (1978). See also the rejoinder, Goldstein & Marcus, supra note 244.
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rope were similar to guilty pleas in the United States, noting that
European trials are likely to be relatively short when defendants
admit their guilt.249 In fact, however, confessions shorten European
judicial proceedings surprisingly little. In what was then the only
empirical study of this question, Gerhard Casper and Hans Zeisel
reported in 1972 that in West Germany a full confession normally
cut the time devoted to trial in half and the time devoted to delib-
eration hardly at all.2 50 In a jurisdiction in which "[t]he average
duration of a [lesser court] trial is one-third of a day ...
[and] of a [major court] trial one day, ' 251 the time savings effected
by a defendant's confession were not especially great.25 2 Moreover,
a more recent study of lower court trials in West Germany re-
ported that a defendant's confession merely reduced the average
time of trial from seventy to fifty minutes.25 Although Goldstein
and Marcus did present some evidence of the mass processing of
criminal cases in lower courts in France,254 their conclusion that
the uncontested trial in Europe is analogous to the American guilty
plea seemed somewhat strained; and of course an even closer anal-
ogy would not have indicated in any way that uncontested trials in
Europe are the product of a bargaining process.255
When Goldstein and Marcus turned from analogues of the
guilty plea to analogues of plea bargaining, they focused primarily
on whether the rules of compulsory prosecution applicable in Italy
and West Germany and the assertedly comparable practice in
France truly preclude the exercise of discretion by prosecutors and
police officers. They found to no one's surprise that discretion had
not been wholly suppressed. Thus in Italy:
Prosecutors admit that they avoid the requirement of
249 Goldstein & Marcus, supra note 223, at 267-68.
250 Casper & Zeisel, supra note 243, at 152 n.22. The fact that deliberation time is af-
fected very little by confession suggests that, in most cases, this time is largely devoted to
sentencing issues.
251 Id. at 149-50.
252 Goldstein and Marcus observed that Casper and Zeisel had not examined the lowest
tier of West German courts where large numbers of minor offenses are tried. In what ap-
pears to be a nonsequitur, the authors argued that trials in these courts "may well be
shorter and, as a result, even more substantially affected by the accused's confession." Gold-
stein & Marcus, supra note 223, at 268 n.68.
2 5 2 Weigend, supra note 224, at 411 (citing D. DOLLING, DiE ZwFrrEu.UNG DER
HAUP TVRHANDLUNG 221 (1978)).
254 Goldstein & Marcus, supra note 223, at 268.
25 The authors also noted that the West German penal order procedure was "a direct
analogue of the American guilty plea." Id. at 267. For discussion of this procedure, see
Langbein & Weinreb, supra note 248, at 1565-67; see also supra notes 128-223 and accom-
panying text.
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mandatory prosecution by the manner in which they appraise
the credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence, and assign
burdens of proof. For example, when a woman of "tarnished"
reputation alleges that she was raped by an established person
who has no previous record, the prosecutor may make com-
parative assessments of credibility and decline to proceed on
the basis of insufficient evidence, even though he could easily
send the case to trial.25 e
Fortunately the rule of compulsory prosecution does permit
prosecutors to assess questions of credibility in deciding whether
there is an adequate evidentiary basis for prosecution, and it is not
clear that the case suggested by Goldstein and Marcus involved a
departure from the rule. Certainly a judgment concerning the
strength of the evidence cannot be wholly mechanical, and one
may readily accept the suggestion of Goldstein and Marcus that, in
close cases, "[c]ompassion intrudes now and then. '' 257 Nevertheless,
to say that the rule of compulsory prosecution is subject to inter-
pretation or even that it may be bent is not to say that the rule
means nothing or that the discretion exercised by European prose-
cutors is even remotely comparable to the essentially unfettered
charging discretion of prosecutors in the United States. More im-
portantly, the exercise of a unilateral charging discretion that, far
from inducing a defendant to convict himself, may save him from
prosecution is plainly no analogue of plea bargaining.258
Goldstein and Marcus ultimately suggested that two European
practices bore a resemblance to American plea bargaining. In
France, even when the available evidence strongly suggests that a
defendant has committed a serious offense within the jurisdiction
of the Court of Assize, a French prosecutor may use the process of
"correctionalization" to charge a lesser offense triable in the cor-
rectional court whose procedures are less elaborate.259 The defen-
dant, however, may object to this correctionalization and may in-
sist upon standing trial on the more serious charge in the higher
court.2 60 Goldstein and Marcus maintained that when a French
prosecutor uses the process of correctionalization, he "is, in effect,
256 Goldstein & Marcus, supra note 223, at 271.
157 Id. at 280. For a sensitive analysis of the rule of compulsory prosecution, see
Dam~ska, supra note 224.
2" See SmBERmN Book Review, supra note 4, at 1032 ("To say that mercy should be
given is not to say that mercy should be sold.").
"I Goldstein & Marcus, supra note 223, at 277.
260 Id. at 250.
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offering an accused a lesser sentence. . . in exchange for a waiver
by the accused of the full process that he would have if he were
charged with a [more serious crime]." ' This argument may be lit-
erally accurate, especially if one wishes to view a defendant's fail-
ure to insist that he should be prosecuted for a more serious of-
fense as a waiver of procedural protections.262 Nevertheless, a
defendant whose case is correctionalized does not concede his guilt
of any crime. He retains his right to trial and to the full range of
legal protections considered appropriate for the only offense with
which he has been charged. A similar situation might arise if an
American defendant charged only with a finable offense in a non-
jury court were permitted to insist (as he is not) that he should be
charged with a more serious crime in a court where he could re-
ceive a jury trial. Although most defendants would be likely to de-
cline the honor, they probably would not think that they had en-
gaged in plea bargaining. Goldstein and Marcus's analogy between
plea bargaining and correctionalization simply indicates that some
Americans go to extremes in the attempt to prove that everyone
else subverts procedural protections just as we do.2 3
Goldstein and Marcus's final contention was that "[iun return
for an admission of guilt . .. prosecutors may recommend sus-
pended sentences or lenient ones, and judges may impose them."'26
In contrast to the authors' descriptions of other European prac-
tices, this seemingly central assertion received little attention and
was unsupported by reference to any specific interview, any illus-
trative incident, or any European literature.265 Professor Langbein
261 Id. at 277.
282 Weigend, supra note 224, at 408, concluded that "[d]espite strong surface similari-
ties between plea bargaining and correctionalisation, it does not appear that defendants are
coerced into waiving their rights to more formal proceedings"; cf. Langbein & Weinreb,
supra note 248, at 1557 ("it would startle all those involved, the accused not least, to sug-
gest that he has given up something when he does not insist on being prosecuted for a more
serious offense").
283 French prosecutors apparently do not use correctionalization to reward confessions.
Weigend, supra note 224, at 409. One reason may be that a French defendant is entitled to
withdraw a confession at any time before conviction. Id. In addition, the decision to correc-
tionalize takes place before there has been any opportunity to bargain. Id.
2:4 Goldstein & Marcus, supra note 223, at 278.
265 One disturbing aspect of the Goldstein and Marcus article lay in its apparent ten-
dency to treat European sources as believable only when they reported the violation of legal
norms. The article contained statements like this one:
It is difficult to tell whether the repeated affirmations of adherence to the norm of
compulsory prosecution and the repeated denials of agreements between prosecutor
and defense attorney reflect the underlying truth, or whether they are a product of the
habit of officials to answer questions in terms of formal doctrine rather than actual
practice.
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has advanced a substantially different view. In the West German
system:
Confessions are tendered at trial not for reward, but because
there is no advantage to be wrung from the procedural system
by withholding them. The accused knows what prospective
evidence is in the dossier, he knows what evidence the prose-
cutor has asked the court to take at trial, and he is always
examined about the matters charged against him (although
.. . he has the privilege to remain silent).
People do not like to be caught lying, even people who
have already been caught committing serious crimes. It is or-
dinary human nature not to deny the obvious when the truth
is certain to come out anyway....
.. . [T]here is nothing unreasonable about the proposi-
tion that 41% of the cases [in West Germany] are so open-
and-shut that the defendants admit the charges for no better
reason than that contest is hopeless. 68
Langbein's analysis may offer at least as plausible an explanation
of the forty-one percent confession rate in West Germany as the
explanation advanced by Goldstein and Marcus, but of course
neither analysis was based on a direct examination of European
sentencing practices.
During the years that I have been studying plea bargaining, I
have encountered a number of lawyers, academics, and judges with
backgrounds in Continental systems and other legal systems pat-
terned on the Continental model. They have included a delegation
of criminal law teachers from Mexican law schools, most of the
members of the Penal Committee of the French National Assem-
bly, a group of officials from the Afghanistan Ministry of Justice,
and Johannes Andenaes of Norway, Jorn Vestergaard of Denmark,
Hans G. Rupp and Klaus Rolinski of West Germany, Dusan Cotic
and Bostjan M. Zupancic of Yugoslavia, and Zdenek Krystufek, an
American professor who had taught law for twenty years in Czech-
oslovakia. Conversations with these sources obviously can provide
only a tentative basis for judgments about legal practices outside
Id. at 270. Perhaps Goldstein and Marcus did not suggest the distinction between theory
and practice in their questions; perhaps they suspected that this distinction was too subtle
for European lawyers to understand even when the researchers presented it; or perhaps they
simply suspected that virtually all European lawyers and judges were dishonest.
' Langbein, supra note 130, at 219-21. Professor Langbein also emphasized the im-
mense difference between the 41% confession rate in West Germany and the much higher
guilty plea rates in the United States. Id. at 220.
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the United States, but in the absence of more systematic empirical
study, they may be worth something.
All of these sources confirmed the absence of explicit bargain-
ing for confessions in their countries, and they noted that if any
form of prosecutorial or judicial bargaining came to light, it would
render the resulting confessions inadmissible. When I asked
whether confession might be viewed on occasion as evidence of re-
morse, all of the sources agreed that it might. To my surprise, a
few suggested that it would be illegal to consider a defendant's
confession even when it plainly evidenced remorse, but they admit-
ted that this legal stricture might not be observed perfectly and
that "judges are human, too. 26 7 With only a single exception, how-
ever,26 the sources denied that a defendant's confession was likely
217 Weigend maintained that "most German courts consider a voluntary confession a
mitigating factor in sentencing," noting that the "practice is of dubious legality." Weigend,
supra note 224, at 411. Formal legal doctrine in West Germany, however, does not sanction
even trivial inducements to confess. The West German supreme court has said, "[I]t is for-
bidden to punish more leniently the criminal who confesses, solely on account of his confes-
sion." 1 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Strafsachen [BGHSt] 105, 106 (W. Ger.
1951), translated in Langbein, supra note 130, at 221 & n.61. The same decision declared
the impropriety of inducing defendants to confess "through the threat of disadvan-
tage-such as a more severe sentence." Id. at 106.
Professor Langbein, like Professor Weigend, conceded that West German courts some-
times reward confession, but unlike Professor Weigend, he apparently based his concession
on formal legal doctrine-specifically, a statute that permits a court to consider along with
many other factors a defendant's "conduct after the crime, especially his efforts to make
amends for the harm." Langbein, supra note 130, at 221 n.60 (citing Strafgesetzbuch (crimi-
nal code) [STGB] § 46 (W. Ger. 1975)). The reference to a defendant's efforts to make
amends for his crime seems on its face to speak more of acts like restitution and victim
compensation than of confession. In fact, Casper and Zeisel translated the relevant statutory
language somewhat differently than Langbein did. They read it to say that a court might
consider the defendant's "conduct after the act, especially his endeavor to make restitu-
tion." Casper & Zeisel, supra note 243, at 165. Their rendering of the statute avoids conflict
between this statute and the West German supreme court decision described above, and my
literate and knowledgeable colleague Hiroshi Motomura reports that the word that
Langbein translated as "to make amends for the harm"--wiedergutzumachen-is more
commonly translated as "to make reparations." This word is used, for example, in the Ger-
man equivalent of the phrase "make reparations of war."
Apart from formal doctrine, Professor Langbein has noted that manuals on the defense
of criminal cases in West Germany have discussed whether it may be tactically advanta-
geous for defendants to confess. These manuals report that a confession may permit "coun-
sel to narrow and direct the court's attention to ameliorating factors in the accused's back-
ground and his criminal conduct." Langbein, supra note 130, at 221 n.61. In contrast to the
extensive discussions of plea bargaining in similar American volumes, the manuals offer no
hint that a defendant's confession is likely to be rewarded with a more lenient sentence. Id.
at 215 & n.40 (citing H. DAHS, HANDBUCH DES STRAFVERTEIDIGERS (4th ed. 1977); H. SCHORN,
DER STRAFVERTEIDIGERS (1966)).
2 6 Apart from Professor Vestergaard, see supra note 237, a letter from Professor Fritz
W. Scharpf of West Germany recognized the possibility that some implicit bargaining might
occur in his country. Scharpf ultimately took an agnostic position, however: "It is hard to
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to be rewarded in a systematic way. A typical statement was that
of Professor Andenaes: "If a defendant were to confess before any
significant evidence against him had come to light, his confession
might seem relevant, but a judge ordinarily would not regard a
confession as relevant to sentencing if it has been made when there
was no way out. 26 9
Because these authorities agreed that a defendant's confession
might affect his sentence on some occasions, I asked whether de-
fense attorneys might advise their clients of this possibility and
whether some defendants might then confess in the belief that this
act could lead to some reward. Again with only one exception, my
sources insisted that judicial rewards for self-incrimination were so
small and sporadic that a defense attorney could not properly en-
courage a client to confess on this basis. When I observed that
even an outside chance of a minor reward might lead a defendant
to confess if he had very little chance of acquittal, they replied
that in any event defense attorneys do not give this advice and
that defendants are not encouraged to confess. Moreover, these
sources generally bridled at any suggestion that European sentenc-
ing practices might serve the same function as American plea bar-
gaining; they used words like "ridiculous" and "unthinkable."
Subjective perceptions of sentencing practices may be more
important in assessing the extent to which legal systems encourage
confession than the sentencing practices themselves. One may
hope that when European sentencing practices are studied in a
systematic way, scholars will devote some attention, not only to
what the courts do in fact, but to the advice that defense attorneys
give their clients and to the perceptions of defendants. 70
say whether something similar to plea bargaining goes on in order to obtain confessions."
Letter from Professor Scharpf to author (Oct. 17, 1967).
2" Interview with Johannes Andenaes, supra note 231.
Dusan Cotic observed that, at one time, a code provision in Yugoslavia had indeed de-
clared that an admission should be treated as evidence of repentance. He noted, however,
that this provision had been repealed because it seemed to threaten a penalty for a defen-
dant's denial of his alleged crime. In addition, the first question asked of the defendant at a
Yugoslavian trial was once whether he considered himself guilty of the crime charged.
Again, however, the code provision requiring this question had been repealed because even
this question seemed unfairly to seek a confession. Today, after the defendant is asked
about his education, family, and the like, he is usually asked only, "What have you to say in
your defense?" Cotic noted some irony in the fact that no more than 30% of Yugoslavian
defendants admit their guilt. "Your legal ideology seems to be much more opposed to self-
incrimination than ours. You do not ask a defendant even to give an account of himself.
Nevertheless, you have lots of confessions and we don't." Interview with Dusan Cotic, Yugo-
slavian lawyer, in Chicago (Mar. 14, 1968).
270 One also may hope that empirically-minded scholars will distinguish as best they
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Of course European legal systems should not be regarded as
immobile alabaster masterpieces in which no deviations from legal
norms have ever occurred. Much more extensive research on
whether European practices serve in even a small degree as func-
tional equivalents of plea bargaining would be desirable. Even
without further research, however, and even if one brings a healthy
dose of American skepticism to the inquiry, it seems undeniable
that European practices are very different from our own. Whether
or not a French defendant who accepts the correctionalization of
his case should be regarded as waiving procedural protections and
whether or not the minority of Continental defendants who confess
are sometimes rewarded for this act, it is idle to pretend that all
legal systems are the same under the skin. At a time when many
thoughtful observers are deeply disillusioned by American criminal
procedure and when European systems are regarded with apparent
equanimity, it is appropriate to ask how these systems have
avoided, if perhaps imperfectly, our disturbing subversion of the
right to trial.
Of the many reasons for the lack of plea bargaining on the
Continent, the most important is the relative simplicity of the Eu-
ropean trial. The West German system offers an especially suitable
illustration of how an essentially plea bargaining-free system can
operate, for the literature in English about West German criminal
justice ig especially rich;271 West Germany seems to avoid the rapid
can between a simple failure to confess and the presentation of a contrived defense-a task
that would seem more difficult in European than in American systems because very few
European defendants do remain silent. Certainly one who opposes the imposition of a pen-
alty for the exercise of a right as basic as the right to trial need not also oppose the imposi-
tion of a penalty for false testimony. See United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 52-55 (1978)
(defendant's apparent perjury may be considered an aggravating circumstance in sentenc-
ing); United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 584, 609 (1976) (unanimous agreement that
even if the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination would have entitled a defen-
dant both to remain silent before a grand jury and to be advised of this right, it did not
excuse his perjury).
Nevertheless, most of the Continental sources with whom I spoke insisted that even a
defendant who advanced an obviously fabricated defense at trial probably would not receive
a more severe sentence as a result. Most judges would regard this attempted deception as a
natural thing to do. The same tolerant attitude may be indicated by the fact that, although
German defendants are questioned at their trials, they are not placed under oath, and their
false answers are not punishable as perjury. W. SCHAEFER, THE SUSPECT AND SocIETY 71
(1967). Both an ideological opposition to penalizing defendants for tactical decisions and a
matter-of-fact recognition that courts rarely can distinguish accurately among defendants
on the basis of their attitudes may account for the apparent reluctance of Europeans to
reward confessions even informally.
271 See, e.g., ASS'N INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PENAL, THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM OF
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (1981); THE GERMAN CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (H.
Alternatives to Plea Bargaining
case processing that Goldstein and Marcus discovered in France;272
and West German criminal procedure is in some ways closer to
ours than is that of other European nations.73
Americans often harbor serious misconceptions about Conti-
nental trial procedures. 7  One persistent myth is that Continental
Niebler trans. 1965); J. LANGBEIN, supra note 242; Casper & Zeisel, supra note 243;
Dam~ska, supra note 224; Felstiner, supra note 133; Felstiner & Drew, supra note 129;
Goldstein & Marcus, supra note 223; Herrmann, The German Prosecutor, in DISCRETIONARY
JUSTICE IN EUROPE AND AMERICA 16 (K. Davis ed. 1976); Herrmann, supra note 240; Jes-
check, The Discretionary Powers of the Prosecuting Attorney in West Germany, 18 Am. J.
Comp. L. 508 (1970); Jescheck, Principles of German Criminal Procedure in Comparison
with American Law, 56 VA. L. REv. 239 (1970); Langbein, Mixed Court and Jury Court:
Could the Continental Alternative Fill the American Need?, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH
J. 195; Langbein, supra note 130; Langbein, supra note 240; Langbein & Weinreb, supra
note 248; Schram, The Obligation to Prosecute in West Germany, 17 AM. J. CoMP. L. 627
(1969); Sessar, Prosecutorial Discretion in Germany, in THE PROSECUTOR 255 (W. McDon-
ald ed. 1979); Weigend, supra note 224.
172 Goldstein & Marcus, supra note 223, at 253-54; see Casper & Zeisel, supra note 243,
at 152 n.22. West Germany also seems to devote greater resources to its courts than France
does. See infra notes 303-08 and accompanying text; Johnson & Drew, This Nation Has
Money for Everything-Except Its Courts, JUDGES' J., Summer 1978, at 8, 11.
173 See J. LANGBEIN, supra note 242, at 2.
274 These misconceptions sometimes find their way into the scholarly literature. Profes-
sor Graham Hughes has written:
[T]he German system depends for its trial efficiency on the existence of an elaborate
pretrial procedure that presents the trial court with a complete dossier containing dep-
ositions and the work-up of the case by a magistrate who has examined the accused
and witnesses. Indeed, it is possible to regard the "real trial" in Europe as taking place
before the examining magistrate so that the later public trial only serves two principal
functions-first, to "review" the magistrate's determination of the validity of the case
against the accused and, second, to bring out all the facts necessary for a proper deter-
mination of the sentence. The conservation of judicial resources through the creation of
a leaner trial mode might not be significant if it had to be accompanied by setting up
cadres of magistrates to conduct the complex pretrial procedures found in Europe. Fur-
thermore, for such procedures to become the centerpiece of a criminal prosecution,
conducted in camera as they are in Europe, would be alien, if not odious, to our tradi-
tions and constitutionally unacceptable.
Hughes, Pleas Without Bargains, 33 RUTGERS L. Rxv. 753, 756 (1981) (footnote omitted).
For the proposition that the efficiency of the West German trial system depends upon
the pretrial work of an examining magistrate, Professor Hughes cited Professor Langbein.
Langbein, however, had written something else. The office of the examining magistrate does
not exist in West Germany; the preparation of criminal cases for trial is the task of the
public prosecutor. Langbein, supra note 130, at 207-08 (the material cited by Hughes,
supra, at 756 n.12); see also J. LANOBEIN, supra note 242, at 2 ("German pretrial procedure
is closer to American than that of many other European systems, because in Germany the
public prosecutor performs functions that in France and elsewhere are left to a more alien
figure, the investigating magistrate.").
It may not be of critical importance whether a nation calls the official who prepares
criminal cases for trial a judge or a prosecutor. The West German and American terminol-
ogy may seem preferable because it calls attention to the possibility that this official, despite
the rhetoric of impartiality that surrounds his office, will not be entirely disinterested. In
any event, use of the West German label might have led Professor Hughes to the proper
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defendants are presumed guilty. in West Germany, 15 and in
France,1 e however, the standard of persuasion is not significantly
different from our standard, beyond a reasonable doubt.21 7 More-
over, the word "inquisitorial" as applied to Continental procedure
probably conveys a false impression. European procedures incorpo-
rate significant adversary safeguards, and Europeans themselves
often describe their systems as "mixed. '271 Although in Europe the
presiding judge usually has primary responsibility for questioning
the witnesses at trial, the prosecutor and defense attorney may
pose additional questions and, at least in West Germany, submit
closing arguments. In addition, West German procedure recog-
nizes a privilege against self-incrimination. 28 0 The trial begins with
a judicial examination of the defendant, but he is instructed that
comparison. To duplicate the West German system, it would not be necessary for Americans
to set up cadres of magistrates. We already have prosecutors. These prosecutors already are
expected to-and sometimes do-prepare their cases for trial (which is all that Hughes
seems to mean when he refers to "complex pretrial procedures," Hughes, supra, at 756).
The function of European trials is no more to review European prosecutors' (or magis-
trates') decisions to charge than the function of American trials is to review our prosecutors'
charge decisions. In both European and American systems, a defendant can be convicted
lawfully only if the evidence presented at trial establishes his guilt with a very high degree
of certainty. See J. LANGBEIN, supra note 242, at 79. Moreover, there is no apparent reason
to conclude that European tribunals defer informally to pretrial prosecutorial (or magiste-
rial) decisions to a greater extent than American judges and juries do. Finally, pretrial pro-
ceedings in Europe certainly are no more in camera than the pretrial work of prosecutors'
offices here.
Indeed, I know of only four significant differences between the pretrial work of Euro-
pean magistrates and prosecutors and the work of their American counterparts. First, Euro-
pean magistrates and prosecutors have a clearer obligation to investigate factual circum-
stances favorable to the accused. Id. at 90-91. Second, they have a clearer obligation to
disclose all of the results of their investigations to the defense. Id. Third, their investiga-
tions are likely to be more thorough and the results more carefully recorded. Fourth, their
tentative conclusions of criminal guilt are more regularly tested at trial. In most of these
respects, the European procedure seems more favorable to defendants than the American. It
is difficult to see anything in the European approach to trial preparation that is "alien, if
not odious, to our traditions and constitutionally unacceptable," Hughes, supra, at 756.
175 Langbein, supra note 130, at 208.
278 78 HARv. L. REv. 460, 461 & n.15 (1964).
177 J. LANGBEIN, supra note 242, at 79.
278 Goldstein & Marcus, supra note 223, at 242 n.7; see Herrmann, The German Crimi-
nal Justice System: The Trial Phase-Appellate and Review Proceedings, in THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 65 (1981); see also Kotz, supra note
224, at 485.
217 See J. LANGBEIN, supra note 242, at 32-35. Moreover, the defendant need not rely
entirely on his counsel. He, too, can question the witnesses and make a closing statement.
See id. at 65 (citing Strafprozessordnung (code of criminal procedure) [STPO] § 258 (W.
Ger. 1975)).
I" Id. at 72 (citing STPO § 136 (W. Ger. 1975)).
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he need not answer.281 In West Germany, moreover, the court is
forbidden to draw an adverse inference from the exercise of this
legal privilege. 282 There is, however, no privilege analogous to the
Anglo-American privilege not to take the witness stand, and per-
haps because silence in the face of detailed questions concerning a
criminal accusation is unnatural and is likely to seem incriminating
whatever the legal rules, nearly all West German defendants do
tell their stories. 283 West German trial procedure is therefore more
inquisitorial than ours, although one should not overlook the fact
that our accusatorial ideals have been so perverted by plea bar-
gaining that American officials commonly expect, not merely an
answer from the defendant, but what they regard as the right an-
swer-an unqualified affirmation of guilt.
West German procedure promotes popular participation in the
administration of criminal justice but does not employ what, de-
spite its democratic virtues, has become the most cumbersome
factfinding mechanism that humankind has devised, the twelve-
person jury. All except the most trivial cases are heard by mixed
tribunals of lay and professional judges, and although the size and
composition of these tribunals varies with the seriousness of the
offense charged, the lay judges always have sufficient voting power
to force an acquittal.28 ' Because West German lay judges are sub-
ject to disqualification only on the same narrow grounds that jus-
tify the disqualification of professional judges, West German pro-
cedure is not burdened by the voir dire examinations of
prospective jurors that prolong American jury trials.285 Also absent
are our elaborate jury instructions ("If you find A, you must con-
sider B, and if you find B. . .")-instructions that also lengthen
the trial and that, most studies indicate, jurors do not under-
stand.28 Because the lay and professional judges deliberate to-
,- Id. (citing STPO § 243 (W. Ger. 1975)).
282 Id.
2'3 See id.; Damoska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal
Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. Rav. 506, 527 (1973).
284 J. LANGBEIN, supra note 242, at 63 (citing STPO § 263 (W. Ger. 1975)). The only
limitation of the lay judges' power to force acquittal arises from the power of the prosecutor
to appeal a judgment of acquittal. If an appellate court composed entirely of professional
judges concludes that the acquittal was erroneous (and if both the court and the prosecutor
are willing to accept the minimum punishment prescribed by law), the appellate court can
order the defendant convicted without remanding the case for a new trial. Id. at 84-85 (cit-
ing STPO § 354 (W. Ger. 1975)). This facet of West German procedure is designed to pre-
clude the nullification of disfavored laws by lay judges. Id. at 85.
' See id. at 142.
" See, e.g., A. ELWORK, B. SALES & J. ALFINI, MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTAND-
ABLLE (1982) (average juror in a criminal case might understand only half of the instructions
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gether, the professionals can explain points of law as they become
relevant. An adversary check on the accuracy of the legal positions
that they adopt is provided by a detailed written judgment that
sets forth both the court's legal positions and its factual conclu-
sions and that can (and often does) lead to wide ranging appellate
review at the behest of either the prosecution or the defense. 8 7
Many American evidentiary rules seem difficult to defend even
in our jury system (for example, the rule that forbids leading ques-
tions on direct examination after a lawyer has spent hours discuss-
ing a witness's testimony with him before trial"88 ). Nevertheless, it
may be the absence of a jury system rather than greater common
sense that accounts for the absence of these complicating rules in
West Germany.28 9 West German witnesses usually are permitted to
present their testimony in narrative form. The principles of "oral-
ity" and "immediacy," designed primarily to preclude the intro-
duction into evidence of statements contained in a pretrial dossier
that have not been presented orally at trial,290 provide a weak ana-
logue to our hearsay rule, but many forms of documentary evi-
dence that would be inadmissible in the United States-including
the recorded but unsworn, statements of witnesses who have be-
come unavailable-can be considered.291 With a very few excep-
tions like the limited hearsay rule292 and the rule against receiving
involuntary confessions, 293 West German procedure does not ex-
clude evidence on the ground that its prejudicial impact may ex-
ceed its probative value; this kind of exclusion seems to occur pri-
marily in systems that claim to value the common sense of juries
but that trust only the less common sense of judges and
rulemakers to determine the worth of various sorts of evidence.
Moreover, West Germans have enough confidence in the discipli-
nary mechanisms applicable to their statewide, hierarchically con-
presented); Charrow & Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable: A Psychol-
inguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1306, 1308-09 & n.8 (1979) (criti-
cally reviewing prior studies); Schwarzer, Communicating with Juries: Problems and Reme-
dies, 69 CALn'. L. Rpv. 731, 740 (1981); Severance & Loftus, Improving the Ability of Jurors
to Comprehend and Apply Criminal Jury Instructions, 17 LAW & Soc'y REv. 153 (1982).
287 J. LANGBEIN, supra note 242, at 84 n.7 (citing STPO § 296 (W. Ger. 1975)).
28 See FED. R. Evir,. 611(c).
18, A somewhat similar relaxation of evidentiary rules has occurred in the United States
in some cases tried without juries. See, e.g., United States v. Compania Cubana De Avia-
cion, 224 F.2d 811, 821 (5th Cir. 1955).
190 See J. LANOBEN, supra note 242, at 67 (citing STPO § 250 (W. Ger. 1975)).
291 See id.
19" See supra note 290 and accompanying text.
293 See J. LANGBEIN, supra note 242, at 69 (citing STPO §§ 69, 136a (W. Ger. 1975)).
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trolled police forces that they have little interest in adopting exclu-
sionary rules to deter police misconduct.2 94
Because "virtually all relevant evidence is admissible,
time is not spent arguing about exclusion and otherwise manipu-
lating evidence in the familiar Anglo-American ways."29 5 In addi-
tion, a pretrial procedure that provides virtually complete discov-
ery to the defense (and that permits the defense to seek the
investigation at public expense of material that the police and
prosecutor may have overlooked) limits the importance of surprise
and forensic strategy at the trial.298 The practice of beginning the
trial with an examination of the accused also tends to identify
which matters are contested and thus to focus the issues." Be-
cause "[v]irtually all of the features of German court structure that
strike an Anglo-American observer as distinctive have the effect of
accelerating the conduct of the trial by comparison with our own
arrangements," 29 8 Professor Langbein has concluded, "German
trial procedure, unlike American, has retained an efficiency that
makes trial practical for every case of imprisonable crime."2 99
It is not only the relative simplicity of the European trial that
has made plea bargaining in West Germany unnecessary. Criminal
caseloads are less burdensome in Europe than in the United States
largely because crime rates there are much lower.300 In addition,
West Germany has legalized some formerly criminal conduct,30 1
and in an effort both to reduce judicial workloads and to eliminate
294 See id.
215 Langbein, supra note 130, at 207.
2" Id.
'" See id. at 207-09.
" Id. at 207.
ZN Id. at 209.
00 See id. Professor Langbein has argued, however, that even if West Germany had our
levels of serious crime, it probably would not resort to plea bargaining but would instead
divert a larger portion of its criminal cases to the various nontrial channels that it has al-
ready established. Id. at 209-10. It seems noteworthy that the number of West German
criminal defendants did increase 30% between 1965 and 1976. Sessar, supra note 271, at
272.
301 Sessar, supra note 271, at 257. Felstiner and Drew have indicated, for example, that
prostitution is punishable in West Germany only when the solicitation occurs near a church.
Felstiner & Drew, supra note 129, at 24. There has even been serious discussion in West
Germany of decriminalizing one property offense-the theft from a self-service store of
goods worth less than $200. A distinguished study group has proposed that victims of this
theft should be entitled merely to civil recovery of both the goods and an amount of money
equal to their value. See Felstiner & Drew, Should Some Theft Be Decriminalized?-A
Look at the German Experience, JUDGES' J., Fall 1978, at 16, 19. A somewhat similar provi-
sion has been enacted in East Germany. See Kaiser, Recent Developments in German Pe-
nal Policy, 4 INT'L J. CRIMINOLOGY & PENOLOGY 193, 197 (1976).
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the criminal stigma from regulatory and other minor violations, it
has substituted administrative for criminal proceedings in many
cases involving traffic, health, and environmental regulations and
in some cases involving more traditional criminal prohibitions as
well.30
2
Finally, West Germany, like most other European countries,
devotes far greater resources to its courts than do American juris-
dictions. A study-by Earl Johnson Jr. and Ann Barthelmes Drew
concluded that the United States does have a significant edge in
the number of lawyers. "The number of practicing lawyers for each
judge in California is more than ten times West Germany's
.... 0so Nevertheless, the public resources devoted to the admin-
istration of justice in the United States are smaller. There are only
one-third as many professional judges per capita in the United
States as in West Germany.3 04 Moreover, this discrepancy does not
seem to be the product of our poverty. While the United States
employs 42.7 professional judges per billion dollars of national in-
come, West Germany employs 90.305 Even with traffic cases set
aside, the average California judge disposes of six times as many
cases as the average West German judge.306 In view of the very
different allocation of responsibilities between lawyers and judges
in European and American jurisdictions, even an adequately
funded American legal system might require fewer judges than the
West German, just as an adequately funded West German system
might require fewer lawyers than the American.307 Nevertheless,
302 See Felstiner & Drew, supra note 129, at 24; Sessar, supra note 271, at 256-60.
'"' Johnson & Drew, supra note 272, at 10 (footnote omitted).
304 Id.
305 Id.
3" Id. at 11. With traffic cases included, the ratio of cases per judge becomes 20 times
greater in California than in West Germany. Id. Not only do West German taxpayers sup-
port more judges than American taxpayers, but the number of prosecuting attorneys in
West Germany increased by 35% between 1965 and 1976-approximately as rapidly as the
number of criminal suspects, see supra note 300, and more rapidly than the number of filed
cases. Sessar, supra note 271, at 258, 261-62.
307 Professor Langbein emphasized this fact in his vigorous criticism of the Johnson-
Drew study. Although Langbein did not dispute any of the study's findings, he objected that
the authors have undertaken their comparison of American and European legal sys-
tems on a purely quantitative basis, disregarding the qualitative differences between
our adversarial and the Europeans' nonadversarial procedures. These qualitative differ-
ences are the true source of the quantitative differences. Johnson and Drew derived
erroneous implications for the manning of American courts because they ignored those
characteristics of European procedure that explain European manpower levels.
Langbein, Judging Foreign Judges Badly: Nose Counting Isn't Enough, JUDGES' J., Fall
1979, at 4, 4.
Unlike Professor Langbein, I did not understand Johnson and Drew to argue that the
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the experience of West Germany and other European nations 08
should cause Americans to blush when they consider the claim that
plea bargaining is an economic necessity. If the resources devoted
to our criminal courts are inadequate to implement our constitu-
tional ideals, that circumstance seems to be the product, not of
necessity, but of choice.
B. The Process That Is Due: The Constitution and the Conti-
nent, the Criminal and the Courts
Until 1968, the very end of the Warren Court era, the Su-
preme Court had said repeatedly, "Consistently with [the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment,] trial by jury may be
abolished."30 9 That year, however, the Court decided Duncan v.
Louisiana3 10 and declared, "[W]e hold that the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all [state] criminal
cases which-were they to be tried in a federal court-would come
within the Sixth Amendment's guarantee."311 In light of Duncan
and other decisions "incorporating" provisions of the Bill of Rights
within the fourteenth amendment's due process clause, it com-
monly is assumed that a revision of American trial procedures to
embody the dominant features of Continental justice would re-
quire "either constitutional amendment or radical reinterpretation
of the Bill of Rights by the Supreme Court."312 In fact, however,
neither constitutional amendment nor a judicial reinterpretation of
the federal Constitution would be necessary.
Duncan's "incorporation" of the right to jury trial was quali-
fied by a critical assumption that many criminal justice scholars
have tended to overlook. Footnote fourteen of this opinion merits
United States should have more judges simply because West Germany and other European
nations do. Plainly the demonstration that American courts are understaffed must come
from another source. If, however, the claim that plea bargaining is an economic necessity
has any foundation, this demonstration of the inadequacy of our resources should not be
difficult. The Johnson-Drew study does suggest that greater social effort on our part is con-
ceivable and that the "realists" who dismiss this option out of hand are not truly realists.
:o8 Comparisons of our judicial expenditures with those of several other European na-
tions are presented in Johnson & Drew, supra note 272. These comparisons are less dra-
matic than comparison with West German expenditures, but they are still extremely
striking.
309 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934); see, e.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S.
717, 721 (1961); Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 288 (1947); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 324 (1937); Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167, 176 (1912); Maxwell v. Dow, 176
U.S. 581, 603 (1900); Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, 31 (1879).
310 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
11 Id. at 149.
312 Hughes, supra note 274, at 756.
1983]
The University of Chicago Law Review
quotation at length:
[RIecent cases applying provisions of the first eight Amend-
ments to the States represent a new approach to the "incorpo-
ration" debate. Earlier the Court can be seen as having asked,
when inquiring into whether some particular procedural safe-
guard was required of a State, if a civilized system could be
imagined that would not accord the particular protection.
The recent cases, on the other hand, have proceeded upon
the valid assumption that state criminal processes are not im-
aginary and theoretical schemes but actual systems bearing
virtually every characteristic of the common-law system that
has been developing contemporaneously in England and in
this country. The question thus is whether given this kind of
system a particular procedure is fundamental-whether, that
is, a procedure is necessary to an Anglo-American regime of
ordered liberty. It is this sort of inquiry that can justify the
conclusions that state courts must exclude evidence seized in
violation of the Fourth Amendment ... [and] that state pros-
ecutors may not comment on a defendant's failure to
testify...
. . . Of each of these determinations that a constitutional
provision originally written to bind the Federal Government
should bind the States as well it might be said that the limita-
tion in question is not necessarily fundamental to fairness in
every criminal system that might be imagined but is funda-
mental in the context of the criminal processes maintained by
the American States.
When the inquiry is approached in this way the question
whether the States can impose criminal punishment without
granting a jury trial appears quite different from the way it
appeared in the older cases opining that States might abolish
jury trial. A criminal process which was fair and equitable
but used no juries is easy to imagine. It would make use of
alternative guarantees and protections which would serve the
purposes that the jury serves in the English and American
systems. Yet no American State has undertaken to construct
such a system. 13
It would be strange and unfortunate if the federal Constitu-
tion were read to preclude states from seeking workable alterna-
tives to our existing regime of criminal justice-a regime so costly
313 Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149-50 n.14 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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and so far beyond the states' perceived capacities that the Su-
preme Court and other observers regard the avoidance of its proce-
dures through plea bargaining as a necessity. Duncan was the high
water mark of selective incorporation, and it is extremely doubtful
that today's Supreme Court would carry an incorporationist view
of the fourteenth amendment beyond the limits of that decision.
Of course this Court and others would scrutinize carefully any de-
parture from a traditional model of American criminal justice to
insure that it reflected a fair and balanced effort to promote effec-
tive law enforcement and the dignity of defendants. No procedure
that served merely as a "cover" for limiting the rights of defen-
dants would be likely to receive judicial approval nor should it. 14
Nevertheless, the current Supreme Court would be extremely un-
likely to condemn a simplification of American trial procedures, in-
cluding a major restriction of the use of criminal juries, simply on
the theory that the sixth amendment and other provisions of the
Bill of Rights automatically apply to the states by virtue of the
fourteenth amendment. Instead, as Duncan revealed, the issue
would be whether a state had constructed a procedural system that
the Supreme Court said could be easily imagined but that no state
had adopted-one that "was fair and equitable but used no
juries.''315
Liberated from the incorporationist assumptions that often in-
fect discussions of state criminal procedure, states might consider a
variety of reforms that could make trials more accessible without
an increase in criminal justice expenditures. For example, although
a state might retain the traditional Anglo-American jury for homi-
cide cases, obscenity prosecutions, and other criminal proceedings
in which the play of community sentiment is invited by vague legal
standards,"'6 it might prefer mixed tribunals of lay and profes-
SI' Of course, a substantially simplified state trial procedure might include some revi-
sion of the doctrines of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), Griffin v. California, 380
U.S. 609 (1965), and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Nevertheless, a state could not
appropriately assume that the dissatisfaction with these decisions expressed by various Su-
preme Court Justices, see, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 420-22 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting), would lead these Justices
to approve a procedural system designed primarily to revise particular constitutional
rulings.
31 Duncan, 391 U.S. at 150 n.14.
3" These proceedings might include those in which defendants assert defenses like in-
sanity and necessity. They also might include cases in which political crimes are alleged
(assuming that an appropriate definition of the term or an appropriate list of "political"
charges could be devised).
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sional judges for most other cases.3 117 As in Europe, the lay judges
probably ought to have at least the collective voting power needed
to force an acquittal, 318 but to satisfy our traditional concern for a
very high degree of certainty of guilt, a state might go beyond the
European model and require the unanimous concurrence of the lay
and professional judges as a prerequisite to conviction. If, as
Duncan argued, the principal reason for entrusting the administra-
tion of justice to nonprofessionals is to check official arbitrari-
ness,3 19 it may be more appropriate to use nonprofessionals as a
check than to yield them the entire field. In a system of mixed
tribunals, lay judges might have less practical power over the ad-
ministration of criminal justice than they currently have in the
American jury system,3 20 but the greater influence of professional
judges need not automatically be regretted and often might work
to the benefit of defendants.3 21 As a group, legally trained judges
may be alert to governmental abuses in ways that nonprofessionals
often are not, and perhaps a system of mixed tribunals could best
utilize the distinctive virtues of both groups in determining issues
of guilt and punishment.s22
The use of mixed tribunals might facilitate other reforms that
also would limit the complexity of trial procedures. A thorough ex-
amination of the merits and demerits of substantially revised trial
317 See Langbein, supra note 271, passim.
s See supra note 284 and accompanying text.
, Duncan, 391 U.S. at 151.
111 See Casper & Zeisel, supra note 243, at 185-91. But see J. LANGBEIN, supra note 242,
at 137-38.
3" Casper and Zeisel sometimes seemed to intimate disapproval of the extent to which
professional judges influence lay judges in West German mixed tribunals. See Casper &
Zeisel, supra note 243, at 189-91. Nevertheless, my reaction to the two authors' many de-
scriptions of mixed-tribunal deliberations was that when the influence of the professional
judges did prove decisive, it almost invariably led to more appropriate results. This reaction
may not be surprising in view of the fact that I am a law-trained professional myself; but of
course, in every case, one or more of the lay judges were persuaded to the same view. For
example, in one of the cases described in the Casper and Zeisel study, the defendant was a
member of a gang that had been removing cigarette machines and stealing their contents.
When surprised by the police, members of the gang had shot at the officers. The lay judges
voted initially to convict the defendant of aggravated robbery on the ground that profes-
sional criminals should be punished as severely as the law permits, but one or more of the
professional judges apparently persuaded them that the defendant's crimes were only grand
larceny and resisting a peace officer. Id. at 158-59. Of course a properly instructed American
jury might have reached the same verdict, but it may have been fortunate for the defendant
in this case that a direct interchange between the lay and professional judges could occur.
322 Discussions of the American jury system have tended to romanticize our citizenry as
a group of hearty yeomen ever alert to incursions on their liberty, see, e.g., H. KALVN & H.
ZISEL, supra note 91, at 219, 236-37, 310-11, but the American citizenry includes some
people who t .ow rocks at children to prevent school integration.
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procedures might require a number of articles as long as this one,
and it certainly would carry a study of plea bargaining far from its
central focus. The discussion that follows therefore does not pre-
tend to be exhaustive. It indicates very briefly some paradoxes of
current American procedures and how they might be remedied in a
system of mixed tribunals. Although the positions that this discus-
sion advances are no more tentative than the other positions as-
serted in this article, the purpose of presenting them in an abbrevi-
ated form is mostly to demonstrate that the paradoxes are serious
and that the proposed remedies are worthy of consideration quite
apart from their facilitation of a plea bargaining prohibition. A
later section of the article will consider whether some of the proce-
dural problems described in this section could be remedied to some
extent within the context of a traditional Anglo-American jury
system.
Like other aspects of our current system of jury controls, our
jury selection procedures present significant paradoxes. The selec-
tion of a jury typically requires more time in the United States
than a trial requires from beginning to end elsewhere in the world.
Our procedures effectively insure the absence of invidious discrimi-
nation at the earliest stages of selection, but ultimately they per-
mit prosecutors and defense attorneys to challenge prospective ju-
rors on the basis of race and other stereotypical characteristics.2 3
In effect, our system guarantees minorities an opportunity to reach
the finals before it discriminates against them; trial-practice manu-
als typically advise lawyers to seek or avoid blacks, Hispanics,
women, people with physical afflictions, teachers, free thinkers,
hunters, master sergeants, Jews, Lutherans, and flower children.2 4
Partly to facilitate this use of peremptory challenges, lawyers
freely probe the private attitudes and practices of prospective ju-
rors, asking questions that undoubtedly would provoke an out-
raged reaction if asked of citizens in other governmental con-
texts32 5 Nevertheless, the available evidence strongly suggests
323 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220-22 (1965). But see People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d
258, 276-77, 583 P.2d 748, 761-62, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 903 (1978); People v. Payne, 106 IMI.
App. 3d 1034, 1040, 436 N.E.2d 1046, 1050 (1982); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461,
488, 387 N.E.2d 499, 509, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 831 (1979).
324 See W. WAGNER, ART OF ADVOCACY: JURY SELECTION § 1.04 (1981); J. Sparling, Jury
Selection in a Criminal Case (unpublished, undated training manual used in the District
Attorney's Office, Dallas, Texas, on file with The University of Chicago Law Review).
325 In a drunk driving prosecution, for example, it apparently is routine to ask prospec-
tive jurors about their drinking habits, their driving habits, and their religious beliefs. See
Oster & Simon, "We Want As Biased a Jury as We Can Get," Chicago Sun-Times, June 19,
1974, at 4, col. 1, at 10, col. 2 ("For the next two days, the prospective jurors would ... be
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that, after our extended jury selection proceedings are concluded, a
lawyer seeking only his client's tactical advantage is almost as
likely to guess incorrectly as to guess correctly in deciding which
prospective jurors to challenge.3 26 In the end, the selection of peo-
ple to perform an important governmental function on the basis of
racial, ethnic, religious, and sexual characteristics serves no sub-
stantial purpose.
Lawyers commonly value the jury selection process not so
much because it yields better juries as because it gives them an
opportunity to try their cases before they try them. 27 The devo-
tion of substantial resources to voir dire examinations, to the in-
vestigation of prospective jurors outside the courtroom, and also to
the typically substantial waiting time of the prospective jurors
themselves seems unjustifiable in a system supposedly so impover-
ished that it is unable to afford trials to more than a small minor-
ity of defendants. In a system of mixed tribunals, by contrast, lay
judges might be assigned to cases on the same basis as professional
judges and might be subject to disqualification only on the same
grounds that would support the disqualification of the professional
judges.
asked hundreds of questions about their jobs, their spouses' jobs, their sons' and daughters'
jobs, and their sons- and daughters-in-laws' jobs"); see also W. WAGNM, supra note 324,
MQ 4-30 (suggesting model questions for attorneys to ask on voir dire).
3"' Zeisel & Diamond, supra note 219, at 514-18. See Broeder, Voir Dire Examinations:
An Empirical Study, 38 S. CAL. L. Rpv. 503, 505 (1965) ("Voir dire was grossly ineffective
not only in weeding out 'unfavorable' jurors but even in eliciting the data which would have
shown particular jurors as very likely to prove unfavorable.").
327 A lawyer's goals typically include impressing upon prospective jurors the lawyer's
theory of the case, emphasizing particular points of law, and charming them completely.
Charles R. Garry offered an illustration of this process in a presentation at the University of
Washington Law School in Seattle on June 23, 1979, "Packaging Voir Dire, Opening and
Closing Argument." He suggested asking a prospective juror whether, as he viewed the de-
fendant at the counsel table, the defendant was guilty or innocent. The prospective juror
was likely to answer that of course he did not know. Garry suggested challenging this pro-
spective juror for cause on the ground that he was unwilling to accord the defendant the
presumption of innocence. Garry recognized that the challenge was unlikely to be successful,
but he thought that it would forcefully impress the presumption of innocence upon the
jurors ultimately seated.
I once mentioned Garry's remarks as offering extreme examples of the waste and abuse
that can occur during voir dire. A California prosecutor responded, however, that Garry's
tactics were not extreme. Indeed, every defense attorney whom he knew routinely asked
some prospective juror whether the attorney's client was guilty or innocent, and most of
these defense attorneys thought it a sad comment on the state of civil liberties in America
that so many prospective jurors responded truthfully that they simply did not know.
Cf. Broeder, supra note 326, at 522 ("Conservatively, about eighty per cent of the law-
yers' voir dire time was spent indoctrinating, only twenty per cent in sifting out the
favorable from the unfavorable veniremen. [Nevertheless, ilndoctrination did not often ap-
pear to succeed.").
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American procedures are almost as paradoxical at trial as at
the earlier stage of jury selection. Despite our professed faith in
jurors, we regard them as incapable of understanding the worth of
evidence that they routinely evaluate in their everyday activities.
At least we say that we do not trust them; our practice may be
different. The enforcement of America's rules of evidence fre-
quently depends on what Justice Jackson called "[tihe naive as-
sumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions
to the jury, . . [an assumption that] all practicing lawyers know
to be unmitigated fiction. 3 28 Sometimes, to be sure, our procedure
rejects this fiction and seeks a more effective control. Jurors are
ushered in and out of the courtroom as lawyers conduct hearings
on evidentiary issues-arguing, for example, about whether a wit-
ness's half-hour description of how a business record was prepared
sufficiently authenticated the record to warrant its admission in
evidence.3 29
Despite all of the time and energy devoted to jury selection,
the enforcement of evidentiary restrictions, the frequently bela-
bored probing of factual issues, the lengthy arguments of counsel,
and the delivery of complex jury instructions, our system of jury
controls often does not work. Indeed, the jurors themselves may
reveal that they have based their verdict on improper considera-
tions or even that they have returned a verdict other than the one
that they meant to return, in one instance by convicting a defen-
dant whom they meant to acquit.3 In this situation, judges invoke
the rule that jurors may not impeach their own verdicts. 31 The
38" Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (cita-
tion omitted).
320 I once observed a homicide prosecution in which there was no doubt that the alleged
victim had died. Nevertheless, when the prosecutor attempted to introduce a hospital record
to establish this fact, the defense attorney resisted; the jury was excused; a hospital admin-
istrator testified about the way in which the record had been prepared; both attorneys ar-
gued at length about the adequacy of the administrator's testimony; the trial judge ruled
that the record was admissible; and the jury returned to the courtroom after nearly an hour
of idleness.
330 In Sellars v. United States, 401 A.2d 974 (D.C. 1979), nine of twelve jurors testified
that they had accepted the defendant's claim of self-defense and had meant to acquit when
they convicted him of manslaughter. Id. at 983 (Mack, J., dissenting). Both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals refused to set the manslaughter verdict aside. Cf. M. GLmasF,
JuRms AND JusTicE 171 (1968) (describing a case in which two jurors admitted that they and
their fellows had failed to realize that a conviction without a recommendation of mercy
carried a death sentence so that they had condemned a defendant to death without meaning
to do so).
331 See, e.g., United States v. Green, 523 F.2d 229, 235 (2d Cir. 1975) (compromise ver-
dict), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 950 (1976); Domeracki v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 443 F.2d 1245,
1247-48 (3d Cir.) (failure to follow instructions), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 883 (1971); Jorgenson
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refusal to know embodied in this rule reflects what we know al-
ready-that our system of jury controls often fails. If verdicts
could be set aside whenever juries had seriously misconstrued the
judge's charge, rendered compromise verdicts in defiance of the
court's instructions, considered for one purpose evidence admitted
only for another, given substantial weight to evidence not admitted
at all, treated a defendant's failure to testify as evidence of his
guilt, or acted on the basis of some manifest prejudice, substantial
numbers of jury verdicts probably could not stand.3 2
A system of mixed tribunals could check the possible miscon-
duct of lay judges more effectively than the elaborate courtroom
procedures that we currently use for this purpose. Of course this
system would require its own rules of evidence-rules of relevancy
and privilege and even, perhaps, a rule excluding from evidence
the products of illegal searches and seizures. Most rules based on
the perception that the prejudicial impact of some evidence out-
weighs its probative value, however, could be abandoned. These
patronizing rules are of dubious merit even in our jury system."' If
v. York Ice Mach. Corp., 160 F.2d 432, 435 (2d Cir.) (agreement to abide by majority vote),
cert. denied, 332 U.S. 764 (1947); Sellars v. United States, 401 A.2d 974, 982 (D.C. 1979)
(described supra note 330).
"31 See J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 115 (1950); F. JAMEs & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE
310 (2d ed. 1977).
Perhaps what we say that we want juries to do and what we truly want them to do are
two different things. On the one hand, we tell juries to follow the law; on the other hand,
when juries do not follow the law, they serve the purposes of the jury system. If we were to
talk out loud about these extralegal purposes, we might emphasize them too much. Perhaps
we achieve the best blend of law and community sentiment when we pretend, contrary to
fact, that law is all we want. In other words, we can assume, if we like, that our lying is
poetry and that everything turns out for the best in the end. It might be difficult to main-
tain this romantic viewpoint, however, if we looked more closely at what happens in jury
rooms.
3'3 The worth of these rules depends not only on their authors' understanding of the
limited value of certain sorts of evidence but also on the conclusion that jurors will lack the
same understanding. The judicial arrogance that must have informed these rules is sug-
gested by the following early defense of the hearsay rule:
[U]pon the minds of a jury unskilled in the nature of judicial proofs, evidence of this
kind would frequently make an erroneous impression. Being accustomed, in the com-
mon concerns of life, to act upon hearsay and report, they would naturally be inclined
to give such credit when acting judicially; they would be unable to reduce such evi-
dence to its proper standard when placed in competition with more certain and satis-
factory evidence; they would, in consequence of their previous habits, be apt to forget
how little reliance ought to be placed upon evidence which may so easily and securely
be fabricated; their minds would be confused and embarrassed by a mass of conflicting
testimony; and they would be liable to be prejudiced and biassed by the character of
the person from whom the evidence was derived.
T. STARKIE, EVIDENCE 55 n.1 (9th Am. ed. Philadelphia 1869) (1st ed. London 1824); see also
In re Berkeley, 4 Camp. 402, 415, 171 Eng. Rep. 128, 135 (H.L. 1811).
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law-trained judges could caution lay judges against the misuse of
evidence and other abuses and also could use their own voting
power to prevent abuse, the most burdensome aspects of our cur-
rent system of jury controls would become superfluous.
A state thus could go far toward simplifying its trial proce-
dures without reassessing two basic tenets that have differentiated
American and European systems-adversariness and a reluctance
to use the accused as a source of evidence. With some reassessment
of these tenets, however, a greater simplification of American trial
procedures might be achieved.
Our adversary system rests on a sound perception that the
prejudices and limitations of a single fact-gatherer may lead him to
overlook important considerations and relevant data. To overcome
this tendency, the adversary system effectively preordains the
prejudices of two advocates and directs them to find whatever evi-
dence they can to support their assigned positions. In the main,
this system reflects an intelligent division of labor in marshaling
evidence and argument.
Nevertheless, the writings of Marvin E. Frankel have docu-
mented the excesses and failures of our lawyer-dominated ap-
proach to truth seeking.3 84 Although Judge Frankel has proposed
remedying these defects primarily by modifying the ethical respon-
sibilities of advocates, 3 5 a number of critics have suggested that
his proposals would be both unworkable in practice and unsound
in principle.338 The courtroom procedures of continental Europe
suggest a more appropriate approach. A "mixed" system of adver-
sarial and nonadversarial procedures could permit advocates to
counteract the prejudices and limitations of judicial fact gatherers
while it encouraged the emergence of truth, not simply from the
clash of two distinct perspectives, but from the interplay of three.
As our adversarial procedures have traditionally operated, wit-
nesses have been divided into two camps. After hearing those who
testify "for" the state, a jury hears those who testify "for" the de-
fendant. In addition, each witness's testimony is divided into two
parts, first the part that may favor the party who called him and
334 See M. FRANKEL, PARUSAN JUSTICE (1980); Frankel, The Search for Truth: An
Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. Rlv. 1031 (1975).
335 See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 334, at 1057-59.
334 See Alachuler, The Preservation of a Client's Confidences: One Value Among Many
or a Categorical Imperative?, 52 U. COLO. L. REv. 349 passim (1981); Alschuler, The Search
for Truth Continued, The Privilege Retained. A Response to Judge Frankel, 54 U. CoLO.
L. REv. 67 (1982); K~tz, supra note 224; Pizzi, Judge Frankel and the Adversary System, 52
U. COLo. L. REv. 357 (1981).
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then, on cross-examination, the part that may favor his opponent.
These two parts do not always make a whole, and no one bears
responsibility for seeking information that the advocates were
afraid (or forgot) to develop."3
A relatively minor modification of our adversarial procedures
would give judicial officers greater responsibility for supplementing
the evidentiary presentations of counsel. 38 A more substantial
modification would require judges to control the order of proof at
trial and to conduct the initial examination of witnesses. Of course
a presiding judge could not perform these functions unless he had
learned something of the facts of a case prior to trial, but the prep-
aration of a detailed pretrial dossier of the sort employed in Eu-
rope would be unnecessary. Instead, opposing lawyers might sup-
ply the judge with lists of witnesses whom they thought should be
heard along with a summary of each witness's anticipated
testimony.33 9
This use of adversarially compiled witness lists might en-
courage a substantially different procedure from that customary on
the Continent.34 0 In light of his limited information and his need to
remain impartial, a judge's examination of witnesses ordinarily
would be cursory. He would determine when each witness should
be heard, invite the witness's narrative testimony, ask obvious
questions, and-prompted by counsel if necessary-intervene
when the testimony strayed from relevant issues. A more detailed
probing of the witness's testimony would remain the task of the
opposing attorneys, each of whom could cross-examine the witness
in turn.
With this basic revision of courtroom procedure, the efficiency
and the coherency of the trial process might be enhanced. Separate
issues could be treated separately-for example, by placing oppos-
ing expert witnesses on the stand after one another-and each wit-
33 See Pizzi, supra note 336, at 366.
Judges currently have the power to call witnesses not called by the parties and to
ask questions that they have failed to ask, FED. R. Evw. 614; see also Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 46, 54-55 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), but they rarely exercise this
power, see Fink, The Unused Power of a Federal Judge to Call His Own Expert Witness,
29 S. CAL. L. REv. 195 (1956).
"I Perhaps the prosecutor also should be expected to reveal to the presiding judge the
identity of people whose testimony he considered unnecessary but whom he believed to pos-
sess relevant information.
10 Indeed, one might hope that it would. The passive role of lawyers at European trials
gives rise to legitimate concern about the extent to which Continental procedure truly
achieves the virtues of a mixed system. See J. LAGBEIN, supra note 242, at 64-65 (discuss-
ing West German practice).
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ness might be permitted to give his version of the "whole truth"
before opposing advocates tested what he said. Not only the use of
a more limited pretrial "dossier" but also our stronger adversarial
traditions would be likely to make our "mix" of adversarial and
nonadversarial approaches to factfinding different from the "mix"
exhibited by European systems. Nevertheless, some movement in
the European direction could promote both a more dignified treat-
ment of witnesses and a more complete, coherent, and accurate
process of fact determination in the courtroom.
In addition to its other virtues, this reform would promote
equality in the administration of criminal justice. Despite our
claim that the kind of trial a person gets should not depend on the
amount of money he has141 (and despite substantial progress to-
ward the achievement of this goal), the American legal system
probably makes the kind of justice that a defendant receives more
dependent on the quality of the lawyer whom he is able to hire
than any other legal system in the world. The defendant most dis-
advantaged in our system probably is not the indigent defendant
represented by a public defender but the defendant who, because
he does not have much money or because he does not know better,
is represented by one of the hangers-on of the private bar who fre-
quently appear in criminal cases. This lawyer's primary goal usu-
ally is to pocket a quick fee by entering a plea of guilty,3 '2 but even
on the infrequent occasions when this lawyer takes a case to trial,
the trial judge will do little to protect the defendant from his at-
torney's apparent inadequacies. The greater the trial court's re-
sponsibility for development of the facts, the less the defendant
with an inadequate lawyer is likely to suffer.
Of course affording a more active role to the presiding judge at
trial might reduce an outstanding attorney's ability to work his
magic. Still, this lawyer would be able to submit any argument
that he could have submitted in a fully adversarial system, to insist
that any witnesses with relevant information be heard, and to ask
any questions that he thought should be asked. If the presiding
judge had overlooked a line of inquiry that seemed potentially
helpful to the defendant, his lawyer could pursue it. For these rea-
sons, the defendant with an able lawyer probably would not be
greatly disadvantaged by the nonadversarial aspects of a "mixed"
procedure, while the disadvantage of the defendant with an inade-
quate or marginally competent lawyer might be lessened.
341 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (plurality opinion of Black, J.).
342 See The Defense Attorney's Role, supra note 4, at 1181-98.
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The issue that may capture best the differing philosophies of
American and European legal systems is the role of the defendant
at his trial. American criminal procedure seems to view the defen-
dant primarily as an object-a target of the coercive forces of the
state. His dignity consists of his passivity, his ability to proclaim to
the state, "Thou sayest," and his constitutional right to force the
government to "shoulder the entire load." The Supreme Court has
described the privilege against self-incrimination-including the
defendant's right to remain silent at his trial-as the essential
mainstay of our accusatory system.as In a European trial, by con-
trast, the defendant rarely remains silent. He is given both the first
word at his trial and the last; he ordinarily may present his testi-
mony as he likes rather than simply in response to the inquiries of
counsel; he may question other witnesses himself; and if the unex-
pected develops, he is asked immediately for his comment.34 4
Certainly Americans bring to the criminal trial a view of
human dignity different from the view that they adopt in other
contexts. As Justice Walter V. Schaefer has suggested, no parent or
schoolteacher feels guilty about asking questions of a child strongly
suspected of misconduct.3 45 Similarly, no employer considers it im-
proper to ask an employee accused of wrongdoing to give his side
of the story. Indeed, criminal cases aside, there are apparently no
investigative or factfinding proceedings in which asking questions
and expecting answers is regarded as dirty business.341
Nevertheless, our accusatorial rhetoric has been one thing and
our inquisitorial practices another. Short of restoration of the rack
and the thumbscrew, a more blatant mockery of accusatorial ideals
than today's practice of plea bargaining is difficult to conceive. In
addition, Americans seek the self-incrimination of defendants
through police interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona3 4 7 held that the
3 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964).
34 See, e.g., J. LANGBIN, supra note 242, at 25, 65 (discussing West German
procedure).
35 W. SCHAMR, supra note 270, at 59 ("[T]he Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination... runs counter to our ordinary standards of morality. Parents try hard to
inculcate in their children the simple virtues of truth and responsibility.").
34 See McCormick, Law and the Future: Evidence, 51 Nw. U.L. REv. 218, 222 (1956)
("Ordinary morality ... sees nothing wrong in asking a man, for adequate reason, about
particular misdeeds of which he has been suspected and charged.... I predict that the
weaknesses of the privilege [against self-incrimination] in point of policy and morality will
become more widely understood."). For an elegant analysis of the "ordinary morality" of
expecting answers in the investigative process and a discussion of its relevance to issues of
constitutional interpretation, see Greenawalt, Silence as a Moral and Constitutional Right,
23 WM. & MARY L. REv. 15 (1981).
7 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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products of custodial interrogation could be used at trial only when
a suspect had made a knowing waiver of his right to remain silent.
As Judge Frankel has commented, however, and as any lawyer will
advise any suspect, "rational people do not condemn themselves
advisedly in the stationhouse. ' 8 Frankel has noted that the target
of a door-to-door vendor currently is allowed a few days of tranquil
reflection before the law holds him to the purchase of a vacuum
cleaner.3 ' 9 If criminal suspects were afforded a similar opportunity
to reconsider their more momentous choices made in a more coer-
cive atmosphere, few of their supposedly intelligent waivers would
be likely to survive.350 Apart from a handful of remorseful suspects,
another handful who may seek conviction for political or other rea-
sons, and a third handful who are innocent and able to clear them-
selves by talking, virtually no one under arrest makes a truly
knowing and voluntary waiver of Miranda rights.
Miranda, designed in part to promote equality between the
knowledgeable and the naive in the administration of justice, may
instead have accentuated the disparity between suspects who are
smooth and sophisticated and those who are slow and easily im-
posed upon. Each year, courts find multitudes of intelligent waiv-
ers by suspects who, had they understood their situations in the
slightest degree, surely would have remained silent.
The reasons for rejecting in practice the accusatorial rhetoric
that we proclaim in theory are powerful; nevertheless, the manner
in which we have done so is absurd. Criminal defendants are close
to the best source of evidence for resolving criminal disputes, and
they should be expected to provide it-the dons of organized crime
no less than the hapless people who yield today to police interroga-
tion. A fair and balanced resolution of the problem is apparent,
and it has been proposed repeatedly by respected judges and
scholars." 1
348 Frankel, From Private Fights Toward Public Justice, 51 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 516, 527
(1976); see M. FRANKEL, supra note 334, at 95-100.
3,9 M. FRANKEL, supra note 334, at 97-98.
350 Id.; Frankel, supra note 348, at 527-28.
3 In his dissenting opinion in Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 345 n.5 (1978), Justice
Stevens commented that "the roster of scholars and judges with reservations about ex-
panding the Fifth Amendment privilege reads like an honor roll of the legal profession." He
then cited works by Wigmore, Corwin, Pound, Friendly, Schaefer, and Traynor. At least
four of the six honorees-Wigmore, Pound, Friendly and Schaefer-had manifested their
reservations about expanding the fifth amendment privilege by endorsing proposals for judi-
cially supervised interrogation. See also Frankel, supra note 348, at 530; Kamisar, Kauper's
"Judicial Examination of the Accused" Forty Years Later-Some Comments on a Remark-
able Article, 73 MICH. L. REv. 15, 33 (1974).
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Following a judicial determination of probable cause,52 a sus-
pect should be questioned in the presence of his counsel before a
magistrate. His answers in this safeguarded environment should be
admissible at trial. Of course these answers might tend to prove
the suspect's guilt because they were incriminating, seemed inter-
nally contradictory, rang untrue in certain details, or were incon-
sistent with the suspect's defense at trial. Equally, however, the
answers might tend to prove the suspect's innocence by showing
that he had denied his guilt promptly, in a manner consistent with
his trial defense and in apparently forthcoming answers to specific
questions. 53 If the suspect refused to answer, this refusal also
should be admissible at trial both because it would have a rational
bearing on his guilt and because its admission would express soci-
ety's judgment that defendants, like other witnesses, should re-
spond to orderly inquiry.
This interrogation, somewhat comparable to the taking of a
party's deposition in a civil case, would be likely to promote accu-
rate factfinding both when accurate factfinding would help the de-
fendant and when it would hurt him. Moreover, the defendant's
counsel should have a reciprocal opportunity promptly to depose
witnesses who might testify against his client.3 54 To make the safe-
guards of this procedure effective, no statements made in response
to custodial police interrogation should be received in evidence.
352 Like a police search, interrogation invades a suspect's privacy and should not be
permitted without antecedent justification. For a discussion of the important moral differ-
ences between interrogation based on slender suspicion and interrogation based on substan-
tial suspicion, see Greenawalt, supra note 346.
One collateral virtue of judicially supervised interrogation is that it wpuld encourage
police officers to bring suspects before magistrates promptly, for it would be only before
magistrates that admissible confessions could be obtained. This reform would promote a
prompt advisement of rights, a prompt bail determination, and a prompt determination of
probable cause.
353 Remarkably, permitting the defendant to present this probative evidence would re-
quire some modification of our arcane evidentiary rules. Today, the hearsay rule often pre-
vents defendants from introducing evidence of their prior consistent statements. These
statements become admissible only when the prosecutor has opened the door by advancing
"an express or implied charge... of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive."
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B). The fact that the prosecutor has accused the defendant of a
crime and introduced evidence of his guilt, moreover, carries no door ojening implications.
This circumstance is never enough in itself to permit the defendant to bolster a current
denial of guilt with proof of an earlier willingness to submit to interrogation and of the
detail and consistency of his responses. United States v. Navarro-Varelas, 541 F.2d 1331,
1334 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1045 (1977).
3" Today, by contrast, although discovery depositions are routine in civil cases, even
liberal criminal discovery rules ordinarily do not permit defendants or their attorneys to
depose prosecution witnesses. See FED. R. CraM. P. 15(a); STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL
DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL § 2.5 (1970).
1008 [50:931
Alternatives to Plea Bargaining
A defendant also should be expected to testify at trial, and a
trier of fact should be permitted to draw an adverse inference from
his failure to do so. At the same time, the process of impeachment
by prior convictions-itself a substantial impediment to the use of
that "most efficient testimonial resource," the evidence of defen-
dants themselves-ought to be eliminated. 55  In accepting
Duncan's apparent invitation 56 to devise a more balanced, more
rational (and more affordable) system of procedure, a state might
resolve the contradictions of America's use of defendants as a
source of evidence just as it might end the paradoxes of many
other aspects of American trial procedure.357
Some Americans favor subversion of the right to trial through
plea bargaining, not primarily for economic reasons, but because
they regard current trial procedures as defective. Scholars pro-
claim, "Plea bargaining is best understood as an adaptive process
in which the prosecutor, defense attorney and judge attempt to
3sThe use of prior convictions for impeachment purposes could be eliminated either by
forbidding their use altogether or by permitting their introduction as part of the prosecu-
tor's case in chief. Descriptions of mixed tribunal deliberations in West Germany indicate
that the tribunals give considerable weight to the always admitted evidence of prior convic-
tions, but as I read these descriptions, they do not support the fear that a tribunal may
convict a previously convicted defendant simply because he is an evil person and not be-
cause he committed the crime alleged. Indeed, a clean record may help a defendant more
than a bad record would hurt him. In one West German case, a defendant accused of at-
tempting to rob a jewelry store claimed, not only that he had not attacked the store owner,
but that the store owner had attacked him. Although this story seemed dubious, the defen-
dant had no prior criminal record and was personally appealing in other ways. Two lay
judges forced an acquittal over the dissent of the one professional judge. Casper & Zeisel,
supra note 243, at 159.
One of the nonjury trials that I observed in Philadelphia in 1968, see infra notes 412-90
and accompanying text, offered a striking comment on the American rule that ordinarily
excludes evidence of a defendant's prior criminal convictions unless he testifies. The charge
was purse snatching, and the state's case depended upon the victim's identification of the
defendant. At the conclusion of the trial, the judge announced that he had a reasonable
doubt of the defendant's guilt and that he would acquit. He then said, "Mr. Prosecutor, let
me see if I got it right." The prosecutor, with a resigned nod, handed the judge a copy of the
defendant's prior criminal record, one apparently indicating the defendant's involvement in
a number of similar offenses. "Oh hell, I blew it," said the judge. I was impressed both by
the judge's willingness to play by the rules and by the rules' artificiality. The judge resem-
bled a quiz show contestant awaiting the opening of a sealed envelope with the correct
answer.
:" See supra notes 309-15 and accompanying text.
117 See Greenawalt, supra note 346, at 46 ("Insofar as a very expansive right to silence
before and at trial impedes efficient ascertainment of guilt, it contributes to a guilty plea
alternative that treats an accused with little respect and concern."). Of course, even without
"unincorporating"-or "divesting"--the fifth amendment privilege from the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause, the Supreme Court might reinterpret the fifth amendment
to authorize the procedures suggested in text. See id. at 42-43, 52-59.
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* . . infuse a sense of realism in the implementation of absurdly
excessive rules and procedures."3 8 When trial processes appear so
hopeless that even a lawless system seems better, the time proba-
bly has come for their revision.
This article's review of the defects of the American trial and of
ways in which trial procedures might be simplified has been ex-
tremely cursory. It should be apparent, however, that substantially
simplified procedures derived in part from European models might
be preferred even to the procedures that our system promises but
does not deliver. When these simplified procedures are compared
not to what we say but to what we do, the issues become far less
balanced and debatable.
The foregoing discussion neglected the most obvious advan-
tage that a substantially simplified system of criminal procedure
would yield-one that would not lie in this system's selection of
factfinding tribunals, its simplified rules of evidence, its blend of
adversarial and nonadversarial procedures, or its use of the ac-
cused as a source of evidence. The most significant change that
this system would effect would lie in its treatment of the right to
trial. Like its European progenitors, this system would permit the
abolition of plea bargaining and make a trial available to every de-
fendant who sought one.
If Americans were to back their professed ideals of criminal
justice with the resources necessary to implement them, they
might conceivably assert the advantages of American procedure
over the more straightforward alternatives suggested above. On the
assumption that the subversion of our trial procedures through
plea bargaining has become a necessity, however, there is little
doubt that these alternatives would better provide the process that
is due.
For the moment, the prospect of revising American trial proce-
dures to incorporate significant features of continental justice is
probably a pipe dream. Although, as this article has argued, the
federal Constitution would pose no significant obstacle to this re-
form, state constitutional guarantees of the right to jury trial and
of other traditional features of American criminal procedure un-
doubtedly would. The processes of amending state constitutions,
although less burdensome than those of amending the federal Con-
stitution, are burdensome enough. Moreover, a proposal for alter-
ing the traditional incidents of the American trial is likely to sound
P58 . UTz, SETrLING THE FACTS 139 (1978).
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shockingly subversive to those whose views of criminal justice are
derived from Law Day rhetoric rather than from what happens in
our courts. Paradoxically, those who view themselves as civil liber-
tarians might be the first to resist indignantly a proposal actually
to afford American defendants some rights for a change.
Nevertheless, the day may come when Americans will seek al-
ternatives to a criminal justice system that sometimes seems more
a ravaged ideological battleground than a functioning social insti-
tution. In place of today's curious blend of repressiveness and lib-
ertarian sentiment, they may seek a system that works. Certainly
that day may come if the schizophrenia of our present system re-
mains unresolved while its promises are ever more clearly aban-
doned. If the thesis suggested by our ideals and the antithesis sug-
gested by our practices are to find their synthesis in a more
balanced, more attainable procedure, responsible students of crimi-
nal justice ought to begin the process now by considering proposals
for reform that are unlikely to be adopted and implemented
tomorrow.
C. Less Sweeping Reforms
Short of reshaping trial procedures in a European mold-and
without any influx of resources-Americans could implement a va-
riety of reforms that would make trials more available. This sec-
tion will review briefly (and in a far from definitive fashion) seven
proposals for conserving current criminal justice resources. These
proposals, each of which has become the subject of its own schol-
arly literature, are (1) to prosecute less, (2) to use existing court
capacity more effectively, (3) to limit the availability of postconvic-
tion remedies, (4) to reduce the size of criminal juries, (5) to sim-
plify jury selection procedures, (6) to simplify evidentiary rules,
and (7) to use videotape technology in assembling and presenting
trial testimony.3 59
1. Prosecute Less. A plea bargaining prohibition might strain
existing resources, but probably not to the point that it would im-
peril the justice system's capacity to prosecute murderers, rapists,
and armed robbers. It seems substantially more likely that prose-
35 Of course this section, like the rest of this article, proceeds from a strongly anti-plea
bargaining perspective. Admittedly, I prefer almost any system of trial procedure that guar-
antees an impartial tribunal and an opportunity to be heard to almost any system of plea
bargaining. Readers who do not share this viewpoint may not consider the restriction of plea
bargaining an important enough goal to justify some of the economies discussed in this sec-
tion; they may need to draw some finer lines.
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cutors faced with a prohibition of plea bargaining would screen
their cases more thoroughly and insist on stronger evidence as a
prerequisite to prosecution, and also that they would forgo more
often the prosecution of drug users, nude swimmers, and dirty
book sellers.38 0 Of course, many observers of American criminal
justice would regard intensified prosecutorial screening as a virtue
rather than as a defect.8 1
Legislatures also could liberate existing resources by
decriminalizing some victimless conduct. Although this article is
not the place to explore in a very serious way our law's embroil-
ment in the morals business, the emergence of plea bargaining oc-
curred at about the same time as a significant expansion in the
scope of the criminal law in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries (especially the enactment of new liquor prohibition stat-
utes by local, state, and national governments). s In the 1960's,
moreover, felony caseloads more than doubled as the result in part
of an explosion in the number of marijuana prosecutions; 63 at the
end of this period, plea bargaining suddenly became respectable,
gaining the endorsements of the American Bar Association,36 the
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration
of Justice,6 5 and the Supreme Court.3 66 Certainly the contribution
of victimless crime to the perceived pressure for plea bargaining
has not been trivial. As recently as 1971, "every second case on the
Los Angeles criminal court docket [was] a pot offense [and] every
fourth arrest across the nation a [public drunkenness] case. '36 7
Prosecuting consensual behavior less would offer one way to reduce
360 Following the prohibition of plea bargaining in Alaska, prosecutors declined prose-
cution in 70% more drug cases than they had before the ban. The rate of declension in
morals cases increased by 540%. In one city, Fairbanks, the rate of declension also increased
for fraud, forgery, and embezzlement cases, but there was no increase in the rate for more
serious offenses. M. RUBINSTEIN, S. CLARKE & T. WHITE, supra note 56, at 139-40.
361 See, e.g., N. MORRIS & G. HAWKINS, THE HONEST POLITICIAN'S GUIDE TO CRIME CON-
TROL 1-28 (1970); H. PACKER, supra note 147, at 249-366.
362 See History, supra note 4, at 32; Mather, Comments on the History of Plea Bar-
gaining, 13 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 281, 282-83 (1979).
63 In California, the number of adult arrests for marijuana use increased from 3,300 in
1962 to 34,000 in 1968, and by the end of this period, marijuana violations accounted for
approximately one-quarter of the state's felony complaints. J. KAPLAN, MARIJUANA 29 (1970).
On the overall doubling of felony caseloads during the 1960's, see The Prosecutor's Role,
supra note 4, at 51 & n.7.
3" STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY (1968).
365 U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHAL-
LENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 135 (1967).
36 See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752-53 (1970).
367 Justice on Trial-A Special Report, supra note 65, at 18.
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substantially our reliance on bargained justice.
2. Use Existing Court Capacity More Effectively. Politicians
are not always persuasive when they argue that potentially costly
innovations can be financed simply by "trimming fat" elsewhere or
by using existing resources more efficiently. With today's criminal
justice system, however, the more effective use of current resources
is not just a rhetorical possibility.
Anyone can test this proposition by walking through a crimi-
nal courthouse on a weekday afternoon and seeing how many
courts are in operation. If this person's experience is like mine, he
will find most courtrooms vacant, and on a Friday afternoon he
will be lucky to find a single court in session. " An investigation of
the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, revealed that the aver-
age judge spent only about two and three-quarters hours per day
on the bench.369 Although the overwhelming majority of convic-
3" Cf. Oster & Simon, Jury Trial A Sure Way to Increase the Rap, Chicago Sun-
Times, Sept. 17, 1973, at 4, col. 3, at 68, col. 1 (a Chicago Crime Commission survey revealed
that between 40 and 60% of all circuit court courtrooms were vacant between 10:00 and
11:30 A.M. and between 2:00 and 3:30 P.M.).
I'l Simon & Oster, Judges on Bench 2 Hours a Day, Chicago Sun-Times, Jan. 20,
1974, at 1, col. 1. The story added:
While judges argue that they spend essential work time off the bench in their
chambers, spot checks of court clerks and other court personnel indicate that on the
average this chambers time amounts to only another 11/2 hours a day.
Along with the three-month court-watching study, more than a score of interviews
were conducted with leading trial lawyers and assistant state's attorneys-those men
who actually spend time in court and in chambers with judges. Opinion was nearly
unanimous that while some judges work hard, most come to court late, leave early and
do little if any useful work in chambers.
... [C]ourtrooms stand empty, unused and often locked on the average of more
than five hours during the normal working day.
A variety of special methods were used in the study to give judges the benefit of
the doubt:
(1) The legal court days preceding and following the Thanksgiving, Christmas, Ha-
nukkah and New Year's holidays were excluded from the study.
(2) If a judge did not show up in court at all, that day was not included in the
study. This means that if a judge chose to take the entire day off-a not uncommon
occurence [sic], especially on Fridays-it was not counted against his average time in
court.
[T]he average bench starting time was about 10:15 a.m.,. but about 45 minutes
later, after 11 a.m., judges start leaving their courtrooms, some never to return.
... [B]y 3 p.m. the number of times judges appear on the bench is less than half
the 10:30 a.m. total.
As to the central debate-whether judges spend their time valuably and properly
when they are off the bench-virtually every judge interviewed said they do and virtu-
ally every lawyer and assistant state's attorney said they do not.
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tions in this court were by guilty plea, the average number of dis-
positions per judge was only about one per working day. °
One cannot estimate with precision the unused capacity of our
courts, but a report written principally by Whitney North Seymour
Jr. for a New York citizens group concluded that more than sixty-
four percent of the money spent each year by the Criminal Court
of New York City was "wasted."' 7 1 The report noted, for example,
that in 1978 the Criminal Court conducted 6878 preliminary hear-
ings in felony cases that later were screened again by grand juries;
it suggested that this duplicative pretrial screening was unneces-
sary. 72 The report also observed that more than seventeen court
appearances per case had become the norm in felony prosecutions
resolved by the Supreme Court in New York City; it concluded
that judges had been too liberal in granting continuances and that
no more than six to nine appearances should be necessary.373 Cer-
tainly the experience of the one state that has attempted to man-
age its caseloads without plea negotiation indicates that a plea bar-
gaining prohibition itself would be likely to spur important
economies and reforms.3
74
Id. at 1, col. 1, at 4, col. 1.
81o See NarduUi, The Caseload Controversy and the Study of Criminal Courts, 70 J.
CriM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 89, 96-97 (1979):
If criminal court resources are examined in light of the procedures actually used to
process cases, one might justifiably contend that many criminal court systems have
considerable excess capacity. Clearly there was much idle time in the trial courts in
Chicago.. . . Moreoever, throughout the two year period examined, the average num-
ber of dispositions [per judge was] about one per working day. This norm of a "disposi-
tion per day" is all the more remarkable when it is realized that during this time period
approximately seventy percent of the dispositions were guilty pleas or dismissals.
M Castillo, supra note 50, at 1.
72 CITIZENS ACTION ON CIME, WASTE, DELAY AND INEFFEcrIvENEss 12 (1980). The an-
nual cost to the taxpayers of preliminary hearings in cases later considered by grand juries
was close to four million dollars. Id.
33 Id. Relying on a time-cost study by a management consulting firm, Mott-McDonald
Associates, the report placed the annual cost of unnecessary court appearances in New York
City at about 34 million dollars. Id. This amount is 12% of the additional expenditure that
this article has estimated would be necessary to afford one-day trials to every felony defen-
dant in America who reaches the trial stage. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
174 See supra note 56 and accompanying text. Justice Robert C. Erwin of the Alaska
Supreme Court has observed:
"A no-plea-bargaining policy forces the police to investigate their cases more thor-
oughly. It forces prosecutors to screen their cases more rigorously and to prepare them
more carefully. It forces the courts to face the problem of the lazy judge who comes to
court late and leaves early, to search out a good presiding judge, and to adopt a sensi-
ble calendaring system. All of these things have in fact happened here."
SILBERMAN Book Review, supra note 4, at 1029 n.81 (quoting interview with the Hon. Rob-
ert C. Irwin, Associate Justice of the Alaska Supreme Court, in Anchorage (June 14, 1976));
see History, supra note 4, at 34 (statement of Judge Arthur L. Alarcon: "Prosecutors say
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Finally, to mention only briefly a development of importance,
judicial administration has burgeoned as a distinct field of study
within the past decade. It has produced an extensive literature on
subjects such as effective calendar management, the uses of pre-
trial conferences, the better training of court employees, the vir-
tues of computerized technology, and the more efficient utilization
of jurors .37 To the extent that the considerable knowledge thus
generated has not been put to use, it suggests a variety of ways in
which current resources might go farther.
3. Limit the Availability of Postconviction Remedies. The re-
view of a criminal conviction in the United States can be disjointed
and prolonged.
Potential steps are these: (1) new trial motion in trial court;
(2) direct appeal to state intermediate appellate court; (3) dis-
cretionary review in state supreme court; (4) discretionary re-
view in Supreme Court of the United States; (5) petition for
collateral review in state trial court; (6) appeal of the collat-
eral proceedings to state intermediate appellate court; (7) dis-
cretionary review in state supreme court; (8) discretionary re-
view in Supreme Court of the United States; (9) habeas
corpus petition in federal district court; (10) appeal to U.S.
Court of Appeals; (11) discretionary review in Supreme Court
of the United States."'
In England, by contrast, where the complexities of our federal sys-
tem are absent, a criminal conviction ordinarily is subject only to a
single review on direct appeal.3 "
A 1976 study by Paul D. Carrington, Daniel J. Meador, and
Maurice Rosenberg recommended both a unified state appellate
procedure patterned after England's and a simplified federal
habeas corpus procedure under which cases would enter the federal
judicial system at the court of appeals level. 37 In 1981, a federal
task force headed by Illinois Governor James R. Thompson and
former United States Attorney General Griffin B. Bell proposed a
that bargaining is a way to reduce the backlog, but in reality it is simply a way to reduce the
work.").
475 See, for example, the pages of The Justice System Journal, which began publication
in 1974 under the auspices of the Institute for Court Management. Indeed, publications
have addressed such previously unexplored topics as how to convert unused buildings into
courthouses at one-half the cost of constructing new facilities. Greenberg, How a Connecti-
cut County Converted a Supermarket into a Courthouse, 64 JUDICATURE 290 (1981).
376 p. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, JUSTIcE ON APPEAL 105 (1976).
377 Id. at 104.
378 Id. at 103-20.
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statute of limitations and other restrictions for federal habeas
corpus actions."'
I do not endorse these proposals. Indeed, this article has sug-
gested making postconviction remedies more available than they
are today to defendants who have pleaded guilty.38 0 Nevertheless,
if one assumes that criminal justice resources are as limited as the
advocates of plea bargaining commonly contend, both the Car-
rington-Meador-Rosenberg and the Thompson-Bell proposals seem
too timid.
Perhaps the costs of multiple postconviction proceedings are
worth paying, but not in a system as reluctant to pay the costs of
trial as ours. It is bizarre to afford some defendants unrestricted
access to trial and appellate courts for repeated postconviction
proceedings while pressing most defendants to sacrifice their initial
opportunity to be heard.381 A better course would be to grant all
defendants an unfettered right to trial (and perhaps to one appeal)
and then to call a halt. If the issue is merely one of first things
first, today's broad access to postconviction relief ought to be re-
stricted in the interest of making trials more available.
4. Reduce the Size of Criminal Juries. The Supreme Court's
decision in Williams v. Florida82 upholding the use of six-person
juries in felony cases led to a flood of scholarly criticism. This criti-
cism, based largely on sophisticated social science research, sug-
gested both that six-person juries are less able than twelve-person
juries to serve some traditional functions of the jury and that they
are less advantageous to defendants.3 83 Although these conclusions
occasionally have been questioned,3" the critics seemed correct on
both points; they also were whistling in a wind tunnel.
One early, forceful criticism of Williams said much in its title,
And Then There Were None.3 85 For the overwhelming majority of
criminal defendants, however-those induced to plead guilty be-
cause American jurisdictions view themselves as too impoverished
to implement the right to trial-there currently are none. To de-
379 ATT'Y GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME, FINAL REPORT 58-60 (1981).
380 See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text
"1 See The Supreme Court, supra note 4, at 38-39; Halberstam, supra note 17, at 42.
"2 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
38 E.g., M. SAKS, JURY VERDICTS (1977); Lempert, Uncovering "Nondiscernible Differ-
ences". Empirical Research and the Jury-Size Cases, 73 MICH. L. REV. 643 (1975).
See Lermack, No Right Number? Social Science and the Jury-Size Cases, 54
N.Y.U. L. REv. 951, 967-72 (1979); Comment, The Impact of Jury Size on the Court Sys-
tem, Loy. L.A.L. REV. 1103 (1979).
3" Zeisel,. . . And Then There Were None: The Diminution of the Federal Jury, 38
U. CHI. L. REV. 710 (1971).
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bate the niceties of jury dynamics amidst the ruins of a system
that strains to avoid using juries of any size is myopic. On the as-
sumption that criminal justice resources will remain inadequate,
the issue is not twelve versus six. It is twelve for a small number of
defendants versus six for a larger number.3 86 Moreover, this issue
of resource allocation does not seem extraordinarily difficult; al-
though six jurors may not be as good as twelve, they are far better
than none.
Despite Williams, the use of six-person juries in serious crimi-
nal cases remains aberrant.3 8 7 Our nation's insistence on the his-
toric number twelve illustrates once more the taste for champagne
and caviar that has brought our system of courtroom justice to the
verge of starvation.88
5. Simplify Jury Selection Procedures. When viewed against
the protestations of poverty used to rationalize American guilty
plea rates, the waste caused by current jury selection procedures
seems scandalous.389 An extreme example was the New Haven
murder prosecution of Bobby Seale and Ericka Huggins in which
the selection of a jury required the examination of more than 1000
prospective jurors over a four-month period.390
Half a century ago, the Wickersham Commission called for an
3" How many resources would be saved by a reduction in jury size is uncertain. Plainly
a reduction from twelve jurors to six would save at least the time, salaries, and expenses of
six jurors per case. If the customary criticisms of six-person juries are sound, see sources
cited supra notes 383 & 385, this reduction also ought to cut deliberation time significantly
and to reduce by about half the number of retrials necessitated by hung juries. A few jury
management problems (for example, those arising when a single juror engages in misconduct
during a trial) also would become less frequent. Some studies of civil proceedings, however,
have indicated that a reduction in jury size might not limit notably the amount of time
required for voir dire or for trial. See Beiser & Varrin, Six-Member Juries in the Federal
Courts, 58 JUDICATURE 424, 428-31 (1975); Pabst, What Do Six-Member Juries Really
Save?, 57 JUDmCATURE 6 passim (1973).
's See NAT'L CENTER FOR STATE CouRTs, FAcETs OF THE JURY SYSTEM 41-43, 61-111
(1976).
M In Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), the Supreme Court held nonunanimous
verdicts constitutionally permissible in state criminal proceedings. Like reductions in jury
size, nonunanimous verdicts probably diminish both jury deliberation time and the number
of retrials following hung juries. Nevertheless, nonunanimous verdicts raise much more se-
vere doubts about the accuracy of criminal convictions than the use of six-person juries.
Zeisel, supra note 385, at 721-24. For this reason, departure from the traditional require-
ment of unanimity in serious criminal cases is probably undesirable.
"' For additional discussion of jury selection procedures, see supra notes 323-27 and
accompanying text.
310 See Seale Jury Seated After 4 Months of Questioning, N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1971,
at 43, col. 3. In one Illinois murder case, only four jurors had been seated three months after
voir dire began. Graham, Mud Slinging Stalls Prison Murder Trial, Am. Law., Jan. 1981, at
16, 16.
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end to attorney-conducted voir dire, s91 and, largely within the past
fifteen years, a number of courts have instituted this reform."9 2
Apart from questioning by the court rather than. by counsel, some
of these courts have employed written questionnaires to elicit in-
formation from prospective jurors, and some have used a single
voir dire proceeding to select juries for more than one case.3 3
These reforms conserve significant resources,394 but they do
not go far enough. The usual English practice of seating without
inquiry the first twelve prospective jurors to enter the jury box
may not merit duplication here, 95 but we ought to come close.
First, our use of peremptory challenges should be ended. The as-
serted justification for these challenges is that they promote impar-
tial juries; but of course, whenever there is good reason to believe
that a prospective juror is biased, he is not challenged perempto-
rily but instead is disqualified for cause. In exercising a peremp-
tory challenge, a lawyer is invited to give rein to his whim or
hunch-usually not a whim or hunch that a prospective juror is
partisan or incompetent but merely that he is likely to prove less
favorable to the lawyer's position than his replacement. Almost in-
evitably, challenges are exercised partly on the basis of race or
things like race, and opposing advocates attack the panel of pro-
spective jurors from both ends. The thin German Lutheran who
rarely smiles disappears from this panel along with the black who
wears his hair in an Afro. The tendency is to provide juries of
clerks and to diminish our vision of the jury as a cross section of
391 NAT'L COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE 47 (1931); see also Judicial Conference of the U.S., The Jury System in the Federal
Courts, 26 F.R.D. 409, 424 (1960) (recommendation of the judicial conference committee on
the operation of the jury system that attorney-conducted voir dire be eliminated in federal
courts).
"I See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a); ILL. CT. R. 231, 244; N.J. CT. R. 1:8-3(a). As of
1971, 20 states permitted or required some form of court-conducted voir dire. Levit, Nelson,
Ball & Chernick, Expediting Voir Dire: An Empirical Study, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 916, 929
n.58 (1971).
393 See Draheim, Efficient Jury Utilization Techniques . . . Or Proposition 12, 28
DRAKE L. REV. 21, 29-38 (1978-79).
31 See Levit, Nelson, Ball & Chernick, supra note 392, passim; Note, Judge Conducted
Voir Dire as a Time-Saving Trial Technique, 2 RUT. CAm. L. REV. 161 (1970).
3" Professor Hans Zeisel once asked the Chief Justice of England, Lord Parker of Wad-
dington, "What if one of the jurors were a cousin of the defendant?" The Chief Justice
replied, "Wouldn't that be awkward?" Zeisel & Diamond, The Jury Selection in the Mitch-
ell-Stans Conspiracy Trial, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 151, 173 n.30. Although I am
not convinced that the greater heterogeneity of American society justifies the use of more
extensive voir dire proceedings here than in England, our failure to restrict prejudicial pre-
trial publicity in the English manner does necessitate a more extended voir dire in some
cases.
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the community.398
Second, whether or not peremptory challenges are abolished,
the initial voir dire of prospective jurors should consist of just
three questions:
Are you acquainted with any of the parties, witnesses, or
lawyers in this case?
Do you currently know anything about the facts of this
case?
Do you know any reason at all why it might be difficult
for you to render a verdict on the basis of the evidence
presented in court in accordance with the court's instructions?
An affirmative answer to any of these questions would require fur-
ther questioning, but a prospective juror who answered all three
questions "no" ought to be seated without further inquiry (unless
of course independent evidence of the sort that would merit the
disqualification of a judge established grounds for his dismissal)."9 7
3" The Supreme Court has said that a jury must be "a body truly representative of the
community," Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940), and that "the fair cross section re-
quirement" is "fundamental to the jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment," Taylor
v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). The author of the Taylor opinion, Justice White, also
wrote for the Court in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), a case holding that a prosecu-
tor may use his peremptory challenges to exclude all blacks from a jury without violating
the Constitution. Id. at 209-22. Apart from the question whether the all-white jury in Swain
was "a body truly representative of the community," one wonders whether the prosecutor's
discrimination was justified by a compelling governmental interest. The Court did not men-
tion in Swain the heightened scrutiny to which racial classifications ordinarily are subject,
and a compelling reason for acting on the basis of a prosecutor's whim or hunch is difficult
to conceive.
39 This simplification of the jury selection process, when coupled with a reduction in
the size of criminal juries, might maintain about the same "balance of advantage" between
the state and the accused as present procedures have established. A reduction in jury size
would diminish the likelihood of deadlock and, perhaps, favor the state in other ways as
well, see the materials cited supra notes 383 & 385, but a simplification of jury selection
procedures might yield an offsetting increase in the diversity of jury panels to the apparent
benefit of the accused. Moreover, a reduction in jury size would diminish the likelihood that
a "wildcard juror" (a juror who exhibited no bias but somehow seemed untrustworthy)
might appear on the panel, and the use of peremptory challenges might therefore seem less
important. To some extent, a reduction in jury size and a simplification of jury selection
procedures would exhibit countervailing tendencies, but in one respect these reforms would
be alike. Both would conserve resources that could be used to make the right to trial not
just a right that defendants have but one that they get.
Sensible though it is, this proposal for a greatly simplified voir dire procedure might
encounter constitutional difficulty in exceptional situations. In Ham v. South Carolina, 409
U.S. 524 (1973), a trial judge had asked prospective jurors about prejudice toward the defen-
dant but had refused to ask specifically about racial prejudice. The Supreme Court held
that the defendant, a black civil rights worker charged with marijuana possession, had been
denied due process by the court's refusal to ask prospective jurors about their possible racial
biases.
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This simplification of jury selection procedures might save
more time and money than any of the other reforms suggested
here. Unlike some of the other reforms, however, economy would
not be the only virtue of this change. In addition, abolishing pe-
remptory challenges and almost abolishing voir dire would pro-
mote the dignity and privacy of prospective jurors, further their
equal treatment, and achieve more fully the asserted purposes of
our jury system.
6. Simplify Evidentiary Rules. In the early nineteenth cen-
tury, Jeremy Bentham decried "almost every rule that has ever
been laid down on the subject of evidence" as "repugnant to the
ends of justice." ' Bentham argued that evidence never should be
excluded on the ground that its exclusion would promote accurate
factfinding s99
Some of the common law rules that Bentham criticized-most
notably, the rule disqualifying criminal defendants from testifying
under oath at trial-now have been abandoned, and most other
common law exclusionary rules have been liberalized as well. Nev-
ertheless, the common law's system of proof remains essentially in-
If, as I believe, current jury selection procedures are outrageously prolonged, it is appro-
priate to ask with respect to every question propounded during voir dire whether the gains
of asking it exceed the costs. The Supreme Court made clear in Ham that it had not discov-
ered a due process right to an extended psychoanalytic probing of each prospective juror to
ferret out subtle, hidden biases; instead, the defendant was entitled merely to have the court
or counsel propound a single general question on racial prejudice to the panel. Id. at 527-28.
The single question required by the Court was, however, essentially useless. I know very few
people who would avow their racial bigotry in response to this question. I doubt, for exam-
ple, that Lester Maddox, George Wallace, or Orville Faubus ever considered himself biased,
and if any of them did; I am not sure that he would have conceded this fact in a public
courtroom. If any prospective juror did admit to racial bias but pledged to judge the case
fairly on the basis of the evidence presented in court, his extraordinary honesty on the first
question might suggest his credibility on the second, and he might seem an exceptionally
qualified juror. Moreover, if a prospective juror recognized some bias within him-
self-perhaps a bias that he was trying to overcome-he probably should not have been
required to avow this problem publicly so long as he remained confident of his ability to
judge the case fairly and in accordance with the court's instructions. The due process clause
apparently does not require United States Supreme Court Justices or even South Carolina
trial judges to answer rude questions about their personal prejudices when they hear cases
involving black civil rights workers.
Three years after Ham, in Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976), the Supreme Court
held that the Constitution did not require voir dire inquiry concerning racial prejudice in a
case in which black defendants were charged with robbing, assaulting, and attempting to
murder a white security guard. Ham thus became something of a sport, and the case might
not pose a significant barrier to the proposal in text for greatly simplified jury selection
procedures. See also Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182 (1981) (plurality opinion)
(specific inquiry into possible prejudice required only in "special circumstances").
:9 1 J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 4 (London 1827).
99 Id. at 1.
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tact-a circumstance that may reflect the self-interest of lawyers
and their deep attachment to the familiar, for our rules of evidence
make only a little more sense today than they did in 1800.
Now that common law pleading and its specialized forms of
action have been abandoned, our law's grandest living memorial to
common law refinement is the hearsay rule and its exceptions. In
1980, the Supreme Court noted that the Federal Rules of Evidence
list over twenty hearsay exceptions, 00 while the number and na-
ture of these exceptions vary significantly among the states. The
Court observed that "every set of exceptions seems to fit an apt
description offered more than 40 years ago: 'an old-fashioned crazy
quilt made of patches cut from a group of paintings by cubists,
futurists and realists.' "401 Despite this declaration, the Supreme
Court reiterated that the confrontation clause of the sixth amend-
ment in large measure "constitutionalizes" the common law hear-
say rule in criminal prosecutions.0 2
Jeremy Bentham favored the exclusion of hearsay evidence
when more direct proof was available; when hearsay was the best
proof to be had, however, he thought it worth hearing.403 Ben-
tham's proposed liberalization of the hearsay rule has been en-
dorsed by modern scholars 40 4 and incorporated in the Model Code
of Evidence.40 5 This revision apparently would be consistent with
the results (although certainly not with the language) of the Su-
preme Court's confrontation clause decisions.40 8 Moreover, a rein-
terpretation of the confrontation clause to incorporate Benthamite
principles has significant scholarly support,40 7 and of course the
400 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). See FED. R. Evm. 803, 804.
401 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62 (1980) (quoting Morgan & Maguire, Looking Back-
ward and Forward at Evidence, 50 HRv. L. REv. 909, 921 (1937)).
402 Among other things, the Court said that "reliability can be inferred without more in
a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception." 448 U.S. at 66.
Nevertheless, some firmly rooted hearsay exceptions-for example, the exception for decla-
rations by co-conspirators-arb not grounded on the supposed reliability of the statements
admitted into evidence.
403 3 J. BENTHAM, supra note 398, at 407-10.
I" See Chadbourn, Bentham and the Hearsay Rule-A Benthamic View of Rule
63(4)(c) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 75 HAIRv. L. REv. 932, 937 (1962); James, The
Role of Hearsay in a Rational Scheme of Evidence, 34 ILL. L. REv. 788 (1940).
405 MODEL CODE OF EvmENcE RuLE 503(a) (1942).
406 See Westin, The Future of Confrontation, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1185, 1195-96 (1979)
(arguing that the Supreme Court has excluded hearsay evidence under the confrontation
clause only when declarants were available to testify in court or when the government itself
was responsible for their unavailability). But see Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64-65 (1980)
(prosecution may introduce statements of unavailable witnesses only when the statements
bear sufficient "indicia of reliability").
407 See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 172-89 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); Westin,
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confrontation clause restricts only the presentation of evidence by
the state. Despite the lack of symmetry, a state might permit de-
fendants to offer hearsay evidence whenever better evidence could
not be presented. Nevertheless, Bentham's proposal for simplifying
and liberalizing the hearsay rule has nowhere been adopted.
To a somewhat lesser extent than the hearsay rule, our rules
concerning evidence of a defendant's prior conduct, documentary
evidence, and the format of testimony at trial fit the historical pat-
tern of unnecessary common law complexity. Paradoxically, the ex-
clusion of evidence pursuant to these rules generally makes trials
longer, not shorter. Substantial revision of all of these rules would
both expedite the administration of justice and further the ascer-
tainment of truth.
7. Use Videotape Technology in Assembling and Presenting
Trial Testimony. The hero of this last segment on trial reform is
not Jeremy Bentham but James L. McCrystal, an Ohio judge who
has pioneered use of the prerecorded videotape trial. As Judge Mc-
Crystal has described it, the process begins when lawyers assemble
(at their convenience and that of one or more trial witnesses), start
a video recorder, and swear one of the witnesses. The lawyers ex-
amine this witness as though they were before a jury, noting and
perhaps arguing evidentiary objections on the videotape. A judge
later reviews the tape, passes on the evidentiary objections, and
edits from the tape whatever material he holds inadmissible. Fi-
nally, the edited tape is presented to a jury.
McCrystal and Young have identified some of the advantages
of this procedure:
(1) the trial flows without interruptions from objections,
bench conference, delays for witnesses, counsel's pauses, client
conferences and chamber retreats; (2) maximum utilization of
juror time is achieved; (3) the time required for a given trial is
shortened considerably; (4) the trial can be scheduled, with
certainty, for a specific day; (5) the witnesses can be presented
in the desired order, obviating the need for adjustment to
availability at the last moment; (6) the chance of mistrial is
greatly reduced; (7) there is no need to recess for the prepara-
tion of instructions; (8) directed verdict motions are decided
when the tapes are previewed and do not infringe on court-
room time; (9) opening statements should be more effective
with knowledge of precisely what the evidence will show; (10)
supra note 406.
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the judge need not be present during the viewing of the tape;
(11) the presence of the lawyers is not required during the
viewing of the tape; (12) it is possible for judge and counsel to
conduct simultaneous trials; (13) trial preparation can be
more effectively scheduled and the taping may be in the most
convenient order of witness availability; (14) last-minute
preparation is eliminated; (15) time is afforded for study of
evidentiary questions; (16) testimony on location is facilitated;
(17) elimination of live trial impediments give the jury a com-
prehensive related view of the entirety of the case; (18) the
tape can serve as the transcript of proceedings on appeal; (19)
retrial is facilitated; (20) extrajudicial judge influence through
reaction to witnesses and comments to counsel is reduced;
(21) the court need no longer resort to the fiction that a juror
can disregard what he has heard in accordance with the
judge's instructions.0 8
Of course one might fear that this form of trial would prove
insufficiently awesome to witnesses and jurors and would fail to
impress upon them the human significance of their responsibili-
ties.4 9 Nevertheless, available evidence offers no support for this
concern and in fact suggests that prerecorded trials probably yield
some gain in juror attention, comprehension, and retention.410
Plainly the time saving potential of this trial format is enormous,
and the dangers of this technological innovation seem minimal
when compared with the pitfalls of today's more widely employed
expedient, plea bargaining. Like most of the other reforms sug-
gested in this section, the prerecorded videotape trial would not
raise substantial constitutional issues,411 would offer important ad-
4" McCrystal & Young, Pre-Recorded Videotape Trials-An Ohio Innovation, 39
BROOKLYN L. REv. 560, 663-64 (1973); see also McCrystal, Videotaped Trials: A Primer, 61
JUDICATURE 250 (1978); McCrystal, Videotaped Trials: Relief for Congested Courts?, 49
DEN. L.J. 463 (1973); Note, Videotape Trials: Legal and Practical Implications, 9 COLUM.
J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 363 (1972).
Although 21 advantages might seem enough, Judge Marvin E. Frankel has noted two
additional virtues of the prerecorded trial. First, it would circumscribe attorney stratagems
like asking questions known to be dubious but intended for effect; second, it would permit
time for judicial thought between witnesses and even during the testimony of a single wit-
ness. Frankel, supra note 348, at 534.
" See Note, The Role of Videotape in the Criminal Court, 10 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1107,
1136 (1976).
410 For a discussion of jury reactions to videotape testimony, see generally Miller, Tele-
vised Trials-How Do Juries React?, 58 JUDICATURE 242 (1974); Miller, Fontest & Dahnke,
Using Videotape in the Courtroom: A Four Year Test Pattern, 55 U. DEr. J. Uiw. L. 655
(1978).
411 The sixth amendment confrontation clause has been read to guarantee a defendant
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vantages apart from its economizing effect, and would permit a sig-
nificant reallocation of existing resources if Americans wished to
end our regime of bargained justice.
D. The Pittsburgh and Philadelphia Stories: Simplification of the
Trial Process Through "Jury Waiver Bargaining"
In suggesting a final alternative to plea bargain-
ing-bargaining for a waiver of the right to jury trial rather than
for a plea of guilty-this article again begins with description and
moves to prescription. The thesis that simpler trial procedures lead
to increased trial use and to reduced pressure for self-conviction is
supported, not only by our history and by European experience,
but also by the recent experience of two American jurisdictions. In
Pennsylvania's two largest cities, criminal trials commonly have
been conducted in an even simpler and more rapid fashion than on
the European continent. Although neither jurisdiction has at-
tempted to abolish plea bargaining, guilty plea rates have been
low. In Philadelphia in 1965, only 27% of all criminal convictions
were by plea of guilty;41 2 guilty pleas accounted for 35% of Pitts-
burgh's criminal convictions in 1967.' 1s These guilty plea rates
were far lower than those of Chicago (87 %), 1 Cleveland (95 %),415
Houston (92%), 4 16 Manhattan (97 %), 4 17 Alameda County (88%), 418
San Francisco (87%),419 and indeed almost every other urban juris-
diction in America.420 These unusually low guilty plea rates were
also far lower than those of the less populous areas of Pennsylva-
the qualified right to attend all phases of his trial, Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 372
(1892), and the sixth amendment also guarantees the right to a public trial. U.S. CONST.
amend. VI. Some uses of video prerecording might raise close questions under these consti-
tutional provisions, but any constitutional objection could be obviated by permitting both
the defendant and the public to be present throughout the preparation, editing, and exhibi-
tion of the videotape.
412 Specter, Book Review, 76 YALE L.J. 604, 605 (1967).
413 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURT, COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY,
1966-67 ANNUAL REPORT 16 (1967) [hereinafter cited as ALLEGHENY CoUTrY REPORT].
414 Unpublished statistic supplied by Carl Rolewick of the Administrative Office of the
Illinois Courts for the year 1967.
415 Estimated on the basis of unpublished statistics supplied by John L. Lavelle, Court
Administrator of the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County for the year 1967.
416 Unpublished statistic supplied by R. J. Roman of the Clerk's Office, Harris County
District Courts for the year 1967.
417 ADMIN. BD. OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, TWELFTH AN-
NUAL REPORT 419 (Table 12) (1967).
418 CAL. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME AND DELINQUENCY IN CALIFORNIA 1966, at 86 (1966).
419 Id.
420 See supra note 36.
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nia. In 1965, despite the very large number of criminal trials con-
ducted in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, 63% of the state's convic-
tions were by guilty plea.42 1 Indeed, the guilty plea rates of
Philadelphia and Pittsburgh were lower than those that the same
two cities had experienced during the 1920's. At that time, guilty
pleas accounted for 58% of Philadelphia's convictions4 2 and for
74% of the convictions in Pittsburgh.2 3
Although today's guilty plea rates in Philadelphia and Pitts-
burgh do not approach those of most other jurisdictions, these
rates have increased since the mid-1960's. In Philadelphia, the
number of trials still greatly exceeds the number of guilty pleas,
but guilty pleas now account for 48% of the cases that end in con-
viction.42 4 In Pittsburgh, the change has been more pronounced.
By 1975, 62% of that city's convictions were by guilty plea,42 5 and
by 1979, 77 %.428 In short, Pittsburgh's low guilty plea rates of the
mid-1960's have more than doubled within a dozen years.
On two occasions approximately nine years apart-in 1968 and
in 1977-I interviewed prosecutors, defense attorneys, trial judges,
and other officials in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh. On both occa-
sions, I also attended trials and plea negotiation sessions. Changes
in the criminal justice systems of the two jurisdictions could be
discerned in more than the official statistics, but before exploring
these changes, the systems' operations at the time of my initial in-
vestigation should be described in greater detail.'
The relative lack of plea bargaining in Philadelphia and Pitts-
burgh plainly was not the product of an unusual commitment of
resources to their criminal justice systems. A study by Professor
Martin Levin 4 28 reported that the Court of Common Pleas in Pitts-
burgh not only had the lowest guilty plea rate of the four felony
41 Commonwealth ex rel. Kerekes v. Maroney, 423 Pa. 337, 345 n.5, 223 A.2d 699, 703
n.5 (1966).
422 PHILADELPHIA BAR ASS'N, REPORT OF THE CREwm SuRvzY CoMMITTEE 404 (1926).
423 R. MOLEY, POLITICS AND CRIMINAL PROSECUTION 160 (1929).
424 PHILADELPHIA COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, 1979 ANNUAL REPORT 51 (1979). In Phila-
delphia, 1863 defendants pleaded guilty in 1979, and 3015 were tried (2699 at nonjury trials
and 316 before juries). Of the defendants who were tried, 1995 were convicted and 1020 were
acquitted. The acquittal rate was substantially higher at nonjury trials (35%) than at jury
trials (26%). Id.
42 Unpublished statistics supplied by Grenville Hayes of the Administrative Office of
the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County.
412 Unpublished statistics supplied by Dennis Starrett of the Allegheny Regional Advi-
sory Committee of the Pennsylvania Council.
421 Unless otherwise noted, the descriptions that follow derive from my interviews and
observations.
428 Levin, Delay in Five Criminal Courts, 4. J. LEGAL STu. 83 (1975).
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courts studied;429 it also had the heaviest caseload per judge.430
The caseload per judge in Pittsburgh was, in fact, almost five times
greater than it was in the District of Columbia and almost three
times greater than it was Chicago.4s  Although the caseload per
judge was lighter in Philadelphia than in Pittsburgh, my very
rough calculations suggest that it remained about twice as great as
the criminal caseload in Chicago. 32
Similarly, the low rate of guilty pleas in these two jurisdictions
did not reflect any unusual devotion of lawyers and court officials
to jury trials. Not only were guilty plea rates unusually low; jury
trial rates were low as well. In Philadelphia, only 1.7% of all crimi-
nal cases were tried to a jury,433 and in Pittsburgh the figure was
3%.43 Professor Levin reported that the rate of what he called full
length trials was substantially lower in Pittsburgh than in any
other felony court that he studied.43 5 Moreover, in the United
States as a whole, a significant majority of the felony cases re-
solved by trial in recent years have been resolved by juries; as a
result, jury trials probably have occurred in about 8% of all cases
filed in America's felony trial courts. 36
In both Pittsburgh and Philadelphia, the most common proce-
dure for resolving a felony case in the mid-1960's was a nonjury
trial. In Pittsburgh in 1967, the cases of 3005 defendants were re-
solved at these trials (while 180 defendants were tried before ju-
ries, 1144 pleaded guilty, and 1174 had their cases dismissed).43 7 In
Philadelphia in 1966, 13,750 criminal charges (a number substan-
4129 Id. at 112 (Table 8).
430 Id. at 88 (Table 1).
431 Id.
432 According to unpublished material supplied by Edward Blake, Court Administrator
of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia [hereinafter cited as Philadelphia Statistics],
2777 "court days" were devoted to criminal matters in 1966. On the assumption that a judge
devotes approximately 215 days per year to judicial business (250 days per year, exclusive of
weekends and holidays, less 35 days for vacations, illnesses, workshops, and the like), this
figure suggests that the equivalent of about 13 full-time judges resolved the 12,308 cases
that, according to the same unpublished materials, were completed during that year. (Two
years later, at the time of my visit, there were indeed 13 judges sitting in the part of the
Court of Common Pleas that heard criminal matters.) The average annual caseload per
judge was therefore 947. Levin reported that the caseload per judge in Chicago was 450.
Levin, supra note 428, at 88 (Table 1). Nevertheless, one cannot be at all confident that
these comparative caseload figures were computed on compatible bases; they are at best
suggestive.
43 Philadelphia Statistics, supra note 432.
4 ALLEGHENY CouNTY REPORT, supra note 413, at 16.
4" Levin, supra note 428, at 88 (Table 1).
4" See supra note 85.
437 ALLEGHENY CouNTY REPoRT, supra note 413, at 16.
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tially greater than the number of defendants) were resolved at
nonjury trials (while 358 charges were resolved by jury verdicts,
4414 were resolved by guilty pleas, and 3094 ended in dismissal,
abatement, or transfer).438 An obviously critical question is why
prosecutors, defendants, and defense attorneys in these jurisdic-
tions usually preferred nonjury trials to jury trials on the one hand
and to bargained pleas of guilty on the other.
Defense attorneys in other jurisdictions often explain their
preference for jury trials by emphasizing the supposed willingness
of jurors to consider legally irrelevant equities and by noting that,
in most states, the vote of one juror out of twelve is sufficient to
prevent conviction.3 9 Some Pittsburgh defense attorneys agreed
with this general perception that juries are less likely to convict
than judges, but most did not. In Philadelphia, moreover, defense
attorneys invariably maintained that judges were as likely, and
perhaps more likely, to acquit than juries.440
The somewhat divergent views of defense attorneys in the two
jurisdictions seemed to reflect somewhat divergent practices.
Thomas M. Uhlman and N. Darlene Walker recently published
two studies of felony prosecutions in a major eastern city,441 and
438 Philadelphia Statistics, supra note 432.
439 Although nonunanimous jury verdicts are constitutionally permissible, Apodaca v.
Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), every state except Louisiana and Oregon requires unanimous
verdicts in felony cases. See NAT'L CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 387, at 41-43
(Chart A) (1976). Only three additional states permit nonunanimous verdicts in misde-
meanor prosecutions absent the defendant's consent: Idaho, id. at 44, 73, Oklahoma, id. at
97, and Texas, id. at 104. For information on each of the 50 states' provisions, see id. at 61-
ill.
440 Lawyers in both cities also suggested as a reason for waiving jury trials that judges
were more predictable. One commented that it was "like having a standing jury."
Professor Stephen J. Schulhofer recently completed a study of plea and "waiver" bar-
gaining in Philadelphia. S. Schulhofer, supra note 52. On most points, Schulhofer's descrip-
tion of Philadelphia practices in 1982 differed little from my description of earlier practices.
In one respect, however, things appear to have changed. The public defenders with whom
Schulhofer and his student assistants spoke regarded juries as more likely to acquit than
judges in most cases. Id. at 89. To some extent, this apparent change in the perceptions of
practitioners might have reflected a change in practice. The acquittal rate at nonjury trials
had declined from 40.2% in the period from mid-1968 though mid-1974, see infra note 443
and accompanying text, to 31.6% during 1981. S. Schulhofer, supra note 52, at n.137. Al-
though the acquittal rate at nonjury trials remained higher at the time of Schulhofer's study
than the acquittal rate at jury trials (31.6% versus 27.5%), public defenders claimed that
these comparisons were misleading because the defenders were "likely to elect jury trial in
very serious cases in which the prospects for acquittal [were] remote." Id.
441 Uhlman & Walker, "He Takes Some of My Time; I Take Some of His' An Analy-
sis of Judicial Sentencing Patterns in Jury Cases, 14 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 323 (1980) [herein-
after cited as He Takes Some of My Time]; Uhlman & Walker, A Plea Is No Bargain: The
Impact of Case Disposition on Sentencing, 60 Soc. ScI. Q. 218 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
A Plea Is No Bargain].
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although they did not identify the jurisdiction that they studied,
the distinctive features of Philadelphia's judicial system could be
recognized as easily as the silhouette of its Independence Hall.445
The authors reported that 40.2% of the defendants tried at non-
jury.proceedings between mid-1968 and mid-1974 in this jurisdic-
tion were acquitted 44 -a figure that is much higher than the ap-
proximate 25% acquittal rate for American felony trials
generally 444 also significantly higher than the 34.2% acquittal rate
for jury trials in that city.445 In Pittsburgh, by contrast, 33.7% of
442 Indeed, one who knew nothing of Philadelphia's judicial system easily might have
recognized that city. There were not many northeastern cities in 1979 that had populations
of two million and conservative, Democratic mayors. See T. UHLMAN, RACIAL JUSTICE 27-32
(describing "Metro City").
When researchers have obtained information by promising not to reveal the identity of
the jurisdiction studied, a reader who is confident that he recognizes the city behind the
pseudonym may confront an ethical issue in deciding whether to reveal it. In this instance
and a few others, however, I have not hesitated to blow the whistle. Obviously I was not a
party to the authors' promises, and the gains of revealing this information seem to exceed
the costs. Conceivably this action could diminish the willingness of potential sources to rely
on similar promises and to share information in the future. Nevertheless, a source who relies
on this sort of promise seems likely to be misguided. When researchers supply sufficient
clues that an academic reader can identify the jurisdiction in question, knowledgeable local
readers are likely to have even less difficulty. Moreover, many local observers are likely to
have had contact with the researchers, and whenever the researchers' findings are interest-
ing enough to matter, the word does get around. A promise of jurisdictional anonymity
therefore does not do much to prevent local embarrassment-the kind that is most likely to
concern local officials. At the same time, knowledge of the identity of the jurisdiction stud-
ied greatly increases the utility of the information presented. For example, piercing the veil
of the Uhlman-Walker studies has enabled me to offer statistical data in support of conclu-
sions about Philadelphia's criminal justice system that otherwise would have rested entirely
on my own impressionistic observations and interview material. Moreover, my indepen-
dently gathered knowledge of Philadelphia criminal justice has enabled me to offer some
criticism of the conclusions that Uhlman and Walker advanced. This kind of in-
terchange-both the criticism and the reinforcement-becomes impossible when one set of
researchers can effectively keep secret the fact that they have studied the same jurisdiction
as other researchers.
Although sources sometimes may insist on promises of jurisdictional anonymity as a
condition of revealing information, I suspect that some researchers make these promises too
freely. Some, in fact, seem to believe that these promises should be made routinely, perhaps
to preserve the researchers' lofty image as social scientists unconcerned with localism and
the helter skelter of politics. See M. FELEY, supra note 100, at xxii (discussing criticism
that the author incurred for revealing the identity of the court that he examined while pre-
serving the anonymity of individual sources). This view seems short-sighted and inconsis-
tent with the openness that generally should characterize academic research. There have
been too many books and articles about Metro City, Metropolitan Court, and Westville and
not enough about places on the map.
443 He Takes Some of My Time, supra note 441, at 326; A Plea Is No Bargain, supra
note 441, at 221. For some caveats concerning the 40.2% acquittal rate, see infra note 479.
44 K. BROSI, supra note 49, at 49.
'" He Takes Some of My Time, supra note 441, at 326; A Plea Is No Bargain, supra
note 441, at 222.
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the defendants tried without juries in 1967 were acquitted-again
an unusually high figure, but not as high as the remarkable 48.9%
acquittal rate at Pittsburgh jury trials.4"
Far more important than acquittal rates in explaining the pre-
dominance of nonjury trials in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh were
the sentencing patterns that characterized both cities. Judges,
prosecutors, and defense attorneys uniformly agreed that a defen-
dant convicted at a jury trial was likely to receive a substantially
more severe sentence than a comparable defendant convicted at
what they called a waiver trial. This phenomenon was in part the
product of the sentencing philosophies of individual judges, but it
also grew out of the practice of assigning judges with relatively
"tough" reputations to the courtrooms in which jury trials were
heard.447 Pittsburgh made extensive use of visiting judges, and
these judges, generally assumed to have the sterner attitudes asso-
ciated with rural and small-city areas, were assigned regularly to
"jury rooms. '448 Although Philadelphia made much less use of vis-
iting judges, its assignments of local judges also strongly en-
couraged waivers of the right to jury trial.449
Indeed, the agreement to waive a jury was occasionally the
product of express bargaining. I observed a number of "major
case" bargaining sessions in Philadelphia in which defense attor-
neys proposed waivers of the right to jury trial in exchange for a
reduction of the charges against their clients.450 Moreover, when
defense attorneys suggested that their clients would waive the
right to jury trial in exchange for the assignment of their cases to
particular judges, presiding judges and court administrators often
were accommodating.451 In short, Philadelphia and Pittsburgh dis-
couraged exercise of the right to jury trial in more or less the same
fashion as other cities by rewarding defendants who waived this
right and by threatening defendants who exercised it with unusu-
ally severe sentences. What was distinctive about Philadelphia and
Pittsburgh was simply that no one in these cities regarded plea
bargaining as the principal alternative to jury trials.
Just as sentencing patterns explained the relative absence of
446 ALLEGHENY CouNTY REPORT, supra note 413, at 16.
447 He Takes Some of My Time, supra note 441, at 326-27.
44 See Levin, supra note 428, at 119.
"' See C. SILBERMAN, CRIMNAL VIOLENCE, CPUMuNAL JUSTICE 279-80 (1978).
4" I did not, however, see any case in which this offer was accepted.
451 "Expediting the business of the court is what we're here for," one of Philadelphia's
Deputy Administrators for Criminal Listings observed. Interview with Albert A. Ciardi Jr.,
in Philadelphia (Jan. 16, 1968).
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jury trials in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, they also provided the
most obvious explanation for the lack of guilty pleas. 52 Without
exception, judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys reported that
a defendant ordinarily could not anticipate a notably lighter sen-
tence following a guilty plea than he would have received following
conviction at a nonjury trial. The only disagreement concerned
whether there might be a slight "sentence differential" between de-
fendants convicted by plea and those convicted at nonjury trials,
or whether the two procedures usually led to identical sentencing
outcomes. Indeed, most observers, including most of the defense
attorneys, adhered to the latter view.153 In most American jurisdic-
tions, a defendant apparently can anticipate both a more severe
sentence if convicted by a jury than if convicted by the court and a
more severe sentence if convicted by the court than if convicted on
a plea of guilty.454 In Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, however, the
usual three tiers of the sentence differential had been collapsed
into two, and only defendants convicted at jury trials were rou-
tinely penalized for their tactical decisions.
The Uhlman-Walker studies revealed that, at least in Phila-
delphia, the practitioners' perceptions of sentencing patterns were
accurate. Using a concept of sentence weights that enabled them to
compare prison and probationary sentences in terms of severity,
the authors reported that the mean sentences imposed following
guilty pleas and following convictions at nonjury trials were essen-
tially the same-a weight of 24.9 for guilty plea convictions and
25.1 for convictions at nonjury trials.455 The average sentence im-
452 In Pittsburgh, but not in Philadelphia, an additional reason for the relative lack of
plea bargaining may have been what Professors James Eisenstein and Herbert Jacob would
call the instability of courtroom work groups. See J. EISENSTEIN & H. JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE
35-37 (1977). Lawyers in both Pittsburgh and Philadelphia, however, explained the princi-
pal organizational obstacle to plea bargaining not in terms of the ways in which lawyers and
other personnel were assigned to particular courtrooms, but rather in terms of the ways in
which cases were allocated to these courtrooms. Because of last-minute case assignments,
defense attorneys usually did not know which prosecutor would be responsible for a given
case until the day on which the case was set for trial, With the exception of homicide cases
in Pittsburgh and cases designated major cases by the prosecutor's office in Philadelphia,
the only opportunity for plea negotiation was usually a rushed conference in the courtroom
or in chambers shortly before the case was to be tried and after the attorneys were as ready
to try it as they would ever be.
453 See S. Schulhofer, supra note 52, at 76-81 (six Philadelphia public defenders be-
lieved that a guilty plea generally led to some break in sentencing; eight public defenders
believed that guilty plea defendants generally received no break).
4" See, e.g., Cook, Sentencing Behavior of Federal Judges: Draft Cases 1972, 42 U.
CiN. L. REv. 597 (1973); Oster & Simon, supra note 368, at 4.
455 He Takes Some of My Time, supra note 441, at 328.
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posed following convictions at jury trials, by contrast, was 63.1.456
Defendants who pleaded guilty were somewhat less likely to be im-
prisoned than defendants convicted at nonjury trials (34% versus
39%), but neither group was nearly as likely to be imprisoned as
the defendants convicted by juries (87 %).457 In fact, defendants
convicted at nonjury trials were slightly less likely to have been
convicted of the most serious charge filed against them than defen-
dants who had pleaded guilty. 58
To some extent, more severe sentences were imposed following
jury trials in Philadelphia because jury trials occurred more often
in serious cases, but even when Uhlman and Walker controlled for
the seriousness of the offense charged and for other "criminality
factors," they found that the sentences imposed after guilty pleas
and nonjury trials were almost identical, while the sentences im-
posed following jury verdicts were about twice as severe.459 They
also reported that the defendant's bail status, type of defense
counsel, age, race, and sex did not alter the basic relationship be-
tween method of conviction and sentencing outcome.4'6
In light of these sentencing patterns, the significant question
may seem to be, not why so many defendants preferred nonjury
trials, but why significant numbers of defendants pleaded guilty.
Although Uhlman and Walker discussed this issue,'461 they over-
looked one reasonably obvious explanation-that apart from any
possibility of securing sentencing concessions, a substantial num-
ber of defendants recognized that they had no plausible defenses.
Many of these defendants may have had no desire to undergo even
very rapid trials when the outcomes seemed inevitable. 62 To be
sure, some manifestly guilty defendants in both cities did insist on
trials simply in the hope that prosecutorial errors might lead to
acquittals. Nevertheless, despite the relatively casual trial practices
that characterized these jurisdictions, 63 there were undoubtedly
cases in which this hope seemed unrealistic and others in which it
seemed so slim as not to be worth even the emotional burdens of
454 Id.
457 Id.; A Plea is No Bargain, supra note 441, at 225 (Table 1).
45 A Plea Is No Bargain, supra note 441, at 224.
45, Id. at 227 (Table 2); He Takes Some of My Time, supra note 441, at 333 (Table 2).
4"0 A Plea Is No Bargain, supra note 441, at 331 n.14, 332-33 (Table 2).
461 Id. at 331-33.
462 See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text; accord S. Schulhofer, supra note 52,
at 84-86 (62% of guilty pleas in Philadelphia apparently entered without significant sen-
tencing concessions).
493See infra notes 482-90 and accompanying text.
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trial. Prosecutors and defense attorneys described a substantial
portion of guilty pleas in both cities as "open pleas." These pleas
were entered without an express bargain and usually with little
reason to anticipate an implicit reward.
In addition, there were some cases in Philadelphia and Pitts-
burgh in which defendants properly could view bargained guilty
pleas as bargains. The slight indications in the Uhlman-Walker
figures of a "sentence differential" between defendants who
pleaded guilty and those convicted at nonjury trials may have re-
flected these atypical cases rather than some small sentence differ-
ential applicable to all or most prosecutions. In homicide cases in
Pittsburgh and in homicide and other "major cases" in Philadel-
phia, prosecutors recognized that trials of any description were
likely to consume substantial resources, and they often were will-
ing to bargain for guilty pleas in these cases."' Indeed, apart from
the fact that nonjury trials were a frequently discussed option, plea
negotiation in these "major" cases resembled plea negotiation else-
where. Certainly when a prosecutor offered to reduce a first degree
murder charge to second degree murder or to manslaughter in ex-
change for a plea of guilty, a defendant could sense that he had, in
effect, been offered a significant sentencing concession (especially
in view of the mandatory minimum life sentence prescribed for
first degree murder in Pennsylvania).6 5
Moreover, when prosecutors in less serious cases recognized
that they might be unable to obtain convictions at trial, they fre-
quently offered significant concessions in an effort to secure pleas
of guilty.4e6 In the overwhelming majority of these "weak" cases,
the offer to a defendant who had secured his pretrial release was a
recommendation of probation; and although the recommended
sentence for a defendant in custody sometimes involved jail time,
it was almost invariably time already served.8 7 Defendants who
sensed even a slight possibility of conviction at trial usually found
the prosecutors' offers irresistible.46 8 Although prosecutors ordina-
rily seemed to have little interest in inducing defendants to plead
guilty, these weak cases and some major cases were plainly excep-
tions. It is therefore not surprising that, in the aggregate, the
4', See The Prosecutor's Role, supra note 4, at 61-62.
465 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1102(a) (Purdon 1973 & Supp. 1981); see Zimring, Eigen
& O'Malley, Punishing Homicide in Philadelphia: Perspectives on the Death Penalty, 43
U. CHI. L. REv. 227, 233 & n.10 (1976).




Alternatives to Plea Bargaining
Uhlman-Walker figures revealed a slightly lower likelihood of im-
prisonment for defendants who pleaded guilty than for those con-
victed at nonjury trials. Contrary to the suggestion of the authors
themselves, 6 9 the entry of guilty pleas in Philadelphia probably
did not reflect a significant misperception of sentencing patterns
on the part of most defense attorneys.
Because plea bargaining and implicit "waiver" bargaining in-
duced the overwhelming majority of criminal defendants in Pitts-
burgh and Philadelphia to relinquish the right to jury trial, some
observers concluded that these cities' practices were not very dif-
ferent from those of other jurisdictions. Charles E. Silberman
wrote of Philadelphia:
During his tenure as district attorney (1969-73 [sic4'7 ]), Arlen
Specter gained national acclaim for having abolished plea bar-
gaining. The reputation was undeserved; all that Specter did
was shift its locus. Instead of bargaining over the charge to
which defendants would plead guilty, prosecutors and defense
lawyers under Specter's regime did their bargaining over
whether or not defendants would waive their right to a jury
trial and elect a bench trial instead. Since bench trials can be
completed in a matter of minutes, they serve substantially the
same purpose as guilty pleas; in some jurisdictions, a bench
trial... is referred to as "a slow plea of guilty."... In short,
plea bargaining was abolished in name only.7 1
As this article has indicated, Philadelphia did not abolish plea
bargaining even in name, and so far as I am aware, Arlen Specter
did not suggest that it had. Specter maintained only that there was
much less plea bargaining in Philadelphia than there was else-
where, and this contention was accurate. 2 Moreover, Specter did
not claim to have brought about this phenomenon, which clearly
antedated his term as district attorney.47' The significant issue
raised by Silberman's discussion, however, is the extent to which
nonjury trials in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh should be regarded
as the functional equivalent of pleas of guilty in other jurisdictions.
On occasion, as Silberman indicated, nonjury trials in Phila-
delphia, Pittsburgh, and elsewhere were called "slow pleas of
460 A Plea Is No Bargain, supra note 441, at 232.
470 The dates should be 1966 to 1973.
471 C. SmBERMAN, supra note 449, at 279.80 (footnote omitted).
47 See Specter, supra note 412, at 605.
"73 See id.
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guilty. ' 474 There were some cases in which this label was appropri-
ate. In a very few cases, in fact, defense attorneys entered explicit
"slow plea bargains." A Philadelphia defense attorney reported
that he might approach a trial judge in chambers and say, "Your
Honor, my client is crazy. They've got him dead-to-rights, but he
still says that he didn't do it. Let's give him a half hour trial just to
make him happy, but when you find him guilty, give him no more
than two years, O.K.?" The attorney added that the judge was
likely to respond to this disloyal proposal by accepting it or else by
haggling about the terms of the defendant's mock trial.76
Although concerted efforts to deceive defendants in this fash-
ion were certainly exceptional, most defense attorneys in Philadel-
phia and Pittsburgh observed that these cities' sentencing prac-
tices permitted them to take hopeless cases to trial without much
fear of reprisal when defendants were unwilling for one reason or
another to plead guilty. Indeed, in some "slow plea" situations, the
defendants themselves entertained no hope that their trials would
lead to acquittals. Their attorneys sometimes preferred nonjury
trials for other tactical reasons-for example, to obtain an oppor-
tunity to emphasize some mitigating circumstance that might not
have been developed fully in a presentence report or to preserve
the defendant's right to appeal a trial judge's unfavorable ruling on
a pretrial motion.42 6 On other occasions, defendants who recog-
nized that they would undoubtedly be convicted at trial simply
found it psychologically difficult or impossible to convict
themselves. 4"
In the overwhelming majority of cases resolved by nonjury tri-
als, however, the term "slow plea of guilty" was a misnomer.47 8
Judges in Pittsburgh and Philadelphia did consider the evidence
presented at these trials, and they were not reluctant to acquit
when this evidence failed to establish guilt beyond a reasonable
474 The chief public defender in Pittsburgh even recalled an occasion when a trial judge
had employed this description in court in the presence of a defendant-one whom the judge
was about to try without a jury. Interview with George H. Ross, Public Defender, in Pitts-
burgh (Jan. 17, 1968).
475 The Defense Attorney's Role, supra note 4, at 1288.
476 A guilty plea ordinarily precludes a defendant from challenging the denial of a pre-
trial motion on appeal or in postconviction proceedings. See, e.g., McMann v. Richardson,
397 U.S. 759, 766 (1970). A "slow plea," however, does not. See Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420
U.S. 283, 290-91 n.7 (1975).
477 See The Changing Debate, supra note 4, at 666-67.
471 Professor Schulhofer and four student assistants observed 182 nonjury trials in Phil-
adelphia in 1982. They concluded that only "six trials might be considered candidates for
the 'slow plea' designation." S. Schulhofer, supra note 52, at 126.
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doubt. As this article has noted, the acquittal rates at nonjury tri-
als in these cities substantially exceeded the acquittal rates in most
other American jurisdictions, and it is therefore nonsensical to dis-
miss these proceedings as the functional equivalent of pleas of
guilty.479 Although bargaining for waivers of the right to jury trial
seemed as common in these cities as elsewhere, the difference be-
tween inducing a defendant to select a particular form of trial and
inducing him to forgo any trial whatever is a distinction of consid-
erable importance. It is the difference between affording the defen-
dant an unfettered opportunity to present a defense and pressing
him to sacrifice the opportunity to be heard. From a social per-
spective, it is also the difference between seriously attempting to
determine what happened and merely splitting the difference.
The term "slow plea of guilty" as applied to nonjury trials in
Philadelphia and Pittsburgh was a misnomer in another respect as
well, for there was nothing "slow" about these proceedings. Indeed,
the usual failure of prosecutors and trial judges to seek pleas of
guilty reflected their recognition that a nonjury trial often con-
sumed fewer resources than the process of negotiating a guilty plea
and of making the record that would justify its acceptance in the
courtroom.4" 0 In one sense, Silberman was correct in suggesting
that nonjury trials could "serve substantially the same purpose as
guilty pleas"; 48 1 although the nonjury trials of Philadelphia and
Pittsburgh afforded defendants a much greater opportunity to be
heard than the plea negotiation practices of other jurisdictions,
these informal trials were about equally effective in enabling the
479 Professor Schulhofer has expressed some doubt about the 40.2% acquittal rate re-
ported by Uhlman and Walker for Philadelphia nonjury trials. See supra note 443 and ac-
companying text. He has suggested that "some acquittals may have been recorded for cases
in which the defendant was convicted on other related charges." S. Schulhofer, supra note
52, at n.167. Moreover, just as some of the recorded convictions may have been "slow pleas,"
some of the recorded acquittals may have been "slow dismissals." Schulhofer has reported,
however, that recent statistics showing a 30% acquittal rate are not suspect on these
grounds (although the 30% figure still may include a few "slow dismissals"). Id. Whether
the appropriate figure is 40%, 30%, or even less, the essential point seems beyond dispute: a
great many nonjury trials in Philadelphia lead to acquittals after bona fide assessments of
the evidence by trial judges; Philadelphia's adjudicative system cannot be equated with the
nonadjudicative systems of other American jurisdictions.
480 The nonjury trials that Professor Schulhofer and his student assistants examined in
1982 were more carefully conducted and more structured than those that I had examined in
1968. Nevertheless, Schulhofer reported that the average length of a nonjury trial in Phila-
delphia was only about 45 minutes. When an allowance for courtroom waiting time was
added to this figure, "the total courtroom time consumed for the average list room bench
trial totalled approximately 1 hour and 20 minutes, compared to 55 minutes total courtroom
time for the average guilty plea." S. Schulhofer, supra note 52, at 101-02.
481 See supra note 471 and accompanying text.
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criminal justice system to handle large numbers of cases with re-
sources that would have been inadequate to implement the right to
jury trial.
Most lawyers and judges in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh esti-
mated that a majority of nonjury trials were completed in less than
an hour and that a single court could conduct eight to twelve of
these trials in a day.482 Indeed, I sometimes heard suggestions of
greater dispatch. George H. Ross, the chief public defender in
Pittsburgh, maintained that fifteen-minute trials were common
and that a judge might hear twenty or perhaps even twenty-five
cases in a day. This sort of expedition would exceed that of the Old
Bailey in the eighteenth century, and even the more moderate esti-
mates would make today's criminal trials on the European conti-
nent appear extraordinarily deliberative. When I expressed some
doubt about these estimates, James G. Dunn, the first assistant
district attorney in Pittsburgh, produced-seemingly at ran-
dom-an official summary of court actions on a day shortly before
my visit. It revealed that a single judge on a single Monday had
conducted nineteen trials. More generally, the cases of 3005 defen-
dants were resolved at nonjury trials in Pittsburgh in 1967483-a
time when there were only three "waiver courtrooms" in that juris-
diction. Apparently each judge assigned to one of these courtrooms
tried an average of approximately four and one-half cases on each
working day (while receiving a substantial number of guilty pleas
and conducting other judicial business as well).4a
Philadelphia's nonjury trials included some extraordinarily ex-
peditious proceedings in which the defendants' trial rights were
sharply curtailed; a small number of cases were included in a pro-
gram called officially the Minor Case Program and much more
commonly referred to as "crash" court, "trash" court, or "trash
and crash" court. (A footnote to this article describes the operation
of this unique Philadelphia institution.)4 5 Of course, even with
481 Cf. Levin, supra note 428, at 85 n.5 (most "brief informal trials" are completed in 10
to 30 minutes).
483 See supra note 437 and accompanying text.
4 Based on a figure of approximately 215 days per year devoted to judicial business.
See supra note 432. In Chicago, by contrast, where guilty pleas accounted for about 80% of
all convictions in the Criminal Division during 1972 and 1973, judges averaged about one
disposition per day during the same years. See supra note 369.
' The district attorney's office determined whether to list a case in the "crash" pro-
gram, and although a defendant could refuse to participate by demanding either a jury trial
or an orthodox nonjury trial, a defendant who accepted the prosecutor's listing was required
to stipulate both to the truth and to the admissibility of the police offense report. When an
assistant district attorney first described this program to me, I suggested that agreeing to
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these "crash" court cases set aside, the nonjury trials of Philadel-
the truth of a police offense report was probably an almost certain route to conviction. To
the contrary, the assistant replied, a majority of the defendants tried in the "crash" program
were acquitted. Interview with Joseph M. Smith, Ass't District Att'y, in Philadelphia (Jan.
16, 1968). Some acquittals in the relatively minor cases included in this program may have
been the product of judicial sympathy rather than of bona fide doubt concerning the defen-
dants' guilt, but lawyers insisted that an equal or greater number of acquittals were based
on the "evidence." Although a defendant could not "contradict" the police offense report, he
could "explain" and "supplement" it, and both the defendants' explanations and the fre-
quent defects of the reports themselves commonly made guilt seem doubtful. In addition,
defense attorneys maintained that, on occasion, they could "wiggle around" their stipula-
tions and challenge portions of the police offense report.
Prosecutors reported that only about 10% of the criminal cases in the Court of Com-
mon Pleas were included in the "crash" program. The prosecutors added that they always
examined the defendant's prior record before listing a case in the program, that gambling
and liquor violations accounted for a very high proportion of cases in "crash" court, and
that cases in which violence was alleged were ineligible for inclusion. Defense attorneys,
however, maintained that assault cases were often tried in "crash" court; that in an effort to
avoid the presence of police witnesses who might criticize lenient dispositions, even cases of
assault on police officers were listed in the program; and that defendants with extensive
prior records often appeared in "crash" court as well.
Defense attorneys also reported that defendants virtually never objected to "crash"
court listings. The principal reason, they observed, was that the presiding judge deliberately
assigned judges to "crash" court trials who were even more lenient than those assigned to
other nonjury trials. When defendants were not simply acquitted, most of them were satis-
fied with their sentences.
Some attorneys also maintained that the district attorney's office had entered a stand-
ing agreement that any defendant sentenced to incarceration following a "crash" court pro-
ceeding could obtain a new trial free of "crash" court restrictions. Moreover, they expressed
their confidence that, apart from this agreement, the "crash" court procedures were so con-
stitutionally defective that any "crash" court conviction could be upset on appeal. Other
defense attorneys reported that although the district attorney's office once had adhered to
the described agreement, it had rescinded this understanding. Prosecutors, however, main-
tained that the supposed agreement had never been entered and was always a figment of
some defense attorneys' imaginations. They also insisted that there were no legal defects in
"crash" court proceedings and that their office was ready to submit the issue to an appellate
court whenever a defendant sought review. (The fact that no defendant apparently had ap-
pealed a "crash" court conviction may suggest either that prosecutors did circumvent ap-
peals by agreeing to new trials or, more probably, that the program's outcomes were fully as
lenient as the defense attorneys suggested.)
Of course the "crash" court procedures may seem shocking, but as limited as a defen-
dant's trial options were in "crash" court, these options were at least somewhat greater than
those that the defendant would have enjoyed following a bargained plea of guilty. Indeed, it
is difficult to conceive of any legal principle that would uphold bargained guilty pleas but
condemn Philadelphia's somewhat more limited "crash" court waivers.
In practice, prosecutors did not defend "crash" court procedures on the ground that
they were somewhat less restrictive of constitutional rights than is plea bargaining. An assis-
tant district attorney, who said that he could not begin to justify his office's official position
that the results of "crash" court trials were comparable to those of more elaborate nonjury
proceedings, also maintained that plea bargaining would not increase significantly if the
"crash" court were abolished. Instead, he said, the overwhelming majority of cases that for-
merly would have been "listed" in this court simply would not be prosecuted. For that rea-
son, he declined to characterize Philadelphia's "crash" court as a substitute for plea bar-
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phia and Pittsburgh consumed far fewer resources than jury trials.
The jury selection process, which typically requires half a day of
even the simplest trial, 86 was obviously unnecessary, and there
was also no need to propose, discuss, and deliver sets of jury in-
structions. Moreover, with rare exceptions, both opening state-
ments and summations were omitted.
Perhaps most significantly, the rules of evidence were gener-
ally disregarded at nonjury trials. Witnesses, in fact, were com-
monly invited to present their testimony in narrative form. Despite
occasional departures from this pattern, prosecutors and defense
attorneys apparently shared a tacit understanding that they would
invoke evidentiary restrictions only when a witness's testimony
threatened either to go far afield or to reveal information that
plainly would be prejudicial.
Moreover, lawyers sometimes seemed so ill-prepared for trial
that they might have had difficulty examining their witnesses in
accordance with traditional standards. In Philadelphia, the prose-
cutor's office designated all prosecutions either as "major" or as
"list room" cases, and the express criterion for placing a case in
one category or the other was whether the prosecutor who would
try it ought to interview his witnesses before presenting their testi-
mony on the stand. In the overwhelming majority of cases (perhaps
as many as ninety percent), prosecutors decided that this advance
preparation was unnecessary and that the "list room" designation
was appropriate. In Pittsburgh, moreover, the prosecutor's office
was even less insistent on pretrial preparation; all cases except
homicide cases were treated in the same manner as "list room"
cases in Philadelphia. 87
I observed some proceedings in which it seemed likely that the
prosecutor not only had failed to interview his witnesses but also
had failed to review his file before trial.8 8 A prosecutor typically
opened his case by calling a police officer to the stand, by searching
through his file for a police offense report, by asking, "Officer, did
gaining. Interview with Alan J. Davis, Ass't District Att'y, in Philadelphia (Jan. 16, 1968).
486 See supra notes 323-27, 389-96 and accompanying text.
487 A little more than one week before my visit to Pittsburgh in 1968, the district attor-
ney's office had adopted a new case assignment system that would have permitted the ad-
vance preparation of cases other than homicide cases, but no one had yet had any significant
experience with this system.
Ma In one, both the prosecutor and his principal witness seemed baffled as the prosecu-
tor asked a number of questions about sexual fondling without eliciting incriminating infor-
mation; the prosecutor apparently learned the nature of the charge against the defendant
only when the witness impatiently answered one of his questions, "My private parts are no
part of this case. That guy hit me in the face with a bottle!"
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you have occasion to be in the vicinity of 2001 Brandywine at ap-
proximately 3:27 P.M. on June 29?," and then by inviting narrative
testimony: "Will you tell us in your own words what happened?"
Although the informality that characterized nonjury trials in
Philadelphia and Pittsburgh was sometimes troublesome, 89 it
often seemed refreshing. From my perspective, the practice of per-
mitting defendants to tell their stories without interruption was es-
pecially attractive. Some defendants-in proceedings that certainly
qualified as "slow pleas"-failed even to deny the charges against
them. They merely described their troubled lives and motivations
to the court, and their departure from legally relevant issues
prompted no one in the courtroom to sound an alarm. Defendants
often seemed to experience a sense both of gratitude and of gratifi-
cation when their testimony was concluded, and although plea ne-
gotiation has been praised because it enables defendants to partici-
pate in the determination of their sentences,9 0 this bargaining
process usually occurs in a closed door conference between two
lawyers, effectively resolving a defendant's case in his absence. The
informal trial processes of Pittsburgh and Philadelphia seemed to
me to promote participation values more effectively.
The nonjury trials that differentiated Pennsylvania's two larg-
est cities from other jurisdictions in the mid-1960's were plainly far
from perfect. Like other urban jurisdictions, these cities paid a
substantial price for the inadequacy of the resources devoted to
their criminal justice systems. Nevertheless, when the two cities
are compared to the many jurisdictions that are more dependent
on plea bargaining, the price may seem lower and the currency less
debased. Nonjury trials in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh in the mid-
1960's were public rather than closed-door proceedings; each of the
defendants tried in these jurisdictions had an opportunity to pre-
sent his side of the story to an impartial third party (a procedure
that apparently had therapeutic value in itself); and most impor-
tantly, defendants in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh did not surren-
489 For example, the harshest treatment of a complaining witness that I have observed
occurred in a Pittsburgh courtroom. The case was one of attempted rape by a stranger, and
the victim's lack of consent did not seem a disputable issue. On cross-examination, however,
the defense attorney asked whether the victim had ever engaged in sexual relations with her
fianc6. Moreover, upon receiving her denial, the attorney mocked and taunted the witness in
a series of crude and explicit questions. Neither the prosecutor nor the trial judge sought to
prevent this abuse, and the defendant seemed thoroughly to enjoy both his lawyer's per-
formance and the witness's discomfort.
490 See, e.g., Enker, Perspectives on Plea Bargaining, in TASK FORCE ON THE ADMIN. OP
JUSTIcE, supra note 80, at 108, 115; Note, Plea Bargaining and the Transformation of the
Criminal Process, 90 HA v. L. Rav. 564, 576-77 (1977).
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der their chances for acquittal.
The Philadelphia and Pittsburgh experience also illustrates
that, from a social perspective, there is an enormous difference be-
tween a simple and expeditious adjudicative procedure and a very
elaborate and "safeguarded" settlement procedure, one that is
likely to consume as many resources. A person who observes plea
negotiation sessions frequently encounters troublesome factual and
legal issues that are never resolved. The process truly is one of
"split the difference"; opposing lawyers usually reach an accommo-
dation "although the shifting and fallible bases of their conflicting
assumptions are never tested. '491 Nevertheless, most of the dis-
turbing issues that plea negotiation would have left open were re-
solved authoritatively, effectively, and fairly in short nonjury trials
in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh. Even when lawyers were ill-pre-
pared and foundering and essentially left the witnesses to their
own devices, the circumstances surrounding most street crimes
emerged with clarity in half-hour and forty-five-minute trials. And
when, on occasion, important questions remained unanswered at
the conclusion of these nonjury trials, courts treated them in the
only manner that a decent legal system can-by resolving reasona-
ble doubts in favor of those accused of crimes.
When I returned to Philadelphia and Pittsburgh in 1977,
guilty pleas and plea negotiation remained much less frequent
than in most other jurisdictions, but they had become substantially
more common than they had been nine years earlier.4 2 In Phila-
delphia, the changes may have resulted partly from a deliberate
revision of policy. Arlen Specter, a notable opponent of plea nego-
tiation, had been replaced as district attorney by Emmett Fitzpat-
rick, who favored the practice. As an assistant district attorney
summarized his office's policy:
We have no aversion to plea negotiation in any case in which
we believe that we can get more than we give. Still, we recog-
nize that it is usually no more work to try a case on a waiver
than to negotiate and formalize a guilty plea. We therefore
don't go out of our way to make deals.493
In both cities, gradual changes in the trial process may have
been more significant than deliberate changes in plea negotiation
491 The Prosecutor's Role, supra note 4, at 71-72.
4,, See supra notes 424-26 and accompanying text.
493 Interview with John Morris, First Ass't District Att'y, in Philadelphia (Dec. 20,
1977).
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policy. By 1977, Philadelphia's bizarre but expeditious "crash"
court had disappeared,"94 and although most lawyers and judges in
both cities maintained that twenty-minute and half-hour trials still
occurred, they agreed that these very rapid trials had become less
common than in the past. Indeed, my own visits to "waiver rooms"
in Pittsburgh and Philadelphia revealed only two-, three-, and
four-hour trials-a dramatic change from the many trials lasting
less than an hour that I had observed in 1968.
In Pittsburgh, where the changes were especially pronounced,
the quality of lawyers in the public defender and district attorney's
offices plainly had improved in the years since my initial study.
The more energetic and capable lawyers who had joined these of-
fices may have been more insistent on careful trial practices. Al-
though I continued to observe some departures from evidentiary
rules in nonjury trials (frequent leading questions, for example,
and one case in which a police officer was permitted to testify with-
out objection to what other officers had done after he had gone off
duty), in the main the formalities of the trial process seemed to be
observed about as carefully as in most jury trials.
More importantly, in both cities, the level of trial priparation
was far higher than it had been in 1968; lawyers on both sides
knew their cases well and apparently had spoken with their wit-
nesses before calling them to the stand. Indeed, it is difficult to
imagine that these lawyers' cases could have been tried much more
thoroughly in jury proceedings lasting three or four times longer.
Nevertheless, the greater professionalization that finally had come
even to Pittsburgh may have had its darker side. In a small way, it
may have had an effect similar to that of the professionalization of
the Anglo-American trial generally over the course of a much
longer period of time. This professionalization undoubtedly in-
creased the complexity of the trial process and, in the absence of
adequate resources, may have increased the administrative pres-
sure for plea negotiation.
The nonjury trials of Philadelphia and Pittsburgh in the mid-
1960's seemed to indicate that American jurisdictions could reduce
their reliance on plea bargaining very substantially by making
some sacrifices in the quality of the trial process-sacrifices that,
although troublesome, would leave this process far more able to
assure the guilt of the people subjected to criminal punishment
than the more common plea bargaining alternative. Similarly, the
4'4 At least it had disappeared from the Court of Common Pleas; I heard rumors that
"crash court" procedures still could be found in the Municipal Court of Philadelphia.
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nonjury trials of Pittsburgh and Philadelphia a decade later
seemed to indicate that American jurisdictions could reduce their
reliance on plea negotiation somewhat less substantially while re-
taining a trial process in which relevant factual circumstances were
developed in a careful, thorough, and professional manner.
To be sure, the implicit "jury waiver bargaining" that still oc-
curred in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh had much in common with
plea bargaining and was disturbing for some of the same reasons.
Federal and state constitutions guarantee a right to jury trial,495
and defendants should not pay the price of added criminal punish-
ment for daring to exercise that right. If, however, the resources
that our nation can devote to criminal justice are truly as paltry as
many advocates of plea negotiation contend, Philadelphia and
Pittsburgh have found a more appropriate way to allocate these
resources than most other jurisdictions.
The experience of these two cities indicates that if a legisla-
ture were to prohibit plea bargaining without at the same time
providing additional funds to courts, prosecutors' offices, and de-
fender agencies, the probable result would be neither evasion nor
crisis. Administrators could respond to this prohibition in numer-
ous ways: by eliminating inefficiencies, 4e by prosecuting less, 497 by
implementing trial reforms,498 and, most importantly, by turning
from plea bargaining to jury waiver bargaining. In view of the sub-
stantial extent to which Philadelphia and Pittsburgh have limited
their reliance on plea bargaining despite resource constraints more
severe than the norm, most other jurisdictions undoubtedly could
substitute jury waiver bargaining for plea bargaining altogether.499
Indeed, a proposition about criminal justice reform that may
seem too simple to be true may be true in fact. Without elaborate
planning, scholarly studies, and additional funding, one effective
way to prohibit plea bargaining would be just to prohibit it. Con-
fronted with an immediate and unqualified prohibition, the crimi-
nal justice system's powerful mechanisms of bureaucratic adjust-
ment would not wither away. In the absence of dishonesty and
'95 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VI; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7; kLL. CONST. art. I, § 13.
196 See supra notes 368-75 and accompanying text.
"9 See supra notes 360-67 and accompanying text.
498 See supra notes 382-411 and accompanying text.
499 Indeed, however limited a jurisdiction's resources, it could substitute adjudication
for settlement in all cases if its adjudicative procedures were expedited enough. If the sorry
choice were presented, for example, a jurisdiction could substitute five-minute trials for five-
minute plea acceptance procedures.
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evasion, °00 however, these mechanisms would match resources to
caseloads, not by continuing to provide costly trials to the few
while inducing the many to plead guilty, but by affording simpler
trials to all who wished to be heard. Moreover, courts whose fears
of administrative overload have led them to invoke disingenuous
concepts of waiver in support of plea bargaining could invoke the
same theories in support of less sweeping waivers by defen-
dants-waivers that could bring an operational trial system into
existence without additional resources. In short, if a legislature
were to prohibit the exchange of concessions for pleas of guilty
without forbidding official concessions for waivers of the right to
jury trial, the invisible hand that sometimes is thought to make
plea bargaining inevitable could continue its disturbing work. The
differing resource limitations of various jurisdictions would be re-
flected, however, not in varying guilty plea rates or in differing
concessions offered for pleas of guilty, but in forms and procedures
of the nonjury trials that most defendants would be induced to
accept 01
500 See supra notes 141-71 and accompanying text.
501 Legislatures arq not the only potential sources of a plea bargaining prohibition. As I
have indicated, the current failure of courts to hold this practice unconstitutional seems
better explained by their fear of major change than by the strained doctrinal rationaliza-
tions for plea bargaining that they have offered. See supra notes 17-23, 42-46, and accompa-
nying text; The Supreme Court, supra note 4, at 71. Nevertheless, legal and ethical con-
straints would make it more difficult for a court to substitute "jury waiver bargaining" for
plea bargaining than for a legislature to do so. Although a legislature could prohibit plea
bargaining without speaking to the question of jury waiver bargaining, any court that held
plea bargaining unconstitutional might be required to pass upon the constitutionality of
waiver bargaining as well. It would be difficult for a court to uphold this less restrictive form
of bargaining while forbidding plea bargaining simply on the theory that the first practice is
"less unconstitutional" than the second.
Conceivably, however, an appellate court could adopt a Philadelphia-style solution by
avoiding constitutional issues and by relying on its supervisory power over the administra-
tion of justice in subordinate courts. Moreover, after holding that some entrenched uncon-
stitutional practices need be eliminated only with "deliberate speed," a court might treat
the immediate substitution of a "less unconstitutional" alternative as the first step toward
full implementation of constitutional rights. See People v. Byrd, 12 Mich. App. 186, 224, 162
N.W.2d 777, 797 (1968) (Levin, J., concurring) ("The problem is not unlike that of segre-
gated schools in that it is too ingrained to be eliminated forthwith. I suggest that we proceed
to its eventual elimination.") (footnote omitted).
Of course, prior to the decision in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), there
would have been a clear constitutional basis for distinguishing plea bargaining from jury
waiver bargaining. Because the right to jury trial had not been "incorporated" in the four-
teenth amendments due process clause, jury waiver bargaining in the state courts would not
have burdened the exercise of a federal constitutional right. At the same time, the right to
some kind of impartial trial always has been at the core of due process concepts. A practice
like plea bargaining, whose very purpose is to prevent large numbers of defendants from
obtaining trials of any kind, would have raised substantial issues even in the earliest days of
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E. Jury Waiver Bargaining and Sentencing Reform
Although this article has argued that the jury waiver bargain-
ing of Philadelphia and Pittsburgh is superior to the plea bargain-
ing of other jurisdictions, a more satisfactory system of waiver bar-
gaining could emerge from the development of sentencing
guidelines that would both prohibit the imposition of a penalty for
insistence upon a nonjury trial and articulate limitations on the
extent to which conviction by a jury could lead to a more severe
sentence. Moreover, to view these same reforms from a different
perspective, the substitution of jury waiver bargaining for plea bar-
gaining could help to resolve serious difficulties that have plagued
recent sentencing reform efforts.
At the same time that a number of states have reduced sub-
stantially the sentencing discretion of trial judges and parole
boards," 2 plea negotiation has remained virtually immune from se-
rious reform efforts.503 When judged by any criterion other than
the self-interest and political power of lawyers, this disparate
treatment of plea bargaining and other forms of sentencing discre-
tion seems odd. There is almost no objection to the sentencing
power of judges and parole boards that does not apply in full mea-
sure to the sentencing power that prosecutors and defense attor-
neys exercise in plea bargaining; there are many objections to plea
bargaining that have little or no application to judicial sentencing
and parole.5 04 So long as prosecutors retain an unchecked power to
bargain, progress toward certainty in sentencing will remain margi-
nal. Indeed, a determinate sentencing scheme may produce its an-
tithesis-"a system every bit as lawless as the current sentencing
fourteenth amendment jurisprudence. See, e.g., Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 288 (1947)
(it is "inherent in the independent concept of due process that condemnation shall be ren-
dered only after a trial, in which the hearing is a real one, not a sham or pretense"); Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937) ("[flundamental too in the concept of due process,
and so in that of liberty, is the thought that condemnation shall be rendered only after
trial"); Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167, 176 (1912) (the requirements of due process
"are complied with, provided in the proceedings which are claimed not to have been due
process of law the person condemned has had sufficient notice and adequate opportunity
has been afforded him to defend"); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535 (1884) (indicat-
ing that to be consistent with the fourteenth amendment a state procedure must be one that
"renders judgment only after trial").
502 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a)(1) (West Supp. 1981); COLO. Rav. STAT. § 18-1-
102.5 (Supp. 1982). Professor Michael Tonry reported in 1981 that since 1976 more than 20
states had enacted major sentencing reforms. Tonry, Real Offense Sentencing: The Model
Sentencing and Correction Act, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1550, 1551 (1981).
501 See Tonry, supra note 502, at 1554 ("Not one of the major new sentencing systems
faces up to the squalid reality that most guilty pleas are induced by promises of leniency.").
604 See Sentencing Reform, supra note 4, at 564.
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regime, in which discretion is concentrated in an inappropriate
agency, and in which the benefits of this discretion are made avail-
able only to defendants who sacrifice their constitutional rights. '505
Recent sentencing reform efforts have succeeded in focusing
attention on what once were called hidden issues of sentencing.
Some of the most troublesome of these issues have arisen from
America's misuse of sentencing power to avoid the burdens of trial.
Scholars have debated the question of "real offense sentenc-
ing"-whether an offender's sentence should be based on what he
did or on the artificial label that his crime may bear when it
emerges from the plea bargaining process. 506 They have considered
whether statutes or administrative guidelines should specify a pre-
cise "guilty plea discount"-a predetermined reduction in sentence
that a defendant would secure automatically by submitting a plea
of guilty.5 07
Legislative or administrative designation of the reward that
would follow a guilty plea would accord with the logic of today's
search for certainty in sentencing. If the submission of a guilty
plea were treated no differently from other mitigating circum-
stances whose significance was specified in a statute or administra-
tive guideline (and of course if plea bargaining by prosecutors were
prohibited), the reduction of sentence that followed the entry of a
guilty plea would not depend on the host of whims and penologi-
cally irrelevant considerations that commonly influence plea bar-
gaining today.5 08
"I Id. at 551. Although this previous article emphasized the likelihood that sentencing
reform efforts would enhance the bargaining power of prosecutors, it also noted that most
real world reform proposals were characterized by countervailing tendencies and that the
prediction of results was perilous. It concluded, "Determinate sentencing statutes may not
always make things worse, but unless they achieve a major restriction of prosecutorial
power, the reformers will not accomplish the goal of more certain sentencing . "Id. at
576.
so See, e.g., Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Parole Release Guidelines, 51 U. CoLo.
L. Rxv. 237, 241-44 (1980); Schulhofer, Due Process of Sentencing, 128 U. PA. L. Rav. 733,
757-72 (1980); Schwartz, Options in Constructing a Sentencing System: Sentencing Guide-
lines Under Legislative or Judicial Hegemony, 67 VA. L. REv. 637, 680-84 (1981); Tonry,
supra note 502.
"7 See, e.g., Coffee, "Twisting Slowly in the Wind": A Search for Constitutional Lim-
its on Coercion of the Criminal Defendant, 1980 Sup. CT. Rv. 211, 246 & n.132; Gifford,
supra note 38, at 80; Kaplan, Observation: American Merchandising and the Guilty Plea:
Replacing the Bazaar with the Department Store, 5 Am. J. CRiM. L. 215, 222-23 (1977);
Perlman & Stebbins, Implementing an Equitable Sentencing System: The Uniform Law
Commissioners' Model Sentencing and Corrections Act, 65 VA. L. REv. 1175, 1264-65
(1979); Schulhofer, supra note 506, at 778-98; Tonry, supra note 502, at 1555 & n.20; Voren-
berg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1521, 1560-61 (1981).
" Sentencing Reform, supra note 4, at 575.
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Nevertheless, the direct specification by a legislature or sen-
tencing commission of a guilty plea discount or a fixed "tariff" for
exercise of the right to trial seems unpalatable.5 09 For one thing,
some defenders of plea bargaining might object in principle to the
development of uniform sentence differentials.510 More impor-
tantly, open articulation of the sentencing practices that now make
the bargaining process effective would raise issues that most plea
bargaining proponents probably would prefer to keep hid-
den-whether, for example, the sentence imposed following a con-
viction at trial should be 10% or 500% higher than the sentence
that would have been imposed following a guilty plea. Finally, peo-
ple who hope for an eventual prohibition of plea bargaining also
would be likely to oppose the explicit approval of sentence
differentials.
In a system of jury waiver bargaining, however, the recogni-
tion, regularization, and limitation of sentence differentials might
be more feasible. First, a legislature might prohibit both plea bar-
gaining and jury waiver bargaining by prosecutors-a step that
would restore sentencing power to the judiciary and eliminate the
intriguing but plainly insoluble problem of "real offense sentenc-
ing."51 Second, rather than articulate inflexible sentencing tariffs
for all convicted defendants who have exercised the right to be
heard, a legislature or a sentencing commission might develop
guidelines expressing the following principles:
1. Because the right to a hearing before an impartial judi-
cial tribunal is fundamental, no sentencing tariff may be im-
posed for demanding a trial by the court without a jury;
2. A sentencing tariff sometimes may be imposed for exer-
cise of the right to jury trial, but not an extreme or "uncon-
scionable" tariff;"
3. The sometimes permissible jury tariff must be withheld
when a convicted defendant has raised issues that a jury
ought to have heard-for example, when he has advanced an
insanity defense supported by plausible expert testimony.
These principles would represent so substantial a step away
See Perhnan & Stebbins, supra note 507, at 1264-65.
510 See The Trial Judge's Role, supra note 4, at 1127-28.
511 On the insolubility of the issue of real offense sentencing, see 1 RESARCH ON SEN-
TENCING, supra note 155, at 152; Alschuler, supra note 506, at 243. On whether a prohibition
of prosecutorial bargaining could be enforced effectively, see supra notes 141-71 and accom-
panying text.
812 Cf. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1978) (unconscionable contract provisions unenforceable).
[50:9311046
Alternatives to Plea Bargaining
from present practices and toward the civilized administration of
justice that plea bargaining proponents might not blush at their
openness, and plea bargaining opponents might not resist the im-
primatur that they would give to one form of differential
sentencing.
An attempt by a legislature or sentencing commission to spec-
ify in advance precisely the effect that conviction by a jury would
have upon sentencing in various sorts of cases would be artifi-
cial-the product mostly of guesswork. A better course would be to
provide for the appellate review of sentences. A process of judicial
inclusion and exclusion gradually could give content to the concept
of the "triable" case (the sort of case in which any jury trial tariff
would be inappropriate), and to the concept of "unconscionability"
(a concept that would limit the extent of the sentence differential
in "nontriable" cases)."' Within whatever limits appellate courts
established, a trial judge might consider resource limitations and
the press of judicial business in deciding on a case-by-case basis
whether any jury trial tariff was appropriate and, if so, how large it
should be. If many defendants continued to plead guilty despite
the prohibition of plea bargaining, if legislatures allocated addi-
tional resources to trial courts, if these courts began to use their
current capacities more effectively, or if a generous implementa-
tion of the right to jury trial seemed feasible for other reasons, trial
judges might decide to eliminate the jury trial tariff altogether or
else to hold it well below the level that would raise issues of
unconscionability.
To speak in these terms is admittedly troublesome. Justice for
criminal defendants should not consist of choosing the best plan
for spreading existing resources, however meager, to cover existing
caseloads.514 This article has recognized that Philadelphia's less re-
11" An appellate court's ability to determine whether an unconscionable tariff had been
imposed following conviction by a jury (and whether any sentencing tariff had been imposed
following conviction by a court) would depend upon its ability to distinguish the "trial
tariff" from the "baseline" sentence. A scheme of sentencing guidelines probably would need
to be reasonably precise to permit the appellate court to make this judgment. Nevertheless,
the court could permit departures from the guidelines so long as these departures were ex-
plained in terms that the court was persuaded did not mask impermissible tariffs. Of course,
if both trial and appellate courts winked at improper differentials and disingenuous expla-
nations, the scheme would collapse, but so long as an effective match of caseload and re-
sources was achieved, the principal impetus for this evasion would be lacking.
81, From my perspective, proposing the Pittsburgh-Philadelphia alternative to plea bar-
gaining is somewhat akin to urging a person to refrain from robbery on the ground that as
much money can be obtained by shoplifting. A person who offered this advice might well be
punished as an accomplice to whatever shoplifting was committed by a person who followed
it. Nevertheless, some forms of theft truly are less objectionable than others.
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strictive alternative is still restrictive. This waiver bargaining alter-
native not only delivers less than the law promises but also makes
criminal sentences depend in part on the mode of trial demanded
in individual cases. Either a full implementation of the right to
jury trial without shortcuts or a direct, nonbargained simplification
of trial procedures would avoid these defects and accordingly
would seem preferable.515
Nevertheless, the proposed system of jury waiver bargaining
responds to the principal concerns of many proponents of plea bar-
gaining. It would permit trial judges to discourage the use of an
extraordinarily expensive trial mechanism in cases presenting only
insubstantial issues, and it would provide a safety valve that would
enable these judges, within limits established by law, to match re-
sources to caseloads. At the same time, this proposal would pro-
hibit both explicit and implicit plea bargaining and afford an un-
fettered right to a simplified form of trial to every criminal
defendant. Our nation could conserve its resources and still imple-
ment procedures that would allow defendants a greater opportu-
nity to be heard, lead to acquittal when guilt could not be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, and resolve criminal disputes on the
merits rather than adjudge most defendants half guilty in a spirit
of indeterminacy and compromise.
CONCLUSION
The impediments to implementation of a plea bargaining pro-
hibition are not worth a fraction of the paralysis that they have
prompted. Americans certainly could afford full implementation of
the right to jury trial in both felony and misdemeanor prosecu-
tions. Moreover, without additional expenditures, they could allo-
cate existing resources more effectively by simplifying the trial
process and making trials more available. Finally, states could eas-
ily substitute jury waiver bargaining for plea bargaining. Observers
who proclaim that implementation of the right to trial is impossi-
ble have perpetrated a remarkable myth-one whose effectiveness
depends largely on the "outsider's" fear of being thought naive or
utopian and one that any glance outside our own legal system
destroys.
At the end of a long investigation of plea bargaining, I confess
a's Nevertheless, one might prefer a system of jury waiver bargaining to a direct simpli-
fication of trial procedures on the ground that it would give those defendants willing to risk
a sentencing tariff the traditional jury trial option. For a discussion of some reasons why I
do not find this argument persuasive, see The Changing Debate, supra note 4.
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to some bafflement concerning the insistence of most lawyers and
judges that plea bargaining is inevitable and desirable. Perhaps I
am wrong in thinking that a few simple precepts of criminal justice
should command the unqualified support of fair-minded people:
-that it is important to hear what someone may be able
to say in his defense before convicting him of crime;
-that, when he denies his guilt, it is also important to
try to determine on the basis of all the evidence whether he is
guilty;
-that it is wrong to punish a person, not for what he did,
but for asking that the evidence be heard (and wrong deliber-
ately to turn his sentence in significant part on his strategies
rather than on his crime);
-and, finally, that it is wrong to alibi departures from
these precepts by saying that we do not have the time and
money to listen, that most defendants are guilty anyway, that
trials are not perfect, that it is all an inevitable product of
organizational interaction among stable courtroom work
groups, and that any effort to listen would merely drive our
failure to listen underground.
From my viewpoint, it is difficult to understand why these
precepts are controversial; what is more, I do not understand why
the legal profession, far from according them special reverence, ap-
parently values them less than the public in general does.5 16 Daniel
Webster thought it a matter of definition that "law" would hear
before it condemned, proceed upon inquiry, and render judgment
514 Professor Stephen J. Schulhofer once wrote that a paper like this one ought to con-
sider not only the economic feasibility of prohibiting plea bargaining but the political feasi-
bility of doing it as well. Schulhofer, supra note 506, at 779 n.184. I claim no powers of
political punditry, but I once expressed some views on the issue in a conversation with a
congressional staff member who had asked what position I thought the Chairman of the
Senate Judiciary Committee ought to take. When I suggested that the Senator ought to
introduce legislation to prohibit plea bargaining, the staff member appeared somewhat
stunned. "My goodness," he said, "we'd have the United States Attorneys against us, and
the federal judges, and the defense attorneys too."
"Yes," I replied, "and who else?" The staff member's comment obviously had not ac-
counted for as much as one percent of the voting population.
Plea bargaining is a "strange bedfellows" issue that typically unites the president of the
inmates' union and the local police chief in denouncing the hypocrisy of the criminal justice
system. Although lawyers tend to approve of the practice, corrections officials, police of-
ficers, victims of crime, civil libertarians, "law and order" conservatives, and most other
members of the public tend not to. The only public opinion poll on the issue of which I am
aware showed 70% of those polled opposed to the practice and 21% in favor. D. FOGEL,
". . . WE ARE THE LIVING PROOF. . ." 300 (app. III) (1975). A basic question comes to mind:
Who owns the criminal justice system?
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only after trial.517 Apparently the legal profession has lost sight of
Webster's kind of law, and, for all the pages that I have written
about plea bargaining, the issue in the end may be that simple.
517 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 581 (1819)
(argument of D. Webster for plaintiffs in error, Mar. 10, 1818), reprinted in 5 D. WEBSTER,
THE WORKS OF DANIEL WEBSTER 487-88 (Boston 1851).
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